

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY
OF QUEEN MELISENDE
OF JERUSALEM

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MOST recent histories of the crusades, including my own, devote hardly more than a page to the civil war of 1152 in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem¹ and offer little by way of explanation beyond what is to be found in the chronicle of William of Tyre.² We get the impression from both the chronicle and these histories that this *cause célèbre* erupted rather suddenly because there was discontent among the barons about the arrogance of the constable Manasses of Hierges, who was conducting a major part of the politics of the day. It has been reiterated time and again, on the basis of William's chronicle, that the power of Manasses rested on his having struck an alliance with the clan of the powerful Ibelin family by means of a cleverly arranged marriage. Since the death of King Fulk the kingdom had been ruled by Queen Melisende and the constable, and Melisende acted in the capacity of regent on behalf of her son, Baldwin III, at that time still a minor. The discontented barons are said to have approached the King and to have advised him that, having reached maturity, he should no longer be subject to the command of a woman and should take the government into his own hands. Baldwin heeded this advice, demanding that he be crowned without his mother. In this he was refused and was advised to be crowned along with her, but shortly afterward he realized his wish to be crowned alone. He then exacted from his mother a share of the kingdom, and the realm was divided between them, Jerusalem and Nablus going to Queen Melisende, Acre and Tyre to her son Baldwin III. This arrangement did not prove long-lived. Under the influence of those barons who had persuaded him to revolt, Baldwin advanced with military forces into his mother's part of the kingdom, captured and exiled the constable Manasses, occupied Nablus, and besieged his mother in the citadel of Jerusalem until she agreed to withdraw completely from the government on the condition that she retain Nablus to the end of her days. "Thus," William of Tyre concludes, "they were restored to the good graces of one another; and as the morning star which shines forth in the midst of darkness, tranquillity again returned to the kingdom and the church."³

In the absence of other sources, historians have told William's story many times, but have not reached agreement as to when these events took place

¹ J. L. La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem 1100 to 1291*, Monographs of the Mediaeval Academy of America, 4 (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), 17f.; R. Grousset, *Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem*, 2 (Paris, 1935), 315–20; J. Richard, *Le royaume latin de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1953), 65; S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, II (Cambridge, 1952), 333f.; *A History of the Crusades*, ed. K. M. Setton and M. W. Baldwin, I (Philadelphia, 1955), 534f.; A. Waas, *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge*, II (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1956), 109; H. E. Mayer, *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge*, Urban-Bücher, 86 (Stuttgart, 1965), 111; J. Prawer, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem*, I (Paris, 1969), 401f.

² William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum*, in *Recueil des historiens des croisades. Historiens occidentaux*, I,1 and I,2 (Paris, 1844). Quoted throughout as WT, followed by book and chapter.

³ WT, XVII.14. English trans. E. A. Babcock and A. C. Krey, *A History of Deeds Done beyond the Sea*, II, Records of Civilization, 35, 2 (New York, 1943), 207.

since the chronological sequence of William's report is very confused on this point. Most historians have opted for the year 1152, some have placed them in 1151, and some even as early as 1150.⁴ The same mistakes have been repeated over and over again because they were derived from the pages of William's chronicle, especially if it was not read carefully: the power of Manasses rested on his alliance with the Ibelins; the King demanded to be crowned because he had now attained maturity, being twenty-one years of age; and he was now crowned for the first time. Even Grousset's treatment, more acute than all the others, repeated these errors and canonized them for generations to come. Yet Grousset himself did not do much to explain the background of this dangerous internal strife. When I wrote on the subject in 1965, I had doubts about the suddenness of the outbreak of the civil war as well as about some points of detail, and tried to phrase the story as cautiously as possible, thinking to return to it at some later time. I was able to deal with the coronation aspect in 1967,⁵ but other duties prevented me from conducting a closer investigation until the leisure of a Visiting Scholarship to Dumbarton Oaks in the winter of 1970/71 afforded me the necessary time for this, and also gave me the opportunity to expand my source material.

Historians would, in principle, have been well-advised to take into account the royal charters when they wrote the story of the civil war of 1152 in Jerusalem. But it is doubtful whether they would have derived much practical use from doing so, for, unfortunately, most of the royal charters of those years are dated only by the year, and lack any indication of month and day. In preparing my critical edition of the charters of the Latin kings of Jerusalem—which also advanced a great deal during my stay at Dumbarton Oaks and will eventually be published by the German Historical Institute in Rome—it became clear to me that the chronological sequence of the charters as given in Röhrich's *Regesta regni Hierosolymitani*⁶ must be revised and that only after this revision can they be usefully employed as evidence for the events with which I am here concerned. Our source material, then, is of a twofold nature. First, we have the report in the chronicle of William of Tyre. William was a great historian and his account of the actual civil war must be accepted as basically trustworthy. In general he is reliable, but must be read very carefully and interpreted very exactly. Having been trained not only in theology but also in both canon and civil law, he is normally very precise in stating points of law. Regarding political struggles for power, legal arguments are always employed and are in many cases revealing. This having been said I must, however, make a few reservations about William. For one thing he was very poor at making calculations. He is perfectly hopeless at dating events.

⁴ Richard, *Le royaume latin*, 65, argues for 1150. As for other dates see *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Setton and Baldwin, I, 535 note 6.

⁵ H. E. Mayer, "Das Pontifikale von Tyrus und die Krönung der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 21 (1967), 166ff.

⁶ All royal and other charters from the Holy Land are here quoted as *RRH* plus number, after R. Röhrich, *Regesta regni Hierosolymitani (MXCVII-MCCXCI)* (Innsbruck, 1893); *Additamentum* (Innsbruck, 1904).

Attempts have been made to show that his chronology is better than it is reputed to be,⁷ and while this may well be true, it remains bad enough. The chronicler presents us with dates which are manifestly wrong for the reigns of various kings, misdates important battles and, although he was an archbishop, did not even know that the feast of the Sts. Peter and Paul is the 29th of June, and placed it on the 27th.⁸ It has even been suggested that a chronological framework was superimposed on William's *Historia* at a later date.⁹ This, however, does not concern the historian, who must work with what is available to him; it is up to the editor or the scholar specializing in William of Tyre to inquire further into this matter. What we must retain is the fact that the chronology of William is often seriously wrong. And not only are his dates wrong, but very often his sequence of events is irreconcilable with what we know from other sources or with the simple laws of logic.

In part this chronological uncertainty must be due to the fact that William's chronicle was composed over a period of years (1167–82), with long intervals during which he wrote little or not at all; that in its present form it was pieced together from several historical projects he had begun at various times; and that this patching up was done hastily.¹⁰ To this must be added the further handicap that William was out of the country when the civil war took place. In fact, he was in Europe for twenty consecutive years obtaining his higher education (1145–65)¹¹ and therefore wrote his history a considerable time after the events. He had no written sources at his disposal for these years, and this meant that while it may have been easy to obtain an account of the events themselves by interviewing participants and eyewitnesses, their proper sequence could easily become confused. It is a frequent experience for any of us that even after a few years we sometimes have difficulty in remembering, for instance, whether we went to Spain in 1966 or 1967, and only by distinctly recalling that it was in the year before we went to Italy, which was surely in 1967 because this was the year our grandmother died, can we finally arrive at a safe relative and absolute chronology. If we had to reconstruct events of Australian history of thirty years ago by interviewing Australians and without having access to newspapers as repositories of daily events, I should not be surprised at all if we were to arrive at a wrong relative chronology while actually discovering the most important events—and the more Australians we were to interview, the more confused we would become. This same holds true of the civil war of 1152 in Jerusalem. Surely people would remember in the late seventies or early eighties that around the middle of the century the King had

⁷ The first attempt to wrestle with William's faulty chronology and to show that it was not quite as bad as it seems was made by T. A. Archer, "On the Accession Dates of the Early Kings of Jerusalem," *English Historical Review*, 4 (1889), 89–105.

⁸ WT, XVII.9.

⁹ Archer, *op. cit.*, *passim*; W. B. Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East* (Cambridge, 1907), 361 ff. (Appendix B: William of Tyre's Chronology).

¹⁰ The way in which William's work was composed was best described by A. C. Krey, "William of Tyre. The Making of an Historian in the Middle Ages," *Speculum*, 16 (1941), 149–66.

¹¹ See R. B. C. Huygens, "Guillaume de Tyr étudiant. Un chapitre [XIX, 12] de son 'Histoire' retrouvé," *Latomus. Revue d'études latines*, 21 (1962), 811–29.

revolted against his mother, that at first the kingdom had been partitioned and that finally Baldwin III had gone to war against his mother in Jerusalem and had driven her from power. All this would have remained clear in their memories; but to determine whether these events had taken place before or after the Count of Tripoli was murdered or with which of the innumerable military expeditions they had coincided would have been an entirely different matter.

Lastly, it must be taken into consideration that William was a court historian and, more specifically, the court historian of King Amaury I, brother and successor to Baldwin III, whom I am here discussing. Amaury was responsible for the advancement of William in the hierarchy, furthered his career against the opposition of influential ecclesiastics, entrusted his son to him for his education, and was the patron of William's historiographical enterprises. In his chronicle William may be expected to protect the reputation of the royal house in general, in particular that of Amaury I and of his mother Melisende, who had always relied heavily on the assistance of the Church as a political factor and bought the Church's support by lavish grants, which made her legendary in her own day. That William was a partisan of Melisende against Baldwin III will be clear from what follows. I also propose to show that William tactfully chose not to speak of a break in Amaury's career which was caused by his having sided with his mother against his brother to the very end of the civil war.

This then is our principal source. The other, as I have mentioned above, are the royal charters which, it is hoped, will reveal some of the preludes that must necessarily be connected with a major political event such as this. It can be demonstrated from the charters and from the history of the chancery how the kingdom gradually disintegrated after 1149, and how the rift between Queen Melisende and King Baldwin III grew wider and wider until the clash became inevitable.

In assessing the events which were to lead to the civil war of 1152, we must go back to the year 1128, when King Baldwin II of Jerusalem regulated his succession. His wife Morphia had borne him no sons, only four daughters of which Melisende was the eldest. Of the younger sisters, Alice married the Prince of Antioch and proved to be as domineering and given to politicking as Melisende herself, Hodierna married Count Raymond II of Tripoli, and Iveta took the veil in the convent of St. Anne in Jerusalem and later became abbess of St. Lazarus at Bethany. Melisende, being the eldest daughter, was chosen to succeed to the Crown. Late in 1127 or early in 1128 an embassy was sent to France from the Holy Land to choose a husband for Melisende. The choice fell upon the mighty Count Fulk V of Anjou to whom it was promised, in the name of the King and the magnates, who had unanimously assented, that within fifty days of his arrival in the Holy Land he would be given the hand of the King's eldest daughter *cum spe regni post regis obitum*.¹²

¹² WT, XIII.24. The chronology of these events was established by R. Hiestand, "Chronologisches zur Geschichte des Königreiches Jerusalem um 1130," *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters*, 26 (1970), 220-29.

In other words, he was assured that he would rule not only as prince consort but as king in his own right. And, having come East and been wedded to Melisende shortly before Pentecost 1129, even before the fifty days had elapsed, he did indeed loyally assist Baldwin II in governing the country until the King's death on 21 August 1131.¹³ The charters of Baldwin II reflect in successive stages how the agreement between Baldwin II and Fulk was carried out. In March 1129 Baldwin II issued a charter for the Holy Sepulchre to which his daughter gave her consent: *Milissenda filia regis hoc laudat et consentit*.¹⁴ This indicates that Baldwin II considered her his successor even before the Count of Anjou's arrival, and therefore allowed her some say in public affairs for she is listed before all other ecclesiastical and secular dignitaries. At some time in 1129 the power of her position increased. An undated charter was issued by the King for the abbey of St. Mary Josaphat which cannot in any case be later than the middle of the year 1129.¹⁵ Here we find that the list of witnesses is headed by *Milissenda filia regis et regni Ierosolimitani haeres*. A third undated charter, which must be placed in 1130 or 1131, issued again by Baldwin II for the Holy Sepulchre, mentions that his grant was made *in praesentia comitis Andegauensis atque Milissendis filie mee*.¹⁶ That the *haeres regni* title for Melisende was now dropped while the consent of the Count of Anjou was included, would seem to confirm my opinion that the second charter here under consideration (*RRH*, No. 137a), in which the Count is not mentioned and Melisende is styled *haeres regni*, should be dated before the third one and, in fact, be placed in the early part of 1129, before the wedding of Melisende and Fulk had actually taken place. Otherwise, the charter would have been a manifest violation of an agreement recently concluded with the Count of Anjou and would have been insulting and humiliating for him. At the time *RRH*, No. 137a, was issued, Melisende was still the sole heir to the kingdom. After Fulk married her, he became the only heir to the throne by virtue of the treaty concluded with King Baldwin II. The chancery took due notice of this by dropping the *haeres regni* title for Melisende and by mentioning the Count of Anjou. That the agreement of 1129 was understood in this way is shown by

¹³ WT, XIII.24: *Adstitit autem praedictus comes . . . domino regi tota vita sua fideliter in negotiis regni ingrediens et egrediens, filii devote implens officium*. R. Hiestand, in another article (see *infra*, note 32), even believes that Baldwin II adopted Fulk.

¹⁴ *RRH*, No. 121. Hiestand, "Chronologisches," 223ff., has shown that this charter must be placed in March 1129 (not in 1128, as was formerly believed).

¹⁵ *RRH*, No. 137a. Hiestand, "Chronologisches," 223, and 224 note 27, has established that this charter cannot be later than the summer of 1129 but must be dated after the death of Queen Morphia, which occurred on 1 October 1126 or 1127. While this is perfectly true, I think that this period can be narrowed. *RRH*, No. 137a, was written by the vice-chancellor Hemelinus acting for chancellor Paganus. Hemelinus is mentioned as vice-chancellor for the first time in *RRH*, No. 130, of 1129, but here Paganus had already been made archbishop-elect of Caesarea. Hemelinus was promoted from vice-chancellor to chancellor in 1130 (*RRH*, No. 134). Since Hemelinus is not referred to at all before 1129, we may assume that *RRH*, No. 137a, was issued shortly before *RRH*, No. 130, that is, in the first half of 1129. Had it been issued earlier, we should not expect to see Hemelinus mentioned. In note 86 of the article quoted *infra*, note 32, Hiestand has convincingly argued in favor of placing this charter early in the year 1129.

¹⁶ *RRH*, No. 137. Since this charter was written by chancellor Hemelinus, it must be dated between his promotion to the chancellor's office (1130) and the death of King Baldwin II (21 August 1131). Hiestand, "Chronologisches," 229 note 60, has limited it convincingly to some time between the end of 1130 and 21 August 1131.

RRH, No. 127, a charter granted by the Archbishop of Tyre, in which King Baldwin II and Count Fulk of Anjou are listed as witnesses, while no mention at all is made of Melisende.

However, when King Baldwin II fell seriously ill in August 1131 and had himself carried to the house of the Patriarch so that he might die closer to the Lord's Sepulchre, he slightly altered the agreement he had with Fulk. He summoned his daughter Melisende, his son-in-law Fulk, and his little grandson Baldwin—born of the marriage of Fulk and Melisende and then in his second year¹⁷—to his bedside, and in the presence of the lord Patriarch and the prelates and such nobles as happened to be there *curam regni et plenam eis tradidit potestatem*.¹⁸ The whole event shows how powerful the monarchy was in the days of Baldwin II, for the King unilaterally altered the agreement he had with Fulk to the disadvantage of the latter by now conferring the *cura regni* and the *plena potestas*, that is the kingdom and the government, on three persons: Fulk, Melisende and the little Baldwin, whereas in 1129 Fulk had been promised the succession without any limitations. The settlement of 1129 had been made with the express and unanimous approval of the Church and the barons, as custom demanded. The change, apparently, was Baldwin's exclusive decision. No consent of Church and nobles is mentioned. In fact, it is expressly said that those of the nobility who were present, were there by chance (*qui forte aderant*). They had not been formally summoned, or at least they had not been summoned to approve a new succession order, but may have been called in to attend on the dying King. In any case, William of Tyre makes it quite clear that whoever these nobles were they were not in a position to speak with authority for the entire body of the nobility. If they had been chosen at all, they had been chosen at random and were certainly not empowered to support in the name of their class a step of so far-reaching consequences.

Yet, although no one had apparently been asked to approve the decision of the dying King, this was carried out without opposition after his death. Fulk and Melisende were crowned on 14 September 1131 without an election having taken place. The change in the succession settlement probably did not amount to very much at the time, as far as the magnates were concerned. It certainly did not mean that Baldwin II had divided his kingdom into three well defined portions to be held by his daughter, his son-in-law, and his grandson, respectively. Such a partition in a small kingdom faced by external threats would have been suicidal and would certainly not have been accepted by the nobility. But on his deathbed Baldwin II quite definitely did not assign the government to Fulk only, but gave also a share in it to his daughter Melisende and to his little grandson. In an age when symbolism meant so much, the symbolic meaning of this designation was a weighty one, and one of which the dying King must have been fully aware. Clearly, Baldwin II considered the monarchy to be hereditary, almost a private property of which he could

¹⁷ Baldwin III was born in the first half of 1130, at the latest in August 1130; cf. Hiestand, "Chronologisches," 225f.

¹⁸ WT, XIII.28.

dispose at his discretion, even if it meant violating a previous agreement concerning a problem for which in the past he had felt it necessary to obtain the consent of the magnates. There was probably not much that Fulk could do about it at the moment, since in coming out East he had burned his boats at home. He had turned over his county of Anjou to his son Geoffrey, whom he had married to the Empress Maud before leaving France. It was most unlikely that Geoffrey would be willing to step down again in favor of his father had Fulk, in disappointment, returned from the Holy Land. For, like Fulk, Geoffrey too must have believed that the various settlements of 1128/29 were intended as final. Thus, the last act of Baldwin II must have been a real blow for Fulk, especially after he had so loyally served the King. It undermined his future position in that it meant that he could never be as strong as Baldwin II had been, because he would always have to share the royal dignity and power with his wife and his son. Probably this prospect was not at all displeasing to the nobles and it explains why they did not object to the violation of the agreement of 1129, even though the new arrangement had not received their rightful consent.

Baldwin II, in altering the settlement of 1129, may have intended to ensure that the throne of Jerusalem would remain in his family and not go to the house of Anjou. Fulk had two sons from his first marriage, Geoffrey, who was now count of Anjou and certainly had no interest in Jerusalem, and Elias, who himself had been deceived by his father-in-law, Count Rotrou of Perche. At the time of Elias' wedding, Count Rotrou had undertaken not to marry again, thus ensuring that his entire inheritance would go to his only daughter and her husband. But, failing to keep his promise, he subsequently married an English lady who bore him several children, so that Elias was cheated out of his expectancy. Baldwin may have feared that, had Fulk been invested with unlimited royal power, he might make use of it to provide for Elias in the Latin Kingdom. He may also have thought of Fulk's own father, Count Fulk IV of Anjou. This gentleman changed his wives more frequently than his coat-of-mail and had been married at least four, if not five times. When Baldwin was about to die, the marriage of his daughter Melisende to Fulk V was less than three years old. It is true that Fulk was no longer a young man, but if, after Baldwin's death, Fulk were to imitate his father's habit of discarding wives, Melisende might be deprived of her rights should Fulk become the only ruler according to the agreement of 1129.¹⁹ By assigning a share in

¹⁹ As precedent, there was the case of King Baldwin I, who in 1113 had repudiated his second wife in order to marry the Countess Adelasia of Sicily on the understanding not only that the issue of this marriage was to succeed to the throne of Jerusalem but that, in the event there was no issue, Adelasia's son from her first marriage, Count Roger II of Sicily, should become king of Jerusalem. When it seemed that this latter possibility might come about and the prospect was not to the liking of either Church or nobility, the precedence of Adelasia's claim over all others was so strong that it could not be broken in any other way than by Baldwin I's repudiation of Adelasia. In repudiating his second wife the King had used the pretext that she had been in Muslim captivity and was suspected of having committed adultery during that time; cf. R. Röhrich, *Geschichte des Königreiches Jerusalem* (Innsbruck, 1898), 8 note 6. This is interesting in view of the rumors spread later that Melisende had a lover. The case of Adelasia might have served as precedent for repudiating Melisende.

the kingdom and government to Melisende and to his grandson, the dying King made sure that they would still have a legitimate claim to the Crown, should a marital crisis between Fulk and Melisende occur.

Soon after the beginning of Fulk's reign such a crisis took place and was linked with the first revolts of the nobility known to us in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. William of Tyre²⁰ reports that Count Hugh of Jaffa and Romanus of Puy, lord of Transjordan, conspired against the King. He says that the enmity between the King and the Count arose for unknown reasons, but he also reports the diffused opinion that Queen Melisende had been seeing altogether too much of the Count, who was young and very handsome, and that Fulk was extremely jealous. In recounting this rumor, William also clearly implies that he himself did not believe this to be the true reason for the estrangement between King and Count; otherwise he would not have stated that the true reasons were unknown. The Count was openly accused by his stepson Walter of Caesarea, who presumably had been incited to this, of *lèse majesté* and of having conspired with his companions against the King's life. The Count denied the charge, although even those who did not believe the gossip of his love affair with Melisende admitted that he had refused to obey the King's commands and was not willing to behave as his subject like the other magnates (*domino regi nolebat more aliorum regni principum subici et eius detrectabat cerviciose nimis imperiis oboedire*). When the Count denied the accusation he was challenged to judicial battle but defaulted by not appearing on the appointed day and was thereupon pronounced guilty. Under the *Etablissement du roi Baudouin*, conviction for *lèse majesté* involved confiscation of the fief, and this was probably what the King had been driving at. Threatened by such a severe penalty Count Hugh resorted to a desperate measure by calling in the Egyptians from Ascalon. By this rash act he thoroughly estranged himself from public opinion and, worse still, from the loyalty of his vassals, especially that of his constable Barisan. His vassals left their fiefs in the county of Jaffa and switched over to the King's side. This shows that, until the time when he allied himself with the Egyptians, Count Hugh could depend on the support of his vassals against the King, so that there must have been considerable opposition to Fulk by some of the nobility—it was not just a case of rebellion of single individuals. The King laid siege to Jaffa, but at this point the Patriarch of Jerusalem intervened, and finally it was decided that the Count, together with those of his followers who still sided with him, should be exiled for three years and in the meantime his crown fiefs should be held by the King in order to pay the Count's debts—which is William's way of saying that the King was to enjoy the revenues of the fiefs for three years, after which they would be restored to the Count. While the Count was waiting in Jerusalem for convenient passage to Europe, he was stabbed by a knight of Brittany one night when he was playing dice in the street of the furriers. He did not die from his wounds and was allowed to remain in the kingdom until the wounds had healed, then he betook himself to Apulia where he

²⁰ WT, XIV.15-18.

met with a premature death. He never returned to the kingdom, and the county of Jaffa permanently reverted to the Crown. The stabbing of Count Hugh created a colossal uproar in the city and everyone immediately accused the King of having arranged the attempted assassination, by which he would, of course, have circumvented the verdict of exile and reached his true goal of acquiring for the Crown the county of Jaffa.^{20a} Feeling for the Count ran high in Jerusalem, as it usually does for the victim of an injustice. The knight was put on trial and condemned to mutilation. Although he did not confess to having committed this foul deed at the King's request, he did admit that he had hoped thereby to gain the favor of the King. In spite of William's statement that this saved the King's reputation, it was still very damaging for him. The knight's admission cleared Fulk legally of any responsibility, but revealed that, in the mind of the assassin at least, the King had a motive. The Queen was outraged by all this. All those who had sided with the King against the Count thought it safer not to appear in her presence and, indeed, to avoid public gatherings altogether. More than against all the others, the Queen's wrath was directed against Rohard the Elder, who she thought had more than anyone influenced the King in this affair. Rohard was a man of great standing in the city of Jerusalem and I shall speak of him again. King Fulk himself found that he was not safe when partisans of the Queen were present; consequently the court was very much disrupted. At long last, things between the King and the Queen were patched up through the mediation of third parties, and the King, by persistent efforts, obtained the Queen's pardon for Rohard and the other nobles so that they could at least appear again at court. William concludes his report on this revolt with the statement that from this

^{20a} Fulk acquired both the county of Jaffa and, illegally, the possessions of Hugh's wife, especially Jericho, a rich prize indeed. The bishopric of Jericho had been united with the patriarchate of Jerusalem (Jaffé-Loewenfeld, No. 11379; E. de Rozière, *Cartulaire de l'église du Saint-Sépulcre de Jérusalem* [Paris, 1849], 319, No. 180). WT, XI.15, reports that Patriarch Arnulf gave to his niece Emma *ecclesiastici patrimonii optimas portiones*, i.e., Jericho and its dependent possessions, as a dowry when she married Eustace Granier, the first lord of Sidon and Caesarea. It is just possible that this explained the stipulation in the patriarch's oath of office that he strictly refrain from reducing the property of the *mensa patriarchalis* (Rozière, *Cartulaire du Saint-Sépulcre*, 274, No. 152). We do find Jericho and vicinity in the possession of Eustace Granier and his wife Emma in 1116, when they disposed, through Viscount Arnulf of Jericho, of land and water rights which had once been owned by the inhabitants of St. Quarantena on Ġabal ẖarantal immediately west of Jericho. After the death of Eustace, the same lands and water rights were in the possession of his widow Emma and her second husband "Prince" Hugh of Jaffa, and were still administered by Viscount Arnulf of Jericho (RRH, Nos. 82 and 104; Rozière, *Cartulaire du Saint-Sépulcre*, 222, No. 119). If Emma's possessions were confiscated along with those of Hugh, this would easily explain why Queen Melisende could dispose of Jericho in favor of the nunnery of St. Lazarus at Bethany, which she founded in the late forties or early fifties (WT, XV.26). It would seem to confirm my dating of Hugh's downfall in 1134 (*infra*, p. 104f.) that the Holy Sepulchre tried to strengthen their hold in this region, which had once belonged in its entirety to them, precisely at the time when Hugh's fall offered them a chance. In 1134 the Patriarch donated Quarantena to the canons of the Holy Sepulchre and at the same time elevated it to the rank of a dependent priory (RRH, No. 152; Rozière, *Cartulaire du Saint-Sépulcre*, 50, No. 27). From the role played by the Patriarch in Emma's two charters concerning Quarantena it may be deduced that the Holy Sepulchre had retained the church at Quarantena when they lost Jericho. In 1136 the Patriarch gave the new priory (where he consecrated a new altar, which presumably means that a new church had been erected) the ecclesiastical tithes of Jericho (RRH, No. 167; Rozière, *Cartulaire du Saint-Sépulcre*, 52, No. 28). These donations must be understood as an attempt on the part of the Holy Sepulchre to establish more firmly their hold on Quarantena, perhaps with a view to recovering Jericho some day. As it turned out, Jericho went to Bethany.

day on King Fulk became very uxorious and did not act without Melisende's knowledge even in small matters.

It is extremely difficult to date this revolt. William of Tyre links it chronologically with the capture of Banyas, which can be dated from Ibn al-Qalānisi²¹ as having taken place in December 1132; to this, two other statements by the same author may be added: first, that the kingdom of the Franks was thrown into trouble and disorder after the death of King Baldwin II because the actions of the Count of Anjou revealed faulty judgment; and second, that in November 1132 news was received in Damascus of the breaking out of serious discord among the Franks, which was said to be unusual with them.²² Surely Fulk did not lack the knowledge of how to reduce unruly vassals to obedience. In Anjou he had coped with the Sablé and the Amboise, had taken the rebellious castles Doué and Ile-Bouchard in 1109, Brissac in 1112, Montbazou in 1118, and Montreuil-Bellay in 1124. It is more likely, that in referring to the troubles in the Latin kingdom, Ibn al-Qalānisi was thinking of the revolt of Count Pons of Tripoli who tried to throw off the yoke of Jerusalem's suzerainty immediately after Fulk had ascended to the throne, but was quickly brought to reason by Fulk in the battle of Chastel Rouge in 1132. From the very beginning of his reign the King was almost continuously engaged in the affairs of Antioch, Edessa, and Tripoli, at least until 1133. During this period only once we hear of him as having been in his kingdom for some length of time in 1133,²³ and he certainly was in Antioch when he issued his two charters *RRH*, Nos. 149 and 157, of 1134 and 1135. This might just leave time for the revolt to have taken place in 1132, after the King had defeated the Count of Tripoli in the battle of Chastel Rouge, were it not for the fact that William of Tyre expressly says that after his victory the King was successfully petitioned by the people of Antioch to remain in Syria and administer the country. Yet other chronological difficulties speak against the date of 1132. Hugh of Jaffa appears last among the witnesses to a charter of Princess Alice of Antioch, issued in her palace at Laodicea in July 1134 (*RRH*, No. 151a). This is not, at first sight, surprising because, since he had to go into exile, it would have been only natural for Hugh to go to Alice, who was a sister of Queen Melisende and had been fighting against both her father King Baldwin II, and her brother-in-law King Fulk. However, we must recall that at the time Alice was not ruling Antioch but was in Laodicea, her dowry, while the principality was being administered by King Fulk as regent; there he granted a charter to the Holy Sepulchre before 1 September 1134.²⁴ Thus, as long as Fulk was at Antioch it would not have been advisable for Hugh to go there,

²¹ R. Le Tourneau, *Damas de 1075 à 1154. Traduction annotée d'un fragment de l'Histoire de Damas d'Ibn al-Qalānisi* (Damascus, 1952), 237.

²² *Ibid.*, 197, 202.

²³ *WT*, XIV.6.

²⁴ *RRH*, No. 149. This charter is dated in the chartulary A of the Holy Sepulchre *a. inc. 1133, indictione 12, epacta 24*, which is surely incorrect, for neither does the indiction agree with the year of the Incarnation nor could there ever have been an epact 24. The more reliable chartulary B shows *a. inc. 1134, indictione 12, epacta 23*, which is in perfect order. We therefore must place *RRH*, No. 149, in 1134, not in 1133 as has been done.

had the revolt already occurred. Moreover, we find Hugh granting a charter to the Knights Hospitallers in 1133, in which he not only styles himself *dominus Ioppensis*, but is still surrounded by an impressive entourage of vassals, a seneschal, a marshal, a chancellor, and is still attended by his constable Barisan, who we know sided with the King along with others of the Count's vassals during the revolt.²⁵ It is thus unlikely that the revolt occurred before late 1134, since in 1133 Hugh was still in full control of Jaffa and in 1134 he was at the palace of Alice, possibly conspiring with her against the King, but certainly not having yet openly revolted.

A last chronological difficulty is presented by William of Tyre connecting the revolt of the Count of Jaffa with that of Romanus of Puy, whom he calls lord of Transjordan. He does not exactly say what the role of Romanus was, but historians have generally separated the two revolts and referred that of Romanus to the later years of Baldwin II since, as a result of this rebellion, the fief of Transjordan was taken away from Romanus and his son Ralph and given to the King's butler Paganus.²⁶ Paganus of Montroyal (the principal fortress in Transjordan) appears already in 1126 and 1132 in two charters.²⁷ If this Paganus is the lord of Transjordan, then Romanus had been dispossessed as early as 1126. The confiscation of his fief, if it had indeed occurred so early, had not meant exile for Romanus, for in 1129 he is found witnessing a charter of King Baldwin II in which the King granted to the Holy Sepulchre a village in the territory of Nablus, with the exception of certain villagers which Romanus of Puy had earlier transferred to another village in the same region.²⁸ So he had now been given lands from the royal domain in Samaria. Being an interested party, he was asked to witness this charter as a matter of routine. In 1133 (*RRH*, No. 147) he is definitely found in the camp of the Count of Jaffa, signing the last charter issued by the latter in this capacity. The revolt of Romanus of Puy has been linked with the promulgation of the *Etablissement du roi Baudoin*, and it has been surmised that the clauses providing for the confiscation of the fief in case the vassal infringed on the royal prerogative of building ports or made roads into the territory of the Saracens, were specially formulated for dealing with Romanus'

²⁵ *RRH*, No. 147.

²⁶ *WT*, XV.21.

²⁷ *RRH*, Nos. 115 and 142. One must seriously reconsider whether this Paganus of Montroyal is one and the same as the former royal butler and subsequent lord of Transjordan. Not only does the butler Paganus sign his name in the witness list of *RRH*, No. 164, of 1136, still as *Paganus pincerna* without mentioning that he is lord of Transjordan (which undoubtedly he was), but, what is more important, both *RRH*, No. 115 and No. 142, are charters issued by the Prince of Galilee in which the entourage of the Prince, his vassals in other words, must be expected to predominate; and, indeed, in *RRH*, No. 142, in spite of his name, Paganus of Montroyal is listed among those *de Tiberiade et confinio* and among a number of people who can be identified as coming from Tiberias or the area west of the Sea of Galilee. It is just possible that this Paganus was only a vassal of the Prince of Galilee who for some obscure reason had come from Montroyal to Galilee and had kept the name derived from the fortress which King Baldwin I had built in 1115. In this case there would no longer be any problem in linking the revolt of Romanus of Puy with that of Hugh of Jaffa. While the possibility that the two Pagani were different persons should not be dismissed, in this article I shall assume that the Paganus of Montroyal of *RRH*, Nos. 115 and 142, is identical with the royal butler and lord of Transjordan.

²⁸ *RRH*, No. 121. For the date, see *supra*, note 14.

revolt,²⁹ although we have no evidence that he ever did either of these things. He was in a position to do so, but so were other lords. I should like to suggest that actually Romanus revolted twice, once in the late years of Baldwin II, when he was dispossessed of Transjordan (if the Paganus of Montroyal appearing in the documents of 1126 and 1132 is really identical with the King's butler and lord of Transjordan), and the second time together with Hugh of Jaffa in whose entourage he is found in 1133. The fact that a dispossessed lord had strong reasons to oppose the monarchy has never so far been considered a possible factor in this revolt, although the discontent of men out of favor has certainly always been a strong incentive to rebellion.

Apart from the significance all this may have in itself in relation to the history of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, I have dealt at such length with these early revolts of the nobility against King Fulk because they must have been prompted by motives far deeper than just jealousy on the part of the King. If Hugh of Jaffa was able to build up a considerable party against the King, he must have had some arguments in his favor. That does not mean that one must discard the jealousy story altogether, especially since it would have given Fulk a convenient pretext had he wanted to rid himself of Melisende. Certainly the events were so dramatic that people would remember these juicy stories for a long time, and William probably felt that he could not afford to suppress them, although he himself did not believe in them. These rumors must have been widespread at the time, or else William would probably have tried to hush them up. If one wishes to penetrate to the true reasons, which, according to William, were unknown, one must start from his statement that, when all was over, the King became so uxorious that he would not act without the knowledge of his Queen even in matters of little or no consequence. This can only be interpreted to mean that, earlier, Fulk had acted without the Queen's knowledge. Further, the Queen's wrath over the affair was quite disproportionate—not only could the King's partisans no longer be introduced to her presence but the King even feared for his own life. Indeed, what William of Tyre cautiously describes as *nec domino regi inter fautores et consanguineos reginae tutus omnino erat locus* is interpreted by his French

²⁹ Richard, *Le royaume latin*, 69. Cf. also J. Prawer, "La noblesse et le régime féodal du royaume latin de Jérusalem," *Le Moyen Age*, 65 (= 4th Ser., 14 [1959]) 51 note 31, who takes the same view as Richard, namely that there were two separate revolts, one of Hugh of Jaffa and one of Romanus of Puy, without, however, trying to date them more precisely. Richard had proposed that the *Etablissement* had been made basically to deal with Romanus' revolt, which he dated tentatively in 1128, and that other measures which provided for the confiscation of the fief in case of armed revolt with Saracen assistance against the King were promulgated at the time of the revolt of Count Hugh of Jaffa and were a later addition to the *Etablissement* issued by King Baldwin II. In a more recent article, J. Prawer "Etude sur le droit des Assises de Jérusalem. Droit de confiscation et droit d'exhérédation," *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, 4th Ser., 40 (1962), 41f., suggested that it was not Baldwin II, but Baldwin III who promulgated the *Etablissement*. This would make it unnecessary to assume later additions to the *Etablissement*. Similarly, one need not separate one from the other the revolts of Hugh of Jaffa and of Romanus of Puy. Two alternatives would eliminate the need to refute the statement of William of Tyre that Hugh and Romanus conspired together: 1. Paganus the butler had not become lord of Transjordan as early as either 1126 or 1132 (see *supra*, note 27), in which case there would have been only one revolt, of Romanus together with Hugh; 2. Paganus was lord of Transjordan already in 1126, in which case there would have been *two* revolts of Romanus, as I suggest in the text.

translator of the thirteenth century far more explicitly: *Li rois meismes fu aucune foiz en tel point qu'il se dota moult qu'il ne fust en perill de son cors*. Fulk was probably well advised to remain in Antioch in August 1135 (*RRH*, No. 157). While William of Tyre does not say how long the Queen persisted in her anger, the French translator—whose importance is greater than is generally realized because he interpreted William's story with an almost contemporary mind—informs us that it lasted until after the death of the Count of Jaffa in Apulia, *porce que li quens estoit morz hors de son païs por li*.³⁰ In other words, the wrath of the Queen lasted for quite a while and is described as having known no bounds. Such a reaction would have been quite monstrous had it been based on nothing else than the rumor of a secret love affair between the Queen and the Count. In reality, the Count probably had never been the Queen's lover, simply because affairs of this kind presented exceeding difficulties. Mediaeval queens were constantly attended by members of the household and the court; they were hardly in a position to go about having secret rendezvous.

Could the fact that the Queen was enraged because the Count had died for her far from home perhaps be interpreted in a different way? Since William of Tyre leaves us in the dark one is entitled to advance a hypothesis, as long as it is not totally improbable. I should like to suggest that King Fulk, having been cheated out of the agreement of 1129 concerning the succession to the throne by the amendment made by Baldwin II on his deathbed, may have tried to overrule Baldwin's will, and brush aside Melisende and rule without her. This would have been not at all incompatible with his character, for he came to the Holy Land with the reputation of having ruled sternly in his French territories, of having turned them into the most centralized fief of the Capetian kingdom, and of having suffered no one to interfere with his government. It is more than likely that he should have tried to do the same in Jerusalem, especially after he had been tricked at his father-in-law's deathbed. Such a policy would have split the nobles into two opposing camps; one contending with the King that, under the agreement of 1129 which earlier had been approved with the unanimous consent of Church and magnates, the rule belonged to Fulk and to him only; the other advancing Melisende's claim to a share in the government by virtue of her father's designation in 1131. If such positions were indeed taken, Fulk's claim would have been the stronger one, from a legal point of view, because the agreement of 1129 had been approved by the nobles while the alteration made in 1131 had not. On the other hand, to uphold Fulk's claim meant to establish a rule as strong and single-handed as that of Baldwin II had been. While the majority of the nobles apparently sided with Fulk and the law in this matter, a number of them supported the Queen. Of her party, Hugh must necessarily have been the leader. He was related to the Queen, their fathers having been cousins-german, i.e., sons of

³⁰ The French translation is cited here by page rather than by book and chapter, and under its more usual name *L'Estoire de Eracles et la conquete de la terre d'outremer*. It is printed below the Latin text in the edition of William's chronicle as given in note 2. *L'Estoire de Eracles*, 633.

two sisters; he was one of the highest ranking lords of the kingdom, destined to play a leading role in whatever he did, and finally, both his father and he himself owed their appointments as counts of Jaffa to the favor of Melisende's father, Baldwin II. For reasons of clannishness and loyalty the Count of Jaffa must have tried to uphold the will of Baldwin II. The very deep split in the kingdom would be more credibly explained by the supposition that constitutional principles of this importance were at stake than by court gossip which, in all likelihood, had no foundation. The refusal of the Count Hugh of Jaffa both to obey the King's command and to be his subject, as William of Tyre says (see *supra*, p. 102), even before being accused of high treason, was a case of felony for which Hugh must have had some legal excuse, and a good excuse could have been his assertion that the King was ruling unconstitutionally, having disregarded the will of Baldwin II. All evidence seems to show that Hugh's party was far from small and did by no means consist only of the dispossessed like Romanus of Puy. This too must mean that there was some justification in Hugh's cause. The cause he fought for was not really lost until he called in the archenemy, the Egyptians of Ascalon, at which point even his own vassals felt constrained to abandon his camp. From then on he was doomed; yet the sentence eventually pronounced on him was extremely mild, certainly milder than the original one, when he had been judged in default. Since the charge had then been high treason and conspiracy to take the King's life, the penalty could only have been the confiscation of his crown fief. Indeed, only a harsh verdict such as this would explain Hugh's desperate move of calling in the Ascalonites. Eventually, however, the verdict was much more moderate: exile for three years, with subsequent restitution of his fief. This was due to the mediation of the Church, represented by the lord Patriarch of Jerusalem, and certain nobles. For the first time we see the Church openly come out in support of the Queen—for, whatever the reason of Hugh's revolt had been, it was certainly closely linked with the person of the Queen. In effecting a compromise in difficult negotiations the mediators were mindful, in the words of the chronicler,³¹ of Matthew 12:25: *Omne regnum in seipsum divisum desolabitur*, that is to say, the internal rift was so grave that they felt that the safety of the kingdom was threatened.^{31a}

³¹ WT, XIV.17.

^{31a} We should, perhaps, also take into account the title of Hugh of Jaffa. He is generally known as count of Jaffa, although the title more commonly used for him is *dominus Ioppensis*, which probably was his only rightful one. Aside from that, we occasionally find *comes Ioppensis* in 1123 and 1127 (*RRH*, Nos. 102a and 120, in charters issued by himself and his constable Barisan le Vieux). Whether he was a self-styled count or had been formally appointed, we do not know. The former is more likely because the kings of Jerusalem in their charters never called him anything but *dominus Ioppensis*, while he himself did so only once, in 1133 (*RRH*, No. 147). Some left the matter open: the Archbishop of Tyre in 1129 called him only *Hugo Ioppensis*, as did Alice of Antioch in 1134 (*RRH*, Nos. 127 and 151a). Besides calling himself count, he occasionally also styled himself *princeps Ioppe* (*RRH*, Nos. 104, 113, and 114, of 1124 and 1126). In 1122 his constable Barisan even called him *consul Ioppensis*. For this title there was a precedent among the counts of Anjou, who called themselves *consul Andegavorum*, implying by this that they were truly great counts and claimed factual independence from the Capetian king. Weighing these various titles—*consul*, *comes*, *princeps*—against the official one, *dominus*, one must seriously consider the possibility that Hugh aspired to an independent or semi-independent position. Since no other count existed in the Latin Kingdom, the title must inevitably

Having acted with such folly Count Hugh could not be saved. This, however, does not mean that his original cause was generally felt to be unjust. When the King was about to capture Jaffa and the Count was deserted by his own vassals, the Church and some of the high nobility came out strongly in favor of the Count to save him from an almost certain death penalty and his fief from complete wreckage. Fulk must have realized that even with the Count's removal the problem was not solved. He cannot have been unaware that public opinion was running high against him, as evidenced by the general anger when the Count was stabbed. The Queen could afford to be highly incensed for a considerable length of time and make the King fear for his own life. All this shows that Fulk felt it advisable to deal leniently with the Count—he preserved his own dignity by exiling him, but otherwise he eliminated the problem, whatever this may have been, by renouncing his original intentions. That these were detrimental to Melisende's interest is shown by her disproportionate wrath over the affair and by her rather prolonged grief over the death the Count eventually met on her behalf (*por li*). The key to the matter is, of course, William's statement that from then on the King became unusually uxorious and would no longer take any action without the consent of his wife. He certainly did not ask her consent when he did not have to. It is not found in either of the two charters issued in his capacity as regent of Antioch (*RRH*, Nos. 149 and 157, of 1134 and 1135), because in Antioch his

have evoked a comparison with the independent counts of Tripoli and Edessa. There was certainly no other *consul* in the kingdom, and in France the meaning of the title was probably not unknown. There was another prince, that of Galilee, who was a vassal of the king. But this principality had been created in 1099/1100 by the mighty figure of Tancred, who most likely had no intention of submitting for long to Godfrey of Bouillon and his successor, but went to Antioch before matters could come to a head in the Latin Kingdom. In any case, this precedent could not be eliminated later on, but remained a case which went back to the days when the state was founded, although the subordination of the prince of Galilee to the king of Jerusalem was never seriously questioned after Tancred's emigration. Aside from the prince of Galilee, however, there was also the independent prince of Antioch. If the titles of Hugh of Jaffa are an indication that he aspired to a more or less independent position in the southwest of the Latin Kingdom, it becomes quite clear why King Fulk had to solve the problem of Hugh in one way or another. Under no circumstances could the King tolerate the creation of yet another independent crusader state in the Latin East at the expense of his kingdom. Such a theory would provide a further reason for Hugh's revolt. His attempt to uphold the will of Baldwin II, in which, according to my interpretation, a genuine constitutional problem was at stake—combined with the efforts of the nobility in the interest of their class to prevent the sole rule of Fulk (with the ever-present possibility of a change in dynasty looming on the horizon)—may very well also have been inspired by personal political ambition on the part of Hugh for a greater degree of independence. He may have held the hope that he would rise to such a position more easily with Queen Melisende than with King Fulk, whose past spoke against his approving any such plan. Indeed, Hugh's championing of Melisende's political interests may have been part of a political deal he had with the Queen, in which he would support her claims to a share in the kingship while she would support his position in Jaffa. We must, in any case, disregard the feudal map of 1151–1291, during which time a county of Jaffa existed as a matter of course. The creation of this important crown fief was apparently a long and involved process, and for the early decades of the twelfth century its existence cannot be taken for granted. One cannot altogether discard the possibility that, had Hugh's plan been successful, Fulk's role would have been reduced to that of the unimportant consort of the Queen, with Melisende and Hugh holding the real power in the kingdom. Such a plan would not have been inconsistent with Melisende's thirst for power, but it would have gravely underestimated the political insight and potential of Fulk. In any case, even if these considerations reflect only potential political possibilities rather than real events, they do indicate that Hugh's revolt was an extremely serious political crisis of far-reaching consequences; much more significant than has so far been realized.

powers rested exclusively on the decision of the magnates of the principality, and even under the will of Baldwin II Melisende could not claim any part in the affairs of Antioch. But in all his other charters which relate to the Kingdom of Jerusalem he mentions Melisende's consent. The fact that *RRH*, No. 205, a charter issued in 1141 by the patriarch of Jerusalem, has only Fulk's consent, is unimportant, since both Fulk's and Melisende's consent appear in *RRH*, No. 201, another charter issued by the patriarch in 1141 and concerning the same transaction. In all likelihood both *RRH*, No. 205, and *RRH*, No. 201, were issued on the same occasion and it was only by accident that Melisende's consent was omitted in the former.

In view of all these facts I should like to sum up my suggestions as follows: After his coronation Fulk tried to remove Melisende from power; in doing so he ran into the opposition not only of his wife but also of part of the nobility led by Count Hugh of Jaffa; the King, perhaps, tried to bring matters to a head by having rumors spread of a love affair between Count Hugh and Queen Melisende; such rumors were not only intended to get rid of Hugh but might also have served as a convenient pretext for repudiating Melisende and locking her up in a convent, as King Baldwin I had done before—which would have been the easiest way of circumventing Baldwin II's will; certainly Hugh and Melisende must have feared the consequences of these rumors; the King intentionally drove Hugh into open revolt after the middle of 1134; he managed to get rid of him for the time being, but had now to abandon all attempts to remove Melisende from power, especially after the attempted assassination of Count Hugh had morally impaired his position, which was already weakened by the continuing opposition on the part of the Church and some quarters of the nobility which had forced on him the mild verdict on Count Hugh; only such high stakes explain the violent reaction of the Queen; and, finally, all this may also explain why the Queen, in later life, clung to power so desperately.

Among all the charters of Fulk, one stands out as unique, which has recently been published for the first time by Rudolf Hiestand.³² The document concerns a grant to the royal hospital of Nablus in which Fulk speaks of his father-in-law as *bonae memoriae rex Balduinus, qui me Ierosolimitani regni fecit heredem*. Clearly Fulk alludes here to the agreement of 1129. I am convinced that this undated charter, which has come down to us only in an eighteenth-century excerpt and which puts great emphasis on Fulk's hereditary rights to the throne, should be attributed to the early part of Fulk's reign, when it would have been necessary to stress such claims. From a confirmation of Fulk's charter, issued by King Baldwin III in 1156 (*RRH*, No. 321), it is evident that the previous diploma had been made *Melisende venerabili regina volente*. No mention, however, is made in the confirmation that Baldwin III too had in his youth given his consent to his father's grant, and, indeed, had he done so, there would have been no need of his reconfirmation in 1156. More likely, it was the fact that, although having a share in the government under the

³² R. Hiestand, "Zwei unbekannte Diplome der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem aus Lucca," *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, 50 (1970), 1–57.

will of Baldwin II, he had been excluded from Fulk's diploma for Nablus that led to the reconfirmation. Since from 1138 on the consent of Baldwin III is invariably included in Fulk's charters, I must conclude that the one for Nablus should be placed in the years 1131–1138. This persuades me that I am justified in thinking that the great internal problem of the early years of Fulk's reign consisted in who should really be *haeres regni*. This title seemed to imply sole rulership, since it had been applied by Baldwin II's chancery to Melisende before she married Fulk (see *supra*, p. 99). It was used later on in Melisende's favor as expediency demanded. William of Tyre, clearly an admirer of Melisende, emphasized her hereditary claim whenever it might have been or actually was challenged. In relating the death of King Fulk in 1143, he said: *reseditque regni potestas penes dominam Milisendem deo amabilem reginam*,³³ thus stressing the fact that Melisende, who now was ruling alone, did so not only as guardian of King Baldwin III, a position which legally she would have to relinquish two years later, but also by virtue of her own rights under the will of her father. And when he wrote about Baldwin's III clash with his mother in 1152 over the problem of who should really rule the kingdom, he again said that after the death of her husband Melisende *regni tanquam iure hereditario sibi debiti curam et administrationem sortita est*.³⁴

My explanation of the revolt of Count Hugh of Jaffa is as good as any which has been given so far. But even if it were not correct, the will made by Baldwin II on his deathbed, by which he altered the agreement he had concluded in 1129 with Fulk of Anjou, is of capital importance in the history of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, and its vital meaning has only recently begun to be realized.³⁵ It is my belief that this will is at the root of Count Hugh's revolt

³³ WT, XV.27.

³⁴ WT, XVII.13.

³⁵ Mayer, "Das Pontifikale von Tyrus," 167; Hiestand, "Zwei unbekannte Diplome," 1–57. Although I read the first typescript draft of Dr. Hiestand's article and also had a copy of his text of Fulk's charter, unfortunately I could not postpone the writing of the present study until publication of Dr. Hiestand's paper. I wish to thank him here for having made available to me his page proof, which reached me shortly after I had finished the final version of my own study. I should like to emphasize here some points in which Dr. Hiestand's opinions differ from mine. Quite correctly he recognized (p. 31) that Baldwin II's main purpose was to prevent at all cost that the throne of Jerusalem might go to Fulk's children from his first marriage or from, possibly, a third. The throne was eventually to go to the children from the marriage of Fulk and Melisende; not, under any circumstances, to a foreign ruler—foreign in the sense of having an agnate claim through the person of Fulk (which would have thrown open the succession to the children of any of Fulk's marriages). This would have canceled the cognate principle established for the first time in Jerusalem in 1127 by Baldwin II and his nobles, before they sent the embassy to France to choose a husband for Melisende and, thereby, a new king. It is a great achievement of Hiestand's paper to have pointed out the establishment in that year of the cognate principle in the Jerusalem laws of succession. That the decision of 1127 was really meant to be basic and a matter of principle, as Hiestand seems to think, is quite possible though not a certainty. Since Baldwin II had no sons and there was no other relative who could have succeeded him under the agnate principle followed before, the decision in favor of cognate succession was an absolute necessity; the only alternative being to relinquish any idea of hereditary succession and resort to free election by the clergy and nobility. But surely the decisions of 1127 became an inviolable precedent in the course of time. This would be all the more true, if I am correct in interpreting the revolt of Hugh of Jaffa as centering around this problem, for, if Fulk attempted to rule alone after 1131, he would certainly have been opposed to the cognate principle. But it must not be overlooked that, before 1127, precedents for the agnate principle had occurred—in the succession of Baldwin I to Godfrey of Bouillon, in that (which very nearly took place) of Eustace of Bouillon to Baldwin I, and even in that of Baldwin II to Baldwin I. It must not be overlooked either that Fulk had partisans among the nobility before, during, and after Hugh's revolt. This

but, while this may be a matter of opinion, undoubtedly up to 1152 it dominated all considerations as to who should rule the kingdom. Under its terms the kingdom had been given to Fulk, his wife Melisende, and their son Baldwin. Constitutionally speaking, this amounted to a case of *Samtherrschaft* in which the kingdom remained undivided but was administered in joint rulership.

points to the possibility that the cognate principle, certainly championed by Hugh of Jaffa, was not universally accepted by the nobles and that therefore the decision of 1127 was not altogether a matter of principle, as Hiestand suggests, although it must be stressed again that eventually it became the basis for a legal principle and that Hiestand's determining this is of great importance. The way in which Fulk's position was limited in order to prevent him from providing for children born of any other marriage of his, has been extremely well and succinctly formulated by Hiestand. Where we differ, however, is in our estimate as to when these limitations were imposed upon him. Hiestand is of the opinion that Fulk's position was limited as early as 1128, when he concluded his treaty with the Jerusalem embassy and agreed to marry Melisende and become king of Jerusalem after her father's death. It is only fair to point out that Hiestand could have adduced in favor of this theory the argument that Fulk had no option, for he could not become king of Jerusalem unless he agreed to the limitations imposed upon him. My answer to this would be that, had this been the case, he would have done better to remain at home and continue as count of Anjou, where he, and he alone, after many years of effort, was lord and master. I presume that in 1128 Fulk could not be told about Baldwin II's ultimate intention to limit his position, for, unless he was prepared to sacrifice political power for the glory of only a crown, he would not have been a candidate for the throne, and Fulk does not seem to have been a vain man. The way in which he arranged for the marriage and betrothal of his children shows that he always aimed high; why, then, would he have settled for less himself? While Hiestand interprets the designation made in 1131 only as a confirmation of the 1128 arrangement, I interpret it as a drastic revision of the treaty of 1128, to the disadvantage of Fulk. While neither Hiestand nor I can absolutely prove at which of the two stages of development Fulk's position was actually limited, we can probably agree that on Baldwin II's death Fulk might at least have contended that his understanding of the 1128 agreement had been totally different—namely, that he alone would be king. His contention would have carried more weight if Baldwin II, as Hiestand suggests (p. 29f.), had indeed adopted him when he married Melisende in 1129. He would then have had all the rights of an actual son and his claim to succession would thus have overridden that of Melisende. Had Fulk been adopted, his legal position could not have been limited at all unless, again, one assumes, contrary to Hiestand, that his rights as an adopted son were brushed aside by the designation of 1131, for certainly, legally, adoption counted for more than a designation, which, after all, was only a recommendation, if a very strong one. Also the theory of Fulk's adoption, for which Hiestand can, indeed, adduce the passage from William of Tyre, quoted *supra* in note 13, creates another difficulty. Agnate kinship did not mean only the relationship of males through other males; it comprised all males who would have been under the same *patria potestas*, had their common ancestor been still alive. Under Roman law agnate kinship was established not only by ties of blood but also by legal transaction, specifically by adoption. In adopting Fulk, Baldwin II would have made possible for his son-in-law the building of a strong case for agnate succession, the last thing he, in fact, wanted—in this I most emphatically concur with Hiestand's judgment. On yet another point there is a slight divergence of opinion between Hiestand and myself. Hiestand (p. 30 and p. 31 note 102a) correctly points out that only the Latin text of William of Tyre says that three persons were designated for the succession or, in a narrower interpretation, that three persons were present and more than one of them, two at least, were designated; whereas the French translator specifically states that only Fulk and Melisende were designated, and that Baldwin III was only present. On the other hand, I continue to believe that Baldwin III was formally designated for the succession along with his parents, in spite of the French translator whose interpretation, in fact, came to my notice only through Hiestand's article. I still think that three arguments point to a formal designation of Baldwin III: 1. If, as Hiestand and I agree, Baldwin II wished to block all possible attempts by Fulk to establish at any time any successor to the throne other than himself, Melisende, or a child of this marriage (and of this marriage only), the formal designation of the young Baldwin III was a political necessity, since it predetermined the succession in favor of the dynasty of Baldwin II even after the death of both Fulk and Melisende. Omitting the designation of Baldwin III would have been a serious blunder on the part of the dying King; 2. In 1152 Baldwin demanded a part not of his father's heritage, but of his grandfather's to which he must, therefore, have had some claim (*cf.* p. 166); 3. In Fulk's charters there is the consent of Baldwin III. Hiestand emphasizes the fact that this consent does not appear until 1138, which, in his opinion, does not speak in favor of a designation in 1131. But, then, why does it appear in 1138? Hiestand (p. 28 note 93) considers the possibility that Baldwin attained some sort of legal competence at the age of eight, in 1138. This line of thought should perhaps be pursued (in view of similar cases also), but, as far as I know, only at the age of twelve and fifteen were people partially or fully legally competent, and the consent of Baldwin III's brother Amaury (which, I believe, was poli-

Clear evidence of this can be discerned in the Jerusalem charters of Fulk (not in the Antioch ones) which begin only after any initial doubts about the validity of Baldwin II's will had been removed as a result of the revolt of Count Hugh. In all of them the consent of Queen Melisende is mentioned. Beginning with 1138 the consent of little Baldwin, then eight years old,³⁶ was also included. My view is corroborated by the fact that the consent of Amaury, younger son of Fulk and Melisende, was not included in any of these charters, even though he was born in 1136.³⁷ He had no share in the kingdom under his grandfather's will, which is thereby proved again to be of paramount importance. Thus, Fulk's charters show us quite clearly the *Samtherrschaft* at work.

When King Fulk died in 1143, there was no question of an election because the joint rule initiated in 1131 continued. It did not come to an end with the death of King Fulk, who was only one of the three persons sharing in it. William of Tyre simply says what I quoted above, that the royal power was now vested in Melisende, to whom it belonged by hereditary right. William did not suppress the fact that in 1131 Baldwin III had been made to share in the kingdom, but he certainly did not emphasize it in his account. Actually, he played it down to such a degree that, until recently, historians have neglected to take notice of it. Probably it would have been recognized, had William subsequently, at some point, stressed Baldwin's hereditary claim to the kingdom. But, being a partisan of the Queen, William had no interest in doing so and only underlined the hereditary nature of Melisende's claim. Unless one reads his chronicle very attentively, one might get the false impression that Baldwin's royal rights dated only from 1143, when his father died. Instead, the rights of Baldwin III went back, like those of Melisende, to 1131. Admittedly, Baldwin was not given a very fair deal in the joint rulership and this may have further helped to obscure the origins of his royal rights. As I have already mentioned, his consent to his father's charters was omitted up to 1138. In other words, his royal rights were disregarded for fully eight years. They were disregarded also in that he was not crowned during his father's lifetime, although the *Livre au roi* in the early thirteenth century stipulated that a king who had not reached the majority was to be crowned at the age of twelve.³⁸

tically rather than legally prompted) does not appear in Baldwin's charters until Amaury was ten or eleven years old. But even assuming that Baldwin III when he was eight attained some legal competence which made it possible for him to give his consent and have it included in Fulk's charters, this would still not explain why at any age he was at all entitled to give his consent to his father's charters, unless he held a part in the kingdom under his grandfather's will. It is certainly not accidental that his consent was included in Fulk's charters while that of his brother was not. It is only fair to say that Hiestand, in considering the various possibilities, while not inclined to admit outright that Baldwin III was designated in 1131, does not commit himself and leaves the matter open. In this case in particular, but also in the other points discussed above, I do not wish to create the impression that I take issue with his opinions or in any way doubt the excellence of his scholarship, to which, both in seminars and in private discussions, I have yielded many times. On the contrary, I wish to emphasize by this long note that there are ways of looking at these events which differ from my own. And the importance of such events for the constitutional history of the Latin Kingdom certainly is so great that they should be studied from every possible angle.

³⁶ For the date of his birth, see *supra*, note 17.

³⁷ He was eight years old in 1143; cf. WT, XV.27.

³⁸ *Le Livre au roi*, chap. 6, in *Assises de Jérusalem, Recueil des historiens des croisades. Lois*, I (Paris, 1841), 610.

On the 14th of September 1131 Fulk and Melisende were crowned and consecrated in Jerusalem but no mention is made of Baldwin III.³⁹ That he was not crowned when his father was alive is obvious from William of Tyre's statement that on Christmas Day 1143 he was solemnly anointed, consecrated, and—together with his mother Melisende—crowned.⁴⁰ A king could be crowned many times in his life, but he could be consecrated and anointed only once and the crowning could not take place until the consecration and anointment had been performed. In 1143, therefore, Baldwin was crowned for the first time, even though part of the kingdom had been his since 1131. Apparently it was not custom that prevented his coronation during his father's lifetime for, apart from the passage in the *Livre au roi* mentioned above, we have the case of King Baldwin V, who, later in the century, was crowned when his uncle and predecessor Baldwin IV was still alive. It is to the will of his parents that we must attribute the circumstance that Baldwin III was not crowned before 1143. Young Baldwin may well have pondered about this matter at times.

Not much changed for Baldwin after his coronation. His mother had taken good care to be crowned together with him. William of Tyre is stating things quite correctly when he implies by his choice of words (*solemniter inunctus, consecratus et cum matre coronatus est*) that in 1143 only Baldwin was anointed, consecrated, and crowned, whereas Melisende was merely crowned, having already received the sacrament of anointment in 1131. Yet, her new coronation together with that of her son made it clear to everyone that she was the one who from now on would rule the kingdom. She rightfully claimed a share in the kingship under the will of Baldwin II, and, in addition, was guardian for Baldwin III, who was then thirteen years old and, therefore, still under age. The kings of Jerusalem came of age at fifteen.⁴¹ In the case of Baldwin III this occurred in the first half of 1145. Under normal circumstances the regency of Melisende would have ended then; but she was made of stern stuff and continued to rule. By so doing she could maintain that, even though her guardianship had terminated, she still had, since 1131, a share in the kingdom; a share that was hers to have and to hold until her death, and that gave her the right to intervene in the affairs of the kingdom, or rather, conduct them herself. This she did until 1152, despite the displeasure of both the King and some of the nobles about this state of affairs, which bears ample testimony to the high degree of legality of her claim. In his chronicle William leaves no room for doubt that Baldwin's share in the government was merely nominal, or at

³⁹ WT. XIV.2.

⁴⁰ WT, XVI.3.

⁴¹ *Livre de Jean d'Ibelin*, chap. 169, in *Assises de Jérusalem, Recueil des historiens des croisades. Lois*, I (Paris, 1841), 259. Herein is the ruling on what should happen to fiefs held by a guardian for a minor, which doubtless applied also to the kingdom. Had the minor completed his fifteenth year, and wanted to get possession of his fief, he was obliged to come into the court of the guardian and say: *Sire, je ais quinze anz complis*. . . . This is confirmed by *RRH*, No. 242: *Et hoc factum fuit post duos annos mortis regis Fulconis, quo scilicet termino filius eius Balduinus rex fuit constitutus*. Fulk died in November 1143; so Baldwin's kingship is made to begin in 1145 in *RRH*, No. 242, which must be placed in the same year. Cf. also *RRH*, No. 1102. The same *venia aetatis* was valid for Jews; cf. *RRH*, No. 1114 (p. 290).

least that such it was meant to be. The young King's fortunes did not really change when he came of age in 1145. It is true that he issued charters of his own at least from 1144 (*RRH*, No. 226). However, this was not very significant, for many cases are recorded in European history of kings who had not attained majority and were not actually ruling, but who issued charters in their name. The fact that a king issued a charter does not necessarily imply that he was the one who made the grant. He might issue it legally, but the power to make or to withhold the grant might be vested in some other person. That no mention at all was made of Melisende in *RRH*, No. 226, is probably due to the fact that this charter is simply the confirmation of *RRH*, No. 174, of 1138 which had been issued to the Holy Sepulchre jointly by Fulk and Melisende. In so far as it was not only a routine confirmation at the beginning of a new reign which the king must perform according to custom, but also an act which did not need the consent of the royal guardian, since Melisende herself had made the original grant with Fulk, back in 1138, she could not prevent Baldwin from confirming it now, nor would her consent have been necessary, since her grant of 1138 still remained binding on her as long as she lived. However, while in this case the charter issued by the King under age and without his guardian's consent was certainly legal, it might give rise to doubts as to whether Melisende still had a share in the power and rulership. I believe that she quite deliberately decided not to permit any charters to be issued in the future in the King's name only. In the same year, *RRH*, No. 227, although drawn up by the same chancery clerk as *RRH*, No. 226, was issued no longer by Baldwin III alone but jointly with his mother—which stresses her role more strongly than a consent clause would have done. That it was a deliberate decision may safely be inferred from the fact that joint issuance was to remain the normal procedure for the next few years, until Melisende began to push Baldwin into the background in the charters. The decision to appear as a joint grantor in *RRH*, No. 227, is a clear indication that the Queen was now determined to emphasize her legal role in the joint rulership, for this charter involved a case entirely similar to that of *RRH*, No. 226; it was a routine confirmation of a grant to the Lepers of St. Lazarus which had originally been made jointly by Fulk and Melisende. The case could, therefore, have been handled exactly as that of *RRH*, No. 226, with a charter made by Baldwin III without his mother's consent, let alone her joint issuance. The introduction of joint issuance and its continuation even after the King had attained his majority unmistakably proves that Melisende denied to her son that part of the joint rule which had belonged to him since 1131 and which he certainly should have been allowed to exercise after his coming of age. When the civil war openly erupted in 1152 Baldwin III was a man of twenty-one or twenty-two years. If he was to assert his kingship at all in an age when kings did not normally live to be very old, it was high time that he did so.

At this point and in the future it will be helpful to examine in some detail the development of the royal chancery under Baldwin III. The concept of a realm indivisible, ruled by two or three people, allowed of only one chancery,

and indeed only one existed until Melisende created her own scriptorium, as we shall presently see. The last charter of Fulk, *RRH*, No. 210, of 1142, had still been authenticated by his chancellor Elias. In *RRH*, No. 226, the first diploma of Baldwin III, we no longer find him. But we do find here for the first time a bishop Elias of Tiberias, and, since the chancellor's office had been from the beginning a springboard for ecclesiastical advancement, I believe I am on relatively safe ground in assuming that the former chancellor had become a bishop. In fact, since as chancellor he must have been the confidant of the late King and since his advancement coincided roughly with Fulk's death, I even suppose that he had been promoted when the old King died. In the absence of a chancellor, there was, strictly speaking, no chancery. However, charters had to be issued, especially at the beginning of a reign, when the grants made by the predecessors must be confirmed as a matter of routine. And, indeed, the chancery continued to function. Without going here into detailed comparison of the *dictamina* of the various chancery clerks, which I shall do in my edition of the charters of the Latin kings of Jerusalem, I should like to present in this paper the results I have reached in respect of the charters of these years.

The new reign also ushered in a new clerk in the chancery, who had not been employed before and whose *dictamen* cannot therefore be really tracked down, since he worked only on *RRH*, Nos. 226 and 227, both of 1144, and *RRH*, No. 226, is for the most part a *verbatim* copy of *RRH*, No. 174, of 1138. Yet it can be said with some degree of certainty that this man had received his training in Fulk's chancery. His appointment to the position of main clerk of the chancery, together with the disappearance of the old chancellor, proves that the new reign brought in new people. Whether this new man was a confidant of the Queen Mother or of the new King, I cannot say, but the former supposition is much more likely because Baldwin, still under his mother's guardianship, had not much say in anything, while she was shrewd enough to realize that she must fill the vital government positions with trusted followers. Immediately after Fulk's death she appointed her kinsman Manasses of Hierges to serve as royal constable, thus filling the main crown office with an utterly reliable, although not too capable man.⁴² Manasses was a newcomer who had been in the Holy Land from 1140 only and was consequently wholly dependent upon royal favor. The constable was the chief military officer of the kingdom, and as such held extensive powers, especially when the king happened to be under age and the regent was a woman. According to the *Livre au roi*, the constable presided over the Haute Cour, the land's highest assembly, whenever the king was absent. He was second in command of the army after the king, and he appointed the commanders of the various army subdivisions. He had himself the prerogative of commanding a group twice as large as those of the others and was to lead the vanguard of the heavily armed knights. He exercised military justice in the army. Under his competence came also *la devisiion des casaus et des terres dou seignor et d'autrui*, that is, the estab-

⁴² WT, XVII.13.

lishing of the extent and the limits of the royal domain in cases of dispute.⁴³ The prompt appointment of a dependent and reliable constable proves that Melisende knew what steps she had to take to secure her political power. Undoubtedly she must have had an eye on the chancery too. Since Fulk knew from his Angevin experience how valuable a good chancellor was, we may be sure that he would have appointed only chancellors he could rely on. If she wanted to put selected men in the top positions, Melisende can have had no desire to retain Elias, while Elias could not possibly refuse promotion from chancellor to bishop of Tiberias. This the Queen could do without great difficulty if a bishopric was vacant because, contrary to the canon law, the monarchs of Jerusalem up to the end of the twelfth century had a large and sometimes predominant role in the appointment of bishops. Why a new chancellor was not appointed immediately I cannot tell. Presumably Melisende at this time would have had the power to impose even a candidate unacceptable to Baldwin III. Perhaps baronial opposition had to be overcome, for, as we shall see, baronial approval was needed for the appointment of new chancellors. But with or without a chancellor, the emergence of a new clerk in 1144 and the change from a charter issued by Baldwin alone to another issued jointly with his mother in the same year and with the same chancery official, shows that Melisende looked after her own interests in the chancery.

There was one field in which Baldwin III had an advantageous position in respect to his mother, and that was warfare. A mediaeval king and especially a king of Jerusalem must necessarily be a warrior. He was thought of as such and had to meet certain expectations. In this, nature imposed certain limitations on Melisende. She could not lead the army into battle, but, being an energetic woman, she did indeed deal with military problems on several occasions, as we shall see; but the actual operations had to be conducted by someone else. It was in this field that the King immediately tried to assert himself. In his first year, that is, in 1144, the native population of Wadi Musa revolted and called in Muslim forces who seized the fortress of the same name in Transjordan. On hearing of it the King, although still a minor (*licet tener adhuc nimium*), led a military force into these regions. He found the fortress impregnable but managed, by cutting down the olive trees, their main source of livelihood, and by granting them a pardon, to reduce the inhabitants to his rule and make them agree to send back the Muslim contingent. It was undoubtedly a successful expedition,⁴⁴ which Melisende apparently resented, for, on the next occasion, things were handled differently. When late in 1144 Zengi laid the fatal siege to the city of Edessa, the Edessenese sent messengers to the King of Jerusalem (*ad regem Hierosolymorum*) for help. But it was Melisende, *quae regni moderabatur imperium*, who made the decisions. She conferred with her nobles and dispatched the royal constable Manasses of Hierges, Philipp of Nablus, and Elinard of Tiberias to assist the county of Edessa which, as we know, could not be saved.⁴⁵ No mention is made of the King—this time he had

⁴³ *Le Livre au roi*, chap. 14, p. 615f.

⁴⁴ WT, XVI.6.

⁴⁵ WT, XVI.4.

definitely been brushed aside. The omission could not be excused on the grounds that the King was still not of age, for had this been a valid reason to keep him from going into battle, he should not have been able, or allowed, to conduct the Wadi Musa campaign mentioned above. Melisende's intention in preventing the King from taking part in warfare was obviously to preclude the possibility of his acquiring a reputation as a military leader which might soon lead to the feeling that he was also a political leader. A king who waged war could not be confined to the role of a commanding general still taking orders from the government. This was a constable's position, and even a constable had a high degree of independence once he was in military action; but a king on the battlefield was a commander-in-chief and, at the same time, the evident supreme leader of his nation and state in a time of crisis. As Baldwin was rapidly approaching the time of his majority, the Queen Mother certainly had no interest in promoting his military career, if she wanted to hold on to power.

The choice of Manasses, Philip of Nablus, and Elinard of Tiberias for dealing with the Edessa crisis was by no means accidental. Their names reveal quite clearly the foundations of Melisende's power—control of the crown offices and feudal support. Elinard of Tiberias was prince of Galilee, and he held the largest crown fief. In the years 1170–85 this principality, according to the list preserved in the *Livre de Jean d'Ibelin*, owed the Crown a service of one hundred knights out of the total 675 listed by Ibelin.⁴⁶ He mentions only two other lordships that owed that much, but in 1144 only one of these was under a single hand. Thus, if we accept Ibelin's list as representing the number of knights roughly owed, in 1144 or in 1152—the period we are dealing with—the list would still have been quite different. The two super-lordships owing a service of one hundred knights which were in existence by the mid-twelfth century were Jaffa and Galilee, and Jaffa at the time did not yet include Ascalon. That Elinard of Tiberias, the prince of Galilee, was a supporter of the Queen must be deduced from his being dispatched to Edessa in 1144, when the King was ignored, as well as from the fact that, when Elinard died, a dispute over Galilee seems to have arisen between the King and the Queen Mother. As for Philip of Nablus, he came of the family of Milly that had been in the royal service since 1108 and possessed fiefs around Nablus which had been carved out of the royal domain. It is quite evident that in Samaria, that is, in one of the centers of the royal domain, Philip, who in fact if not in name was lord of Nablus,⁴⁷ was the only serious competitor for the crown. It was important for the Queen Mother to have him on her side

⁴⁶ *Livre de Jean d'Ibelin*, chap. 271, p. 422ff. On the interpretation of this list, see R. C. Smail, *Crusading Warfare (1097–1193)*, Cambridge Studies in Mediaeval Life and Thought, N.S., 3 (Cambridge, 1956), 89ff.

⁴⁷ He calls himself Philip of Nablus but never specifically "lord of Nablus." The city of Nablus itself was certainly part of the royal domain and was not fortified, which made it unsuitable as the seat of a lordship. Also, we never hear of a *Cour des Bourgeois* of Nablus which would not have been that of the royal viscount. In fact, however, Philip's holdings in this region were so large that he certainly deserves to be called lord of Nablus. He is, indeed, given this title in the fourteenth-century *Lignages d'Outremer*, in *Assises de Jérusalem, Recueil des historiens des croisades. Lois*, II (Paris, 1843), 452.

for, had he been against her, he could make serious trouble for her in Samaria. It is doubtful whether Philip was as powerful in Samaria in 1144 as we find him later in 1161, when the King felt that he ought to make the lordship of Nablus revert to the royal domain and therefore exchanged the lands which Philip had accumulated in the vicinity of Nablus for the huge crown fief of Transjordan and the lordship of Hebron.⁴⁸ There is reason to believe that Philip had acquired some of his very extensive holdings in Samaria as a result of his association with Queen Melisende, since it is unlikely that in 1144 he would have had the fief mentioned in the exchange of 1161 which Rohard the Elder, viscount of Jerusalem, held before him. But undoubtedly Philip in 1144 was, like Elinard of Tiberias, a baron of the first magnitude and one whose possessions were so located that any ruler wishing to control Samaria effectively could not disregard him. We know that Philip remained loyal to Queen Melisende to the end of her political struggle. In addition, having his support meant having also the loyalty of several other families to which Philip, as a member of the high, landed aristocracy, was connected through marriages. For one thing, he was the stepbrother of Renier, lord of Ramla and his sister Helvis.⁴⁹ Ramla, which at the time was already united with the little lordship of Mirabel, was one of the larger crown fiefs, owing a service of forty knights, as many as did the lordship of Transjordan, and guarded the approaches from the plain of Saron on the coast to Jerusalem, the other great center of the royal domain. His sister Helvis was married to Barisan of Ibelin⁵⁰ whom Fulk, toward the end of his reign, had established in the lordship of Ibelin, which, though small—owing only ten knights—was important nonetheless as a protection against the Egyptians in Ascalon and because it was in the hands of a family which was to rise quickly to great prominence. Philip of Nablus was not only stepbrother of the lord of Ramla and his sister, wife of the lord of Ibelin; he was also, by virtue of his relation to Helvis of Ibelin, the uncle of Ermengarde, daughter of Barisan and Helvis, and the wife of the prince of Galilee, Elinard of Tiberias. Thus, all things considered, it was a closely knit clan which supported the Queen. I shall add here that Melisende had also managed to secure the loyalty of Rohard the Elder, viscount of Jerusalem from 1135 to 1147—that same Rohard whom she had earlier persecuted with hatred after the explosion of the revolt of Count Hugh of Jaffa

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 452, 462, for Hebron. For Transjordan see *RRH*, No. 366.

⁴⁹ The genealogy of the early Ibelins as well as that of the early Millys (the family of Philip of Nablus) and of the early lords of Ramla and Mirabel has been revised by W. H. Rüdts de Collenberg, "Les premiers Ibelins," *Le Moyen Age*, 71 (= 4th Ser., 20 [1965]), 433–74. Anyone using this article will be well advised to check the author's every point, though his most important conclusion is undoubtedly correct: Baldwin I of Ramla had not only a daughter, Helvis, who married Barisan le Vieux of Ibelin and eventually brought him the lordships of Ramla and Mirabel, but also three sons, Hugh, Baldwin, and Renier, who were successively lords of Ramla and Mirabel until these lordships went to Helvis and her husband shortly after 1148. The existence of an entire generation of lords of Ramla, which must be inserted into the traditional genealogies, has been obscured by the not uncommon circumstance that in the following generation two of the three sons of Helvis and Barisan le Vieux were also called Hugh and Baldwin.

⁵⁰ Rüdts de Collenberg, *loc. cit.*, distinguishes this Barisan from the former constable of Jaffa of the same name.

(see *supra*, p. 103). Rohard was a powerful man, entrenched in his possessions around Jerusalem and Nablus and, above all, he was of great importance for anyone wishing to control the capital, because, as viscount, he represented the city lord and the royal power. In view of the earlier events at the time of Hugh's revolt one may doubt that there was friendship between Rohard and the Queen Mother, but, as we shall see, there certainly was loyalty based on mutual self-interest. Melisende, therefore, controlled through loyal vassals a solid block of the country stretching from Galilee through Samaria to Judaea with tentacles spreading towards the plain of Saron and into the country of the Philistines at Ibelin. This, together with the virtual possession of the greater part of the royal domain around Jerusalem, Hebron, and Nablus and with the control of the most powerful crown offices, assured Melisende the undisturbed exercise of government.

For the time being Baldwin III had no opportunity of undermining Melisende's position and, therefore, had no choice but to collaborate or to accept the place his mother had assigned to him. In 1145 Count Raymond II of Tripoli made a donation to the Knights of St. John *nutu regis Balduini et regine Melissendis sancte Iherusalem*.⁵¹ So, to all outward appearances the King and his mother worked in close agreement. The same we find in *RRH*, No. 244, of 1 February 1146, for the Knights of St. John.⁵² King and Queen Mother confirmed a previous sale made by Robert of Casal St. Gilles to the Order of St. John of the land of Emmaus which was to become one of the important centers of Hospitaller possessions in the Holy Land. This Emmaus (not to be identified with the biblical Emmaus [*amwās*] although the crusaders believed the biblical events to have taken place in their Emmaus) was situated to the west of Jerusalem. Robert had held this land in exchange for military service, and now sold it for an annual rent of five hundred bezants, which was the equivalent of one knight's fee as expressed in terms of a money fief. Since he now, instead of possessing land, would draw an amount of money worth one knight's service and was entitled to reclaim his possessions in case the Hospitallers failed to pay him, his military service continued, and he therefore had no difficulty in obtaining his lord's consent to the transaction. His lord was none other than Rohard the Elder, viscount of Jerusalem, who must have had considerable possessions in the vicinity of Jerusalem if he could afford to have a subtenant for the "land of Emmaus with the villages belonging to it," which cannot have been exactly a tiny unit.

RRH, No. 244, which I am here discussing was again issued jointly by Baldwin III and Melisende. It is also interesting in that we now find that the chancellor's office, vacant in 1144, had in the meantime been filled. The successor of Elias was a certain Ralph, who was to become one of the greatest among all chancellors of Jerusalem, to be surpassed only by his own successor William of Tyre. William did not think very highly of him.⁵³ Although he

⁵¹ *RRH*, No. 236.

⁵² This charter has always been placed in the year 1147 owing to an incorrect reading by J. Delaville Le Roulx (*Cartulaire général de l'Ordre des Hospitaliers de St.-Jean de Jérusalem* [1100-1310], I [Paris, 1894], 135, No. 173). But the year of Incarnation should definitely be read as 1146.

⁵³ WT, XVI.17.

admitted that this Englishman was learned and good looking (perhaps a compliment of dubious quality) he considered him *nimis secularis*. His opinion was undoubtedly influenced by Ralph's intruding for some years in William's own church of Tyre. Unless chancellor Ralph wrote his own *dictamina*, which I very much doubt, he brought with him a new notary, whose *dictamen* is immediately recognizable and who stabilized the formulas of the Jerusalem chancery for a long time to come. It is to be presumed, however, that the responsibility for this basic reform of the Jerusalem diploma is attributable to both this notary and his superior, chancellor Ralph. In the High Middle Ages heads of chanceries did not normally busy themselves with the daily routine of their chancery. Rather, they were engaged in establishing the guidelines of the policy together with the ruler, went on diplomatic missions, and strictly speaking were more cabinet ministers than chancery clerks. Besides, they generally held high ecclesiastical offices and were burdened with the administration of a bishopric or archbishopric and the liturgical functions which went with their church office. William of Tyre certainly was this kind of chancellor. One can surmise that Ralph, too, was of the same type when he later became bishop of Bethlehem, although he seems, more than William, to have attended on the King and followed the court. But at the time under consideration, 1146 and 1147, Ralph did not yet hold high ecclesiastical office; like his predecessors, he was primarily a chancellor. This meant that he could devote more time to the King's correspondence. He also had a motive to look after the charters himself. Baldwin III having come of age in 1145, the balance and division of political power were now obviously a delicate matter. Ralph was certainly intelligent enough to foresee that the joint rule of mother and son might perhaps not last long and that he would need the favor and the patronage of one of the two or of both (according to how things would develop) for his own promotion. It is, therefore, not altogether surprising that in the first charter issued by the new chancellor (*RRH*, No. 244, of 1 February 1146, of which I am speaking) we find the chancery cautiously serving two masters by inserting into the date clause: *regnante feliciter supra dicto rege Balduino et matre sua regina Melisenda*. Keeping in mind that the charter is for the Order of St. John, we may trace this clause to the influence of the destinee by comparing it to another charter issued in the previous year by Gilbert of Tyre, head of the Order of St. John in this town (*RRH*, No. 242; for the date, cf. note 41). Here we read in the date: *regnante Balduino rege supra dicto et regina Milisenda matre eius feliciter regnum obtinente*. We shall see below that the Hospital of St. John maintained the strictest neutrality in the conflict between Baldwin III and his mother, and as early as 1146 the Hospitallers made a point of listing both rulers in their date line, in contrast to other "private" charters, where only the King or the King and the Patriarch were named. But in 1145, when the conflict had not yet broken out, the Hospitallers, while certainly not omitting Baldwin III and his rights (cf. note 41), correctly stated the truth of the situation by saying that Baldwin was ruling but that actually Melisende was holding the kingdom in her possession (*regnum*

obtinente). It may very well have been the Hospitallers who insisted on having both rulers mentioned in the date of *RRH*, No. 244, but if they did so, the chancery moderated their formula and used an expression indicating something like an equal division of rulership between mother and son.

Chancellor Ralph and his notary also produced the next charter, *RRH*, No. 240, of 19 February 1146, for the abbey of St. Mary Josaphat. Officially at least, and probably also in fact, the King and his mother were still collaborating, issuing their charter jointly, as had been habitual since 1144. In this charter they are rounding off and consolidating the royal domain in the north, at Casel Imbert halfway between Acre and Tyre. The cities of Tyre and Acre and the fertile coastal plain between them formed the third nucleus of the royal domain after Jerusalem and Nablus. A dispute over certain lands and olive groves had arisen between the inhabitants of the royal village of Thaerisibena in the vicinity of Toron-Tibnīn and those of Bethfella in the territory of Tyre which belonged to the abbey of Josaphat. The King and the Queen Mother now waived their claims on the condition that the abbey of St. Mary Josaphat give them the land and olive groves which it had possessed since 1123 in Casel Imbert.⁵⁴ The royal purpose was to obtain complete possession of Casel Imbert in order to establish a rural Latin settlement there (see *infra*, p. 172). Since power in the kingdom was not equally divided between Baldwin and Melisende and Baldwin's position was reduced in the following charters, I assume that this charter really indicates an attempt by Melisende to create for herself partisans in the northern part of the domain. Nothing came of it because it was actually Baldwin who initiated the Latin settlement in that region and apparently not until he had removed Melisende from power. So, whoever it was who intended to create influence in his own favor at Casel Imbert, he (or she) was not successful, since at the time nothing more seems to have happened there than the acquisition of land. This shows that Melisende was not as strong on the coast as she was in the center of the kingdom, while Baldwin was not yet strong enough to create his own sphere of power in the coastal part of the royal domain, as opposed to that of Melisende in Jerusalem and Nablus. Since this land was obviously acquired to serve eventually as a settlement for Latin inhabitants but for fully seven years nothing happened, one may presume that at first there was a kind of stalemate in the northern royal domain between King and Queen Mother, while during the years of conflict there may have been no time for the creation of the settlement.

In the spring of 1147 a local Muslim commander of the castle of Bosra in the Ḥaurān, the agricultural hinterland of Damascus, offered to the Jerusalem government to turn over his castles of Bosra and Salkhad to the Franks, either against payment or by receiving them back as Frankish fiefs.⁵⁵ The reason was that this commander had fallen from the good grace of the Damascus government. He made his offer to the King and the Queen Mother and at a

⁵⁴ On this exchange and its purposes, see J. Prawer, "Colonization Activities in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem," *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, 29 (1951), 115ff.

⁵⁵ WT, XVI.8-13.

subsequent assembly of the nobles it was decided to accept the proposal. Politically this was foolish because since 1139 the alliance with Damascus had protected the northern flank of the Latin Kingdom and was needed now more than ever in view of the increasing menace of Nūr ad-Dīn of Aleppo, who had his eye on Damascus. An attack on the Ḥaurān constituted a great danger for Damascus, whose basic food came mainly from the Ḥaurān. From the beginning of the crusaders' invasions, the Damascus government had always been very sensitive about this region. It had blocked all attempts by the Franks to conquer it and had only agreed in some treaties of 1108–10 to make the Ḥaurān a kind of condominium with the Franks by dividing its agricultural production into three equal parts, one to go to Damascus, one to the Franks, and one to remain for the local population. Later on, however, Damascus had recovered full control of the area which it enforced from three castles: Dar'āt—the *Cité Bernard d'Etampes* of the crusaders—Bosra, and Salkhad. The Damascus government could not remain inactive if Jerusalem now tried to wrest control of the Ḥaurān from its hands; so it called in every ally it had or could obtain, among others Nūr ad-Dīn, whom it did not trust. At the same time every possible effort was made to talk the Franks out of the whole campaign. With the envoy of the King the atabeg of Damascus argued that the Franks were violating the treaty of 1139, which was vital to both Damascus and Jerusalem. The atabeg offered to defray all the King's expenses if he would only desist from his purpose. It is evidence of the political wisdom of the King, still only seventeen years old, and of his political advisers that he now reconsidered the advisability of this whole venture, which was to end unsuccessfully. He tried to save his face by offering to call off the campaign if he would be allowed to reinstall the Muslim commander in Bosra and Salkhad. He would then leave it to Damascus to deal with this man as they saw fit.

By then, however, it was too late, and the King was under severe public pressure, for the *arrière ban* had been summoned (*universus regni populus voce praeconia congregatur*) and the people wanted action. The *arrière ban* was summoned only seldom, when the feudal army would not seem to be of sufficient strength. It meant that every able-bodied man had to join and serve. Once it had been assembled, presumably at considerable expense to the individual, it was not so easy to disperse such an army, for its very summons meant that the country was greatly imperiled; how could it then be explained that the matter had better not be pursued at all, as the King and his retinue tried to do? Also, the common people wished to find compensation for the expenses they had incurred, by taking booty. It was with tumultuous uproar that the people forced the King into this unfortunate expedition. Even though no aim was achieved and the Christian army suffered severe losses, the young King proved to be an energetic leader of the army. When it became apparent that things were going wrong the barons advised the King to abandon the army and take himself and the True Cross to safety on John Gotman's horse, reputed to be the swiftest and most enduring in the army. It is hard to say

whether this advice was given in good faith or whether it was an attempt to ruin Baldwin's military reputation. That a king had fled the battlefield had not happened, if I am not mistaken, since King Baldwin I had done so in 1102 and 1113, but then only after the battle had been lost. That a king should desert his army before any battle had been fought, simply because it seemed that the campaign would not meet its aims and because the army was sorely pressed by the enemy and suffering from lack of water, was without precedent. Baldwin scorned the suggestion with youthful daring and regal magnificence, as William says. In fact, he could not have failed to realize that, were he now to desert his army and his people, never again would he command their respect. By mediaeval standards he would indeed have been unfit to rule. Whatever his motives, he had no choice but to remain with his army until the end. Instead of running away he ordered a retreat which took place under highly perilous conditions and with severe losses, but was eventually accomplished. What part the King had in this retreat William of Tyre does not choose to say, but he does give the credit of guiding the army through unknown territory to the superhuman element, represented by the well-known figure of an unknown knight on a white horse appearing out of the blue. Presumably he had no special achievements to report on Baldwin's part. By the end of June 1147 the campaign was over, for the two Muslim armies which had fought in it returned to Damascus on 28 June 1147.⁵⁶

The King had conducted himself very well, from a moral point of view, but the fact that the campaign had failed was inescapable. If Melisende wanted to lay the blame upon the King, and we can be sure that she did, she could easily do so. This may explain why Melisende chose and was able to reduce Baldwin's position in the next royal charter, *RRH*, No. 245, of 4 July 1147, immediately after the end of the campaign. This diploma is issued jointly not only by Baldwin III and Melisende, but also by Melisende's younger son Amaury. Born in 1136, Amaury suddenly comes here into prominence. The joint issuance by the three of them can only mean that Amaury was now included in the *Samtherrschaft*. While Baldwin III can have had no motive to do so, Melisende had one. Not only did her younger son remain loyal to her throughout, against Baldwin III, but one can also interpret his being brought in to share in the joint rule as an application of the principle *divide et impera*, by which only Melisende stood to gain. How legal this step was we do not know. Certainly the barons, after the death of both Melisende and Baldwin III, did not accept Amaury as their king as readily as they had accepted Fulk and Baldwin III. That Amaury's first marriage was uncanonical did not really trouble the barons, only the Church. William of Tyre,⁵⁷ however, states that there was a minority of the barons who opposed his succession. They may have used the argument of canon law, but certainly this would not have been their true motive, which remains unknown to us. The opposition of these barons

⁵⁶ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Histoire de Damas*, trans. Le Tourneau, 283.

⁵⁷ WT, XIX.1. For the mediation of the clergy mentioned below, see *L'Estoire de Eracles (supra*, note 30), 883.

was eventually overcome by the clergy's mediation, as the French translator says. Thus, although William of Tyre does not speak of an election, he does speak of considerable debate on the matter, which amounted to an election in the sense that it was partly the result of the debate which decided Amaury's succession; the position taken by the Church on his marriage, which had first to be dissolved, did the rest. That there was debate at all and that so many obstacles could be put between the throne and Amaury show that Amaury's admission into joint rule cannot have been considered altogether legal by the barons, and, indeed, there was no foundation for it under the will of Baldwin II. The argument that Amaury had not yet been born when his grandfather died and that the latter might have included him in his will had he already been born at the time was not very forceful because it could not be proved. The fact remained that under the will of Baldwin II Amaury was not one of the beneficiaries and that his inclusion in joint rule, however it was done, could not but diminish the rights of those who legally held a share in it, specifically the rights of Baldwin III. Yet, it is clear that a definite share in joint rule had been established, which later on was occasionally recognized not only by Melisende but even by Baldwin III himself, once he had driven his mother from power, by inserting a consent clause of Amaury into their charters. William of Tyre⁵⁸ repeatedly emphasizes that after Baldwin III's death his brother claimed that the throne belonged to him by hereditary right. Indeed, it seems that on his deathbed Baldwin III named his brother, who had served him well once the clash with Melisende was over, heir to the throne, since William of Tyre says that the King died *fratre regni herede instituto*.

In charter *RRH*, No. 245, discussed here, an unidentifiable *Casale Altum* was given to the Knights of St. John, and this gift was combined with an exchange of territory. The Knights relinquished the casalia they held by virtue of a donation made by Geoffrey of the Tower of David in the *Terre de Suète*, an exposed region east of the Sea of Galilee. In return, the Hospital received two casalia closer to *Altum Casale*, so that, by giving up undesirable outposts, the Order's possessions were evidently consolidated. Strangely enough, however, the two casalia were described as being *propinquiora Alto Casali ex qua parte voluerimus* (not *voluerint*, which would make much more sense). That is, it was up to the King and his mother to choose which casalia they would give to the Order. In other words, the Order was to relinquish its lands in the *Terre de Suète* without exactly knowing what it would get in return. It is possible that this was a loan against the future and that at the time the government had no free casale available in the vicinity of *Altum Casale*. The matter remains somewhat of a mystery. It is unfortunate that we do not know in what part of the country this transaction took place. If we did, perhaps some inference could be drawn from it as to where Melisende or Baldwin expected to have lands available which they were willing to give up.

The charter is interesting on yet another count. It provides evidence, so far unnoticed, of the militarization of the Order of St. John. It is well known

⁵⁸ WT, XVIII.34; XIX.1,4.

that the Order had originally been founded for charitable purposes only. The Hospitallers of Jerusalem, in contrast to the Knights Templars, originally did not fight. It is equally well known that after they were assigned the castle of Bait Ġibrīn by King Fulk (*RRH*, No. 164, of 1136), they began to take on military duties. Jonathan Riley-Smith has recently shown that these military duties were regarded as an extension of their charitable work and that the change to a military order was much slower than had previously been believed.⁵⁹ But what has not been noticed is that this donation of *RRH*, No. 245, was made *ad provectum et ad ampliacionem et liberationem regni Ierosolimitani*. This clause is at first puzzling, especially coming immediately after the end of an unsuccessful campaign. But it reflects undoubtedly a political program for which the grantors were trying to enlist the help of the Knights of St. John—which could be of a military nature only if it involved the enlargement of the kingdom. In accepting this donation the Order accepted military responsibilities. Presumably what was really meant was the *ampliatio regni et liberatio Terre Sancte* because, while the kingdom of Jerusalem had no need to be liberated, the county of Edessa as part of the Holy Land did. The county had been lost in 1144 and just at the time this charter was issued the German army was marching through Hungary on its way to the Holy Land. Already for some time it must have been known in the Holy Land that the Second Crusade was assembling, and I assume that the help of the Order of St. John for this crusade had to be secured. The Master of the Order later took part in the great war council held at Acre in 1148, which decided on the attack on Damascus, and Hospitaller troops did eventually participate in the campaign.⁶⁰

RRH, No. 245, was the last charter to be issued by chancellor Ralph and his notary for quite a while. There came now a crisis in Ralph's life which we must review in order fully to comprehend subsequent events. When Patriarch William of Jerusalem died in September 1145, Archbishop Fulcher of Tyre was chosen as his successor on 25 January of the following year.⁶¹ On 19 February 1146, in *RRH*, No. 240, Fulcher was still qualified as patriarch-elect and, therefore, had not yet been consecrated. It must be assumed that his old see was kept vacant until his consecration as patriarch, to prevent his being left with neither one nor the other should he not be confirmed. After a vacancy which apparently was not very short, the new Patriarch met in Tyre with the King, his mother, *penes quam regni cura et universum residebat moderamen*, and the suffragans of the Archbishop of Tyre in order to elect a successor. Needless to say, the chapter was also present. But the election turned out to be one of many disputed ones. While the church of Tyre and the suffragans favored someone unknown,⁶² the royal court quite definitely supported the candidacy of chancellor Ralph. The opposing party, led by the Patriarch,

⁵⁹ J. Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus c. 1050–1310*, A History of the Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem, I (London, 1967), 52ff.

⁶⁰ *Loc. cit.*

⁶¹ WT, XVI.17.

⁶² Perhaps Peter of Barcelona, the prior of the church of the Holy Sepulchre, who later became archbishop of Tyre by unanimous consent after the succession crisis had been solved. Cf. WT, XVI.17.

took every step within its power to prevent Ralph from rising to a position which in the hierarchy of the land was second only to that of the patriarch, but to no avail. Relying on royal pressure, Ralph took hold of the church of Tyre by violence and held it along with its possessions for two years, until he was removed by the Pope, to whom his opponents had appealed. The disputed election must have taken place after July 1147, because in *RRH*, No. 245, Ralph signs his name as chancellor without adding an ecclesiastical office, which, as can be proved, was not customary for him when he had such an office. As for the political pressure in favor of Ralph's candidacy, William of Tyre leaves no doubt that the King's role in political affairs such as this was still merely nominal and that the Queen Mother was the one who actually ruled the country.

The next major event in the history of the Latin Kingdom was the abortive attempt to capture Damascus with the help of the armies of the Second Crusade. Much ink has been spilled over the causes of such a foolish decision and the persons responsible for the decision itself and its execution. Without going into the very difficult details of this debate here, suffice it to remember that the decision was made at a general war council at Acre (or at Palma near Acre, according to Otto of Freising) on 24 June 1148.⁶³ Both Baldwin III and his mother were present. Which of the two was more influential we do not know, but I should like to point out a fact that so far has gone almost unnoticed, namely, that in a much more restricted meeting which had taken place previously it had already been decided to attack Damascus, thus predetermining the results of the debate at Acre—a meeting of King Conrad III of Germany, King Baldwin III of Jerusalem, and the Patriarch of Jerusalem as well as representatives of the Knights Templars. The report by Otto of Freising is precise and reliable because the great chronicler, a relative of Conrad III, was with him in the Holy Land and had first-hand information from the German court. No mention is made of Queen Melisende and although the Patriarch, who usually favored her rather than Baldwin, was present, one must remember that at this very moment he was at odds with the Queen Mother over the appointment of chancellor Ralph to the archbishopric of Tyre. In considering how the decision at the war council at Acre was made, one would be well advised in the future to take into account this first restricted meeting, where the Acre decision was obviously hatched and prepared, especially in view of the fact that the Patriarch of Jerusalem was then dispatched to the King of France to induce him to come also to Jerusalem. I can see no reason why Otto of Freising should have omitted to mention the presence of the Queen Mother at the first meeting had she been there. If Baldwin and Conrad agreed to attack Damascus, if they had the support of the lord Patriarch and the Templar Knights, if the Patriarch could persuade Louis VII of France to adopt this same view (and this he must have done else Louis would not have participated in such an event; at least he must have informed the French

⁶³ WT, XVII.1; G. Waitz ed., *Ottonis et Rahewini Gesta Friderici I. imperatoris*, 3rd ed., in MGH, *SS.Rer.Germ.* (Hannover-Leipzig, 1912), 89f.

King about the understanding that had been reached); then the war council could not but follow suit and Melisende would have been powerless to change the original decision. This by no means implies that she was opposed to it. We simply do not know. If she was well advised politically she must have been against the expedition, which would destroy the vital alliance with Damascus and drive that city into the arms of Nūr ad-Dīn. Considering the odds for Melisende and Baldwin, it seems that Melisende could not have been in favor of the expedition. If it did not take place, things would not be any worse for Jerusalem or for her. If it did take place and was successful under the King's leadership of the army of Jerusalem while she, being a woman, had no part in it, it would establish Baldwin III as true king because the European kings who came to help would eventually go home and he would remain and be considered the conqueror of the city of St. Paul. Precisely this aspect must have been tempting to Baldwin III, for a military success in this campaign would surely have given him the upper hand, politically, over his mother. Melisende, having nothing to lose if the expedition did not take place, stood only to gain, internally, if it failed. The game, however, would have been dangerous because the alliance with Damascus was not likely to be patched up again for a long time, once a serious attempt to conquer it had been made; besides, one could not foresee its failure with any certainty unless, of course, Melisende managed to engineer the obstruction and maneuvers on the part of the barons of Jerusalem to force the lifting of the siege. All considered, her political interests could not favor her support of the expedition, unless one would accuse her of such recklessness in politics as to make her first support the campaign, and then engineer its failure with the help of her partisans in the camp before Damascus, in order finally to cause the collapse of Baldwin's military and political reputation. The price would have been too high, the outcome too uncertain. Besides, although the expedition eventually did fail, yet Baldwin was not totally crushed. On the other hand, if Baldwin's odds in the game are weighed, he obviously had reasons for favoring it. While he might hope to survive a failure, he would have won everything by a success that would be spectacular. Like Conrad, who needed something to show back home, he must have been eager for something really striking. In view of these considerations it is not at all surprising that the two Kings should have conferred without the Queen Mother, who, of course, could not be excluded from the Acre meeting, which, according to the Jerusalem constitution, was also a meeting of the Haute Cour in which Melisende as one of the joint rulers certainly had a vote. When the crusaders finally did advance on Damascus, we know that King Baldwin III led the vanguard.⁶⁴ Nothing else is recorded of his actions during this campaign.

The failure of the campaign must have been a serious setback for Baldwin III. If he had entertained any hopes that now he might get a larger share in the government, his hopes had been destroyed by the miserable failure of the siege of Damascus. The following year, however, offered him again a chance to

⁶⁴ WT. XVII.3,

acquire military and political stature. On 29 June 1149 Raymond of Antioch and many of his knights were killed in the disastrous battle of Inab, Nūr ad-Dīn's greatest victory. On hearing this Baldwin III immediately collected some troops in haste and marched toward Antioch, unsuccessfully besieged the fortress of Ḥārim on the Orontes, and dispatched Humphrey of Toron, a lord of large holdings in the vicinity of Tyre, to reinforce the fortress of Ezaz with sixty knights.⁶⁵ Whether Baldwin gained much stature as a military leader from this campaign remains doubtful. Up to this time he had conducted only one successful campaign, that to Wadi Musa in 1144. Both the Ḥaurān expedition of 1147 and the Second Crusade had been failures, although back in 1147 Baldwin had shown moral courage in remaining with his army. But the 1149 expedition to Antioch is important in that the King now for the first time assumed political responsibilities by administering the principality of Antioch as regent upon the invitation of the local barons, as his father and his grandfather had done. In affording protection to Antioch and the remainder of the county of Edessa he was living up to a traditional responsibility of the kings of Jerusalem. He could not remain there very long. His campaign in the north must have taken place in the second half of 1149. Apart from the fact that William of Tyre says that he did not stay long because the affairs of his own kingdom called for his presence in the south, in the spring of 1150 we find him engaged in rebuilding Gaza in the southern part of Palestine.

The Queen Mother was taking advantage of the setback which Baldwin III must have suffered from the unsuccessful Damascus campaign. This much can be gathered from the fact that now, in 1149, she went one step further in reducing his legal position in the charters. It should be recalled that at the very beginning of his reign Baldwin had issued a charter in his own name, without including his mother's consent. This procedure had been replaced by joint issuance, and lately Melisende's younger son had been included in the joint rule, as joint issuance of charters clearly shows. Melisende now issued *RRH*, No. 256, in her own name and mentioned only Baldwin's consent, at least in the first part of it. This charter deals with an exchange she made with the Knights of St. John. The Knights relinquished the public baths in the street of St. Leonard in Acre and received in return a loggia opposite their church of St. John the Baptist and the houses which had once belonged to the châtelain Franco of Acre, for which the Queen Mother had once filed a suit that they be returned *in potestatem et dispositionem regni*. She now apparently waived her claim to these houses. By issuing her charter alone in its first part, she did not wish to imply that the joint rule had come to an end, since in the same charter she confirmed, jointly with Baldwin (*ego cum pre-nominato filio meo rege Balduino omnino ratam et inconvulsam haberi decerno*), the sale of a house with an adjacent tower, made by the former Viscount Robert of Acre to the Order. This is important, for it shows that the Queen Mother approved of the Order now having a fortified residence in the economic center of the kingdom. In addition she gave to the Order the village of Assera,

⁶⁵ WT, XVII.10.

not far from Caesarea. She only announced her own seal—apparently it was not her intention to have the charter corroborated by Baldwin's seal also. Whether she deliberately ignored him in the first part of this charter or whether she merely took advantage of his being in Antioch after the battle of Inab, I cannot tell, since the charter bears no indication of either month or day and cannot be dated more closely otherwise. But most likely the affront was intentional, for even if Baldwin was away it would have been proper to issue charters jointly, the way they had been issued before. Another indication that Melisende was deliberately pushing Baldwin into the background is found in the fact that from this point on there is no return to joint issuance. A consent was the most Melisende would from now on concede to Baldwin.

It is evident from all that has been said and from the gradual reduction of Baldwin's position in the royal charters that relations between the King and his mother must already have been strained at this time. Since Melisende controlled a solid block of power stretching from Galilee to Judaea, the King, if he wished to counter her effectively, must establish his control over the royal domain on the coast, more especially over Acre and Tyre. *RRH*, No. 256, shows that in 1149 the Queen Mother wished to prevent this, for we see her spread her own tentacles toward Acre. Like *RRH*, No. 240, of 1146 (see *supra*, p. 122), *RRH*, No. 256, must be regarded as a definite attempt by the Queen Mother to widen her influence and to establish herself also in the northern part of the royal domain. We must stop to ask ourselves how she could ever have obtained Baldwin's consent to this charter, a consent which I do not regard as an empty formula. It is evident that the charter is also an attempt by Melisende to win over to her side the Knights of St. John in the event the Hospitallers should side with her son, for they could nibble at her possessions from the south, where King Fulk had granted them the castle of Bait Ġibrin in 1136. They could also create difficulties for the Queen Mother in the center of her power, since the Order had large holdings around Jerusalem. In 1150 we shall find Melisende making yet another important concession to the Order; also in the past she had wooed the Knights with royal grants. In this way she succeeded at least in buying the strict neutrality of the Order in her conflict with her son. While Templar Knights appear as witnesses in charters of both sides in the following years, the Hospitallers are totally absent. The failure of Melisende to obtain active support from the Order may be explained on the grounds that Baldwin took great care never to offend the Order. We shall see this again in the next charter of Melisende (*RRH*, No. 262), but Baldwin's attitude is also apparent in *RRH*, No. 256, now under discussion, to which the King gave his consent although he must have been displeased by his mother's attempt to extend her sphere of power to Acre.

The real importance of *RRH*, No. 256, however, is not revealed until we assign it its place in the history of the chancery of Jerusalem. *RRH*, No. 245, of July 1147, had been the last charter issued by chancellor Ralph and his notary. In *RRH*, No. 256, they both have disappeared from the scene. Ralph does not reappear as chancellor until immediately after Baldwin III had

definitely removed his mother from power. Quite obviously he had been dismissed from office. By 1149 the storm about Ralph's intrusion into the church of Tyre must have reached its peak. The lord Patriarch and the episcopate were against Ralph (probably because the elevation of a royal chancellor to the position, at the same time, of archbishop of Tyre meant the collapse of all hope to regain the northern suffragans of Tyre which actually were controlled by Antioch) and consequently against the Queen Mother, who had forced his appointment. But Melisende needed the Church as an ally. She had always behaved lavishly toward the Church, to such an extent that her gifts soon became legendary. Because of these gifts, she was considered a devoutly religious person, which she may have been. But she also was a shrewd politician and her gifts to the Church must be viewed as an attempt to buy its political support. Apart from the quarrel over Ralph, no case is recorded in which she was at odds with the Church. On the other hand we shall see that in the final fight between her son and herself the Church repeatedly intervened in her favor. Having limited Baldwin's share in the kingship, as his position in the royal charters shows, Melisende must have been expecting a showdown. She knew that, when it came, she would need the support of the Church. I assume, therefore, that she realized that Ralph's position as chancellor had become untenable since his succession to the church of Tyre had developed into a major scandal. The details of what actually happened, whether chancellor Ralph was officially dismissed or whether he was persuaded to resign, are not known. But I believe it is safe to assume that he would not have given up the chancellorship voluntarily. It would not have been his way of conducting his affairs, for it would have removed him from the court, the center of power, and also because his resignation, voluntary or enforced, could not but make his position in the struggle over Tyre even more difficult, since he had now openly lost that support which had procured Tyre for him in the first place—royal favor.

One argument could conveniently be used to pressure Ralph into resigning, the argument of existing precedents. Two of his four predecessors in the chancery, Paganus and Elias, had resigned from that office upon being promoted to a bishopric or archbishopric, while in the case of the other two, Hemelinus and Franco, it is not known whether they ever ascended to the top of the hierarchy.⁶⁶ Employing this argument meant to present Ralph with the choice of giving up either Tyre or the chancellorship. So much for the argument itself—but who would have used it against him? Certainly not his ecclesiastical opponents, for what his choice would be must have been clear to them, and primarily they wanted to oust him from Tyre, not from the chancery. In allowing him a choice they would have recognized his rights to Tyre, in the event he gave up the chancellor's office. For Melisende, instead, if she wanted to get rid of him the argument was very convenient. I do not

⁶⁶ Unless Franco is to be identified with Archbishop Franco of Hierapolis, which I rather doubt because chancellor Franco authenticated the two Antioch charters of King Fulk, *RRH*, Nos. 149 and 157, of 1134 and 1135 respectively, without adding any ecclesiastical office to his name, while the Archbishop certainly held office as early as 1134 (*RRH*, No. 153a).

know whether she pressured him to this end, but, had I been in her position, I should certainly not have failed to do so. It must be realized that it would have been quite a different matter whether it was the high clergy or Queen Melisende who might have presented Ralph with such an option. In giving him a choice the clergy would implicitly recognize his rights to Tyre. If Melisende presented him with the same choice she would force him to abandon the chancery without maneuvering the clergy into a tacit approval of Ralph's position in Tyre. Ralph might have argued that in this case, also, to give him a choice between two things amounted to granting him whichever of the two he chose. But such an argument would have been only a sophism, since by removing him from the chancery the court withdrew that protection which had procured Tyre for him in the first place. To have granted Ralph this choice would have been a clever move on Melisende's part. She would thereby have given him an option in which he could not but choose Tyre, would have rid herself of a chancellor who had become a political liability, and would have designated him to the higher clergy as someone without adequate protection, who might then successfully be hunted down. It is true that the Queen Mother had originally used pressure and patronage to procure Tyre for Ralph, without apparently wishing to deprive him of the chancellor's office, for at the time of the election he had not been chancellor long enough for it to be assumed that the reason for promoting him was to replace him in the chancery. Also, as events were to show after his downfall, there was no one around nearly as capable as Ralph and his notary to succeed him. Yet, had Ralph argued that while the Queen Mother now demanded the separation of the two offices, she had previously wanted them under a single administration, Melisende could always have found a convenient excuse—for instance, that public opinion insisted that precedents be followed. To produce an excuse in order to explain her change of sides would have been the easiest part in the handling of this difficult case, as everyone who has dealt with politics at any level knows. We should, however, consider the possibility that, at the time when Melisende made Ralph archbishop of Tyre, she may already have been following some precedent and asked him to relinquish the chancellorship. The matter of precedents spoke for such a policy, which in all likelihood was founded on a ruler's fear of the concentrated power that a chancellor-bishop or chancellor-archbishop might have. However, at a time of friction between herself and her son, Melisende should, on the contrary, have been interested in just such a concentration, if Ralph was her chosen man, as we must assume he was. It would especially have strengthened her position versus her son in that it would have given her a great influence in that part of the royal domain where she was weakest, namely in Tyre. We have no reason to suppose that she had any interest in taking the chancellor's office away from Ralph when she created him archbishop, since the following events showed that it was not possible for her to appoint a new chancellor; thus she ought to have made every attempt to keep Ralph in both positions as long as he did not turn into a political liability. If this was the case, she clearly underestimated the Patriarch's op-

position to the scheme. We may leave aside the question whether or not a patriarch was likely to oppose the concentration of power deriving from the accumulation of the offices of chancellor and archbishop. Probably it would not have endangered his position as spiritual lord of the kingdom. But for the reasons mentioned above, he must surely have been utterly opposed to the appointment of the royal chancellor to this particular archbishopric, whose obedience (*oboedientia*) was a matter of hot dispute between the patriarch of Jerusalem and that of Antioch, the northern suffragans being actually controlled by Antioch. By persistent efforts the patriarchs of Jerusalem tried to restore the province of Tyre to its old extent. The appointment of the royal chancellor to the Tyre archbishopric meant creating there so much royal influence that both the patriarch and the prince of Antioch would be antagonized and all chances for a peaceful settlement of this thorny question must be shelved. Melisende may have felt that the patriarch of Jerusalem, who surely had not been appointed against her will in 1146, would not seriously oppose her; but to a patriarch of Jerusalem this was a problem of the utmost importance, a problem which he could not afford to neglect. I suggest, therefore, that at first Melisende wished to create Ralph archbishop of Tyre while keeping him in the chancellor's office, and that only subsequently, when the storm broke, did she drop him as chancellor, thereby ruining his position in Tyre as well.

This is a hypothetical reconstruction of what may have happened. It is based, however, on certain undeniable facts, namely that: (a) Melisende must have felt politically encumbered by retaining Ralph, for it was bringing her into serious conflict with the Church, (b) Ralph, as his later career proves, was a man who would have liked to hold both offices, and (c) resignation from the chancellorship would seriously weaken his Tyre position and therefore such resignation cannot have been truly voluntary. It still might be argued that Baldwin III must have had as much interest as Melisende in getting the Church's support and that it could well have been he who overthrew Ralph. But any such speculation is denied by the fact that the following year we find Ralph, no longer chancellor but still archbishop-elect of Tyre, supporting King Baldwin III at a desperate moment of the latter's struggle (see *infra*, p. 150). There are, therefore, good reasons to suppose that Ralph was removed from the chancellorship against his will and at the instigation of Queen Melisende.

When Ralph departed he took with him his chancery clerk, of whom we find no trace in the *dictamina* until he returns at the same time as Ralph—as is shown by *RRH*, No. 291, of April 1152, which is written in his unmistakable style. In the meantime there was no chancellor, and the chancery was vacant. From Ralph's last mention in *RRH*, No. 245, until his reappearance in *RRH*, No. 291, we have seven royal charters, six by Melisende and one by Baldwin, in which nothing is said of a chancellor. Practically, the chancery collapsed, for the two most able men had left and no one having the same degree of professional efficiency could replace them. *RRH*, No. 256, the first royal

charter after Ralph's downfall and the first one to be issued by Melisende alone, is a diplomatic disaster, such as would have never emanated from Ralph's notary nor ever obtained the chancellor's final approval. The man who wrote the piece was faced with the task of combining an exchange between the Queen Mother and the Knights of St. John with the confirmation of a previous sale and a previous grant by third parties to the Order. For a trained chancery clerk this would not have presented insurmountable difficulties, but the man who prepared it failed miserably. All he managed to do was to draw up the exchange and then add to it what he more or less copied from the two previous acts, which had to be confirmed. The result was a royal charter which, among other irregularities, contained two promulgations, three dispositions, three announcements of the seal and two corroborations—in fact, a total monstrosity. One would certainly try to explain this as having been composed by the destinee were it not that, on the basis of textual similarities, we must ascribe it to the same man who wrote *RRH*, No. 259, of 1150, for another destinee. In fact the monstrous *RRH*, No. 256, opens a series of charters by Melisende which were all drawn up by a man from her chapel, who twice signed his name as Guido and once listed his vocation: *regine clericus*.⁶⁷ He drafted all of Melisende's charters up to her death, with the possible exception of *RRH*, No. 262, of 1150. As his first charter shows, he was not a trained chancery man. His second charter, *RRH*, No. 259, of 1150, which dealt with a simpler case, is considerably better but still reveals that he did not come from the royal chancery and that his background was rather that of a man accustomed to composing so-called "private," i.e., non-papal and non-royal charters, for there are still irregularities, such as putting the contents of the grant after the announcement of the seal instead of with the dispositive clause. Another indication that he was a man used to drafting "private" charters is his way of mentioning the King in the datelines of his early products. In *RRH*, No. 256, of 1149, he lists the regnal year, although incorrectly, in *RRH*, No. 262 (if indeed he wrote this), of 1150, he lists the King as reigning, and so he does in *RRH*, No. 259, of the same year. This was typical of private charters, although a few times in the past it had also appeared in royal ones. Later on Guido's charters became simpler and, in spite of the fact that he liked to vary his expressions, he developed his own formulary, in which he adopted a simple date consisting only of the year of the Incarnation and the indiction—not always correctly computed. His computational uncertainty is again a sign that he had not previously been affiliated with the Jerusalem chancery.

What do these results of formal diplomatic research mean when translated into terms of political history? The chancellor, apparently, had been removed from office. The vacancy had not been filled. The chancery had lost not only its head but its only capable notary. The Queen Mother had turned to a member of her chapel to whom she entrusted the task of drawing up her charters. Guido, however, did not work in the chancery. This is obvious from what happened after the return of chancellor Ralph to his office in 1152.

⁶⁷ *RRH*, Nos. 313 and 359.

While from that year on the chancery was again functioning for the King, with Ralph's name in the bottom line and the *dictamen* of his notary clearly apparent, the Queen Mother continued to have her charters drawn up by Guido until her death. In other words, Guido did not run the chancery but rather the scriptorium of the Queen, which continued to function even after the chancery had been revived. At first sight this might not seem much of a change, for, whatever the office was called, there was in fact a place where the Queen Mother could have charters drawn up and issued. It would not matter very much to the destinees whether these charters emanated from a chancery or a royal scriptorium. The main thing, it would seem, was that government continued. But actually the change did make a difference. In the first place it shows what Melisende could, and what she could not, do. It was one thing to remove a chancellor from office—this could be done behind the scenes. It was quite another thing to create a new chancellor—an act involving much more formality. William of Tyre, himself a chancellor and therefore in a position to know, informs us that the appointment of a new chancellor required the assent of the magnates and involved a formal investiture (*de consilio principum suorum nos ad praedictum vocavit officium et cancellarii nobis tradidit dignitatem*).⁶⁸ If such an appointment needed the approval of the magnates, it needed *a fortiori* the consent of Baldwin III as a sharer in joint rule. It is more than doubtful whether Melisende would have received his approval for a new appointment. The rift between mother and son was clearly widening, as evidenced by the slow downgrading of Baldwin in the royal charters. Melisende must have realized that in all likelihood she would not be able to exclude her son from power forever. She could not totally eliminate him from the political scene, because as a woman she could not fulfil all functions of a king, and the barons would have refused to be ruled by a woman alone. She would certainly try to keep the power to herself, but, if that was no longer possible for the whole kingdom, she was apparently prepared to undertake creating an area of her own within the kingdom itself in which her son would have no say; in other words, she would work toward an actual division of the kingdom into two distinct entities while avoiding a formal partition, a dangerous solution for a small kingdom constantly exposed to the pressure of external threats to its existence. Quite logically the Queen Mother prepared for such an eventuality with the creation of a separate administration by breaking up the official chancery and replacing it with her own scriptorium. She would not have objected to her scriptorium recognizing Baldwin as King in the datelines of the early charters issued from this office because she was willing to acknowledge in theory the barest minimum of Baldwin's rights, having nothing to gain by his complete downfall. To appoint a new chancellor without Baldwin's approval would have meant to transgress the limits of prudence. It would have amounted to assuming unilaterally the kingship for herself and herself alone, and that would have brought the country to the brink of civil war or to formal partition, neither of

⁶⁸ WT, XXI.5.

which she wanted. Thus, while she had the power to cause the downfall of chancellor Ralph, she was not powerful enough to install a successor without seriously endangering her own cause. Besides, there was a great practical advantage in not filling the vacancy in the chancery. Had she appointed a chancellor, there would have been a royal chancery, the use of which she could not very well have denied to her son. He would then certainly have insisted on having charters issued again under both names. Indeed, this question would have been raised by any new chancellor. By resorting to her own chaplains and her own scriptorium Melisende was able to exclude Baldwin III from the use of this instrument of power, and that she did this is shown, as we shall see, by Baldwin having to resort to his own devices whenever he himself wanted to issue a charter. The supposition of such an ulterior motive is confirmed by the fact that, when Baldwin was strong enough to revive the chancery and reappoint chancellor Ralph after his mother's complete withdrawal from power, he apparently denied her the use of the chancery (although he may have permitted his brother to use it), for she went right on issuing charters through her own scriptorium and through Guido her chaplain. In 1149 there seems to have been a tacit agreement that for the time being neither party would appoint a chancellor, but each would issue its charters through its own scriptorium and deny the use of its own facilities to the other.

The establishment of two separate scriptoria was a compromise which brought certain advantages to both sides, and at the same time saved the country from an open break between Queen Mother and King, a break which the King apparently did not yet feel strong enough to face, and from which the Queen had nothing to gain. In fact, however, it meant a division of royal power such as had not existed before. The creation of Melisende's scriptorium marked the beginning of the partitioning of the kingdom into two distinct blocks of power.

During this time the Queen Mother must have suffered a setback with the death of Elinard of Tiberias, the prince of Galilee who, it should be recalled, had been a trusted follower of hers and had secured her control of Galilee. His death seems to have removed the greatest crown fief from Melisende's obedience and to have swung the balance somewhat in favor of Baldwin. With Galilee being disputed it would seem that he had at last a fair chance to build up a zone of his own influence which might match and balance that of his mother. Only by way of hypothesis can we reconstruct from later events what happened in Galilee. In June 1150 we find Simon of Tiberias witnessing a charter of Baldwin III, at a time when the King had been deserted by most of the crown vassals (see *infra*, p. 150f.). Simon must have succeeded Elinard, who is last heard of at the war council of Acre in June 1148. The appearance of Simon's name would seem to indicate that the principality had gone over to Baldwin's side. What reason had the Prince of Galilee to attend on the King at a moment in Baldwin's life which was desperately critical? Since some time later it appears that there was a second claimant to the principality,

Simon's rule of, or claim to, Galilee cannot have been altogether undisputed and this would indeed have given him a reason to seek his fortunes with the King had the other claimant tried to win the Queen Mother's support. Apparently, from the legal point of view, Simon's competitor had the better claim, for, while nothing is known of Simon's background, his rival was William III of Buris, the younger brother of the late Prince Elinard.⁶⁹ Unfortunately, we do not hear of him until after Baldwin had removed his mother from power, but since he was clearly not the King's candidate I am inclined to conclude that he had enjoyed the support of the Queen Mother already before 1152. It is indicative of William's better claim that eventually it was acknowledged by the King, not, however, until after the downfall of his mother. Simon, as I have mentioned, attended the King in June 1150 (*RRH*, No. 258) and again, immediately after the end of the civil war of 1152, in *RRH*, No. 291, of April 1152. He was present at the siege of Ascalon in the King's army from January to August 1153, and William of Tyre⁷⁰ lists him among the barons of the first magnitude, thus indicating that he considered him the Prince of Galilee. On 28 October 1153 William III of Buris granted some land to the Knights of St. John and his charter (*RRH*, No. 283) is witnessed by an impressive retinue of men from the principality. Although he does not style himself Prince of Galilee or Lord of Tiberias, his retinue would seem to indicate that he so considered himself. On 30 July 1154 a charter of Baldwin III (*RRH*, No. 293) is witnessed by William of Tiberias, Simon of Tiberias, Gormond of Tiberias, and Mahengot of Tiberias with his son Ralph. Gormond obviously is the same Gormond who heads the list of witnesses in *RRH*, No. 283, mentioned above, and therefore he was not Prince of Galilee, but rather a vassal of the prince. So was Mahengot, since he appears in the same year 1154, in *RRH*, No. 297, as lord of Gerin, a dependancy of the principality of Galilee, and there is a seal which must be ascribed to his son Ralph.⁷¹ Thus, by way of exclusion only William III and Simon remain, and as William takes precedence over Simon in signing, I must conclude that Baldwin III now recognized his claim rather than that of Simon and that Simon's position had been reduced to that of the principal vassal of the Prince of Galilee. In the same year the Viscountess Ermengarde of Tiberias donated lands to the Lepers of St. Lazarus in Tiberias and the first witness after the Bishop of Tiberias is William III, who is styled *dominus Tyberiadis* (*RRH*, No. 297). There cannot be any reasonable doubt that by 1154 William was recognized as prince of Galilee by the King as well as within the principality; on the other hand, it is certain that the King had upheld Simon's claim at least from 1150 to 1153. Unless William III's claim was entered very suddenly in 1153 (which I would question, for, whatever its basis, William's claim must have existed at the time of Elinard's death and before Simon's appearance), I must assume

⁶⁹ This matter was studied in detail by H. Pirie-Gordon, "The Reigning Princes of Galilee," *English Historical Review*, 27 (1912), 452f.

⁷⁰ WT, XVII.21.

⁷¹ G. Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient Latin*, Bibliothèque archéologique et historique, 37 (1943), 47; Richard, *Le royaume latin*, 83 note 2.

that the principality was disputed between the two for a number of years. Since the King backed Simon, William's support must necessarily have come from the Queen Mother. Whatever the details of this strife, for the Queen Mother Galilee was certainly no longer a totally dependable source of help.

The first practical problem which in these years arose from the actual division of the country, as the establishment of two distinct scriptoria shows, was whether a charter issued by one of the competitors would be honored by the other in a country which, in theory, was still united. Potential destinees had somehow to evade the risk of seeing rejected by the King what the Queen Mother had granted, or vice versa. How people coped with this problem can be seen first in *RRH*, No. 262, of 1150, a curious document in many respects. Let me first try to establish its date more precisely. Very surprisingly, it is witnessed by Humphrey of Toron, the only witness in all the charters issued by Melisende alone who was a usually loyal supporter of King Baldwin III against his mother. He went to Syria with the King in 1150, when very few others did, and the King appointed him his constable in 1152. From then on Humphrey served him with unfailing loyalty and was a source of strength to Baldwin III and his two successors, his brother Amaury I and his nephew Baldwin IV. Humphrey met his death as a result of wounds he had received on the battlefield while protecting Baldwin IV, the leper king. In 1150, however, he must have had some doubts as to Baldwin's chances. When he went north to Antioch and Edessa with the King in the summer of 1150 he requested that he be given possession of the fortress of 'Aintāb, in the county of Edessa west of the Euphrates, which he felt strong enough to hold against the Turks. He certainly did not need this fortress, for in the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem he held the lordship of Toron-Tibnīn which had been in the hands of his family from the beginnings of the crusader states and which comprised all the land between Tyre and the mountains. In addition, we find him holding the castle of Banyas as a fief of the lord of Bairut, half of which he gave to the Hospitallers in 1157 to bring down the expenses of its defense (*RRH*, No. 325). Given the geographical position of his possessions, he was outside the orbit of the Queen Mother; but if he was ready in the summer of 1150 to relinquish his comfortable holdings in Toron for an extremely insecure position east of the Orontes, he must have had serious doubts as to the King's chances. The impression is that he wished to evade the whole conflict by emigrating to Edessa. At the time he showed this desire, in the summer of 1150, he had already cast his lot with the King by going with him to Syria, an action which Melisende, as we shall see, had tried to prevent at all costs. Having gone to Syria with the King, Humphrey thought it better not to remain too close to the Queen Mother. The fact that he is attending on her as a witness in *RRH*, No. 262, forces me to place this document earlier than her charter *RRH*, No. 259, of 1150, which in turn can be shown to be immediately prior to Baldwin's *RRH*, No. 258, of 22 June 1150 (see *infra*, p. 146). Thus *RRH*, No. 262, should be placed early in 1150, when Humphrey was still undecided as to the course he should take and was keeping open to himself more than

one avenue of action, as his witnessing of Melisende's charter *RRH*, No. 262, and his accompanying the King on the march to Syria seem to show.

The charter *RRH*, No. 262, itself has come down to us in its original form, but it is a strange charter. At first it was not intended to serve as the actual document. The invocation is written in normal script rather than in *elongata*, the names of all the ecclesiastical witnesses are abbreviated, one of the initials was added afterward having first been forgotten, and there is another later insertion of the word *in*. The document originally ended with a list of witnesses. Later on, a line and a half were added in much smaller script: *Anno ab incarnatione domini M^oC^oL^o, indictione duodecima, data est hec pagina per manum Frederici capellani fratribus Hospitalis, regnante quarto rege Balduino, Fulchero patriarcha, quod sui iuris est, regente*. Below this, there is a *plica* through which holes were pierced to accommodate two seals. One of them must obviously have been the seal of Melisende, which is announced in the charter. The second, surprisingly, was that of Baldwin III, which is not announced but was still seen by Sebastiano Pauli when he examined the piece in the eighteenth century.⁷²

There are only two ways of explaining the curious outer traits of this document. Possibly it was a sort of petition drawn up by the destinees and then handed to Melisende's scriptorium where it was considered satisfactory enough to pass as an original after a few corrections had been made. This I rather doubt, for in many ways the document stresses the superiority of Melisende's claim to the rule of the kingdom over Baldwin's, and from all we know the Hospital tried to remain neutral in the conflict and would not have drawn up such a document. The only alternative explanation I can offer is that we have here the unusual case of a first draft used as an original after it had been revised. The script is a very careful one, showing distinct traces of the influence of papal chancery script, especially in the long "s" and the "f," and more particularly in the ligatures "st" and "ct." It was not unsuitable for use as an original once some minor mistakes had been corrected. Its being a rough draft would explain these mistakes as well as the abbreviation of the names of the high ranking ecclesiastics and even the addition of the date and the authentication by the chaplain Frederick. It is puzzling to find him signing his title, for lack of space, only as *Fredericus* ^a/_c, which might mean either *cancellarius* or *capellanus* although neither word is normally abbreviated in this way. I prefer the reading *capellanus* in consideration of the fact that there was no chancery at the time, while we know that both the Queen Mother and the King had their own chapels, which issued charters. Since the document

⁷² *Codice Diplomatico del Sacro Militare Ordine Gerosolimitano oggi di Malta*, S. Pauli ed., I (Lucca, 1733), 30, No. 28; drawing of the seal, *ibid.*, pl. II, No. 17. There is some slight evidence that there may have been another charter sealed by both Baldwin III and Melisende as early as 1148. In this year the Jacobite convent of St. Mary Magdalen in Jerusalem filed a lawsuit before the King and his mother for the possession of a certain village and was allowed to repurchase it from the current owner for 1,000 gold dinars. A Syriac fragment says that for this the convent received "a deed of purchase duly witnessed and sealed with the royal seals"; cf. W. R. Taylor, "A new Syriac Fragment Dealing with Incidents in the Second Crusade," *The Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, 9 (1929/30, published 1931), 124.

was also presented to the scriptorium of the King for the affixing of his seal, the question arises whether chaplain Frederick's addition was made in the scriptorium of the Queen Mother or in that of the King. Without wishing to commit myself just yet I am inclined to prefer the first possibility because, if I am not mistaken, the script of the addition, although much smaller and less formal than that of the main text, is by the same hand as that of the document proper. Consequently, a hierarchy in Queen Melisende's scriptorium, in which Guido would have made the rough draft and Frederick would have corrected and authenticated it, is precluded. The assumption of such a hierarchy would indeed be doubtful in a small kingdom like Jerusalem and especially in a semi-official scriptorium, when the existence of such an organization is hard to demonstrate even in the larger chanceries of Europe. If, however, the handwriting of the addition is not the same as that of the main body of the text we must either assume that a hierarchy existed or else attribute the addition to the scriptorium of the King. The simplest solution would seem to be that a rough draft, though written carefully by Frederick, was nevertheless meant to be only a draft; he then liked it so well that he decided to use it as an original after he had corrected it and added the authentication. Methodically speaking, the simplest solution is usually preferable, but in this case it depends on whether or not the two scripts are by the same hand. The differences in the scripts certainly are not an obstacle to my supposition. It follows that Melisende's scriptorium did not have a hierarchy, but only more than one chapel clerk—Guido, who wrote most of the documents, and Frederick, who wrote this particular one. The *dictamen* may be related to that of Guido, but not without difficulties. This again makes it more likely that the whole document was Frederick's work.

It must have been known to the scriptorium of Melisende that Baldwin would be asked to affix his seal to this charter. Otherwise, the holes for Melisende's seal would have been pierced in the middle of the document, i.e., equidistant from either margin. In this instance they were not; they were pierced halfway between the middle of the document and either the left or the right margin. Later, the holes for Baldwin's seal could be pierced in the corresponding place on the other side in relation to the middle, so that at present the two sets of holes are evenly spaced along the bottom of the charter; to be exact, at one and at two thirds of its width. In other words, they are arranged symmetrically, and this could have happened only if it had been known in advance that a second seal was to be affixed.

In the document the Queen Mother again concerned herself with the royal domain at Acre, for she gave to the Knights of St. John the village of Beroeth which was very close to that city. Although we must presume that by this time Acre was in the King's zone of influence, since there is evidence that in the summer of the same year it was under his control, Melisende still tried to meddle in his affairs in that area. If she did not actually control Acre it would make it all the more easy for her to grant parts of the royal domain there to the Hospitallers; these, however, made sure that the King too would affix his

seal to the grant in order to make it operative. In a way Melisende had the King in a tight corner since a refusal to confirm the grant she had made might have driven the Hospitallers into her camp. He must in advance have given his assurance that he would ratify his mother's grant, for his consent, as well as that of his brother, is mentioned; his seal was added later.

A close examination of the text reveals several interesting features. Melisende made her grant *consilio itaque discretorum et maxime rectiora nobis consulencium studiosissime percunctato*, i.e., after she had carefully pondered on the advice given her by discerning men and especially by those who generally gave her the more correct advice. The Queen Mother is unusually reticent in not specifying who these discerning men were, but undoubtedly she is referring to the advice of certain of the vassals. The phrase can only be interpreted as meaning that there were two opposing camps among the barons, those who (in her opinion) gave her sound counsel and those who did not. It does not necessarily mean that both camps had been consulted; only that there existed a different body of opinion which perhaps she did not choose to consult at all. Those who gave her the better advice must surely have been her own partisans, whereas those who gave her the worse advice must have been the King's. In fact, in view of later developments, I suggest that here is the first indication that Melisende was now deliberately creating a vassalry of her own—an act which would really split the kingdom. That things were not going at all well in the kingdom can be sensed from the sentence in which she stated that she was making the grant to ensure the continuance of peace in the rule which had been entrusted to her (*ad consequendam in commisso regimine pacis perseverantiam*). Baldwin's royal position was considered only as an appendix to her own, for she said that the proceeds of the village were to be used by the Hospitallers for the feeding of the poor *me regnante cum filio meo rege Balduino*. She granted him the position of a *coheres*, co-heir, but that meant only that she had once more relegated him to the same position as his brother Amaury, whose consent she here implied by saying that anyone violating this charter would incur her own wrath and that of her *coheredes*—which can refer only to Baldwin III and Amaury. As for Amaury, her younger and favorite son, the Queen Mother was again deliberately attempting here to create for him a share in joint rule under the will of Baldwin II, and this time the attempt was made much more clearly than the first time (see *supra*, p. 124f.). One must remember that Baldwin III was not married yet and could not foresee that he would die without offspring. He must, therefore, have resented very much his brother being called a co-heir, because if Amaury really was a co-heir, the succession of Baldwin's children, which he no doubt hoped to have some day, would be seriously jeopardized.

In announcing her seal the Queen Mother said: *dono et concedo, literarum etiam et sigilli nostri, quod maius est, auctoritate confirmo*. This can mean one of three things: 1. Melisende is making her grant by means of the royal authority of a charter (*litera*) and, what is more (*quod maius est*), of her seal; 2. Melisende has two seals—one small and one large—and is having the larger one affixed

to this charter to lend it additional weight; 3. Melisende is sealing this charter with her seal, which is larger (*maius*) than others—in other words, is more important than that of Baldwin III which she knew was to be affixed to the charter. There is no evidence that the rulers of Jerusalem ever had a smaller and a larger seal, a simple and a solemn one, as some European rulers had. We may therefore safely discard the second possibility. The first is not very likely either because, if the grant is made by charter, the charter must be sealed in order to be valid. The seal would not increase (*quod maius est*) the validity of the charter but would in fact constitute its validity. We are left with the third possibility, the one which assumes that, just as Melisende's scriptorium subtly hinted that there was now a vassalry of the Queen Mother as distinct from that of the kingdom, so did it as subtly hint that her seal was more important than that of the King, because she was the true ruler and Baldwin was king in name only. The punctuation of the original would seem to confirm this assumption. I am giving here in parallel two passages from this charter, with their mediaeval punctuation:

| | |
|---|--|
| <i>ad consequendam in commisso regi- mine pacis perseverantiam · sive quod devocius esse percipitur · pro predeces- sorū nostrorum animabus</i> | <i>dono · et concedo; literarum etiam et sigilli nostri quod maius est · aucto- ritate regia confirmo;</i> |
|---|--|

It will be noted that the punctuation with regard to the *quod*-clause is different in the two instances. In the left column the whole clause appears enclosed within *puncta*. The meaning is clear. It is stated that the grant is made for the continuance of peace in the kingdom and, what is even more pious, for the souls of the predecessors. In the right column, instead, the *quod*-clause is not enclosed within *puncta* and must be a qualification of the preceding nouns *litera* or *sigillum*. For obvious grammatical reasons the *quod*, if indeed it qualifies one of these two nouns, can refer only to *sigillum*. I am, therefore, convinced that the meaning of the sentence is the following: "I give and concede and confirm by the royal authority of a charter and of our seal which is the more important one . . ."

More than any other charter, *RRH*, No. 262, emphasizes the leading role of Melisende and reduces the position of Baldwin to a merely nominal one. This, of course, does not mean that the charter actually reflects the exact political situation. The King could not but confirm Melisende's grant to the Hospitallers in the vicinity of Acre, if he wanted the Order to remain neutral. However, now for the first time he deliberately interfered in that part of the kingdom which Melisende had so far rightly considered to be her own zone of influence, for in the spring of 1150 he rebuilt Gaza near Ascalon in the south. If the Queen Mother meddled in Acre in the north, where Baldwin was trying to establish his own influence, surely he could do likewise in Gaza in the south. We assume that Gaza was rebuilt after *RRH*, No. 262, had been issued, since this charter must be placed before *RRH*, Nos. 259 and 258, which in turn were issued immediately after Gaza was rebuilt. By rebuilding Gaza the

King cut off Ascalon, still in Egyptian hands, from Egypt and completed the ring of fortresses with which King Fulk had surrounded Ascalon between 1136 and 1142. William of Tyre⁷³ reports that Gaza was reconstructed shortly after the events of 1149 in Antioch, previously described by him, when Baldwin III had marched north to administrate the principality of Antioch after its ruler's death in the battle of Inab. William goes on to say that the rebuilding was completed within a short time (*in brevi consumant feliciter*)⁷⁴ and that the King and the lord Patriarch returned to Jerusalem in the early spring when the inner castle was partly finished, that is, before completion of the whole project (*Circa veris autem initium domino rege dominoque patriarcha completo ex parte municipio interiore... Hierosolymam reversis*). The castle was committed to the care of the Knights Templars. Again I shall attempt to date these events more precisely and clarify their political meaning. Ibn al-Qalānisi⁷⁵ assures us that in the spring of 1150 the Franks made a raid into the Ḥaurān east of the Sea of Galilee. This brought on a counterattack by Nūr ad-Dīn of Aleppo which alarmed the ruler of Damascus, who feared Aleppine dominance and consequently invoked the alliance he had had with the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem since 1139 against Nūr ad-Dīn. Instead of plundering the Ḥaurān, the Franks decided to make common front with Damascus against Nūr ad-Dīn. Ibn al-Qalānisi says that the Franks were heading toward Ascalon with the purpose of rebuilding Gaza, but changed direction and marched north to Banyas, to help the Damascenes. This cannot refer to the Frankish main force but only to a contingent on its way to join the King at Gaza, for no source mentions that the King himself set out to march against Nūr ad-Dīn. In fact, Ibn al-Qalānisi, the contemporary Damascus chronicler, calls it a vanguard. Nūr ad-Dīn campaigned in the Ḥaurān from 4 to 26 April 1150 (these dates are specifically mentioned by Ibn al-Qalānisi). He did not achieve anything and made peace with Damascus in May 1150. The rebuilding of Gaza, therefore, must be placed at some time between March and May 1150. It presented a definite threat to the interests of Queen Melisende. With Galilee being disputed, with the King trying to establish his control over Acre, as evidenced by the addition of his seal to Melisende's *RRH*, No. 262 (and having actually established it, as will be shown by his own *RRH*, No. 258), it would have been very dangerous for her if he now got control of a fortress in the south. This would mean that he could threaten the Queen Mother's possession from two sides, having managed to catch her in the middle. Melisende herself apparently was not present at Gaza, but the Patriarch was, and presumably was to look after her interests after chancellor Ralph's removal from office. If the King built a fortress in the spring of 1150, at a time when the situation between himself and his mother was extremely tense, he must have intended to place in it a reliable vassal, else his effort would result only in strengthening

⁷³ WT, XVII.12.

⁷⁴ From the evidence of better documented cases, one is surprised to find how quickly the Franks could build their fortresses; sometimes it took only a few months.

⁷⁵ *Histoire de Damas*, trans. Le Tourneau, 311f.

Melisende's position. Melisende, on the other hand, must have had every intention of preventing the establishment of a royal vassal in Gaza, which would endanger her own position as well as that of the Ibelins. Barisan of Ibelin and his son Hugh had witnessed her charter *RRH*, No. 262, and were therefore in her camp. They were now more important to the Queen Mother than they had been in 1144 (see *supra*, p. 119) because, after the death of Renier, lord of Ramla and Mirabel, Barisan of Ibelin had acquired these two lordships, in addition to his own in Ibelin, his wife being now the only surviving child of Baldwin I of Ramla. He owed the service of forty knights for Ramla and Mirabel and ten for Ibelin. Eventually, the fortress of Gaza was entrusted to the Knights Templars. This, we must assume, was a compromise acceptable to both parties since it made Gaza neutral in respect to the internal struggle of Jerusalem, yet ensured that the fortress would serve its military purpose against Ascalon. The Templars did not maintain such a strict neutrality as the Hospitallers, but that they were neutral is shown by the fact that we find Templars witnessing for both sides—although it must be admitted that Melisende had to show on her charters Templars of far greater importance than Baldwin III did. Yet, the politically significant fact is that Gaza was not entrusted to either a partisan of the Queen Mother or one of the King. We may be sure that the Patriarch had had a hand in this solution for, as soon as this decision was made, the Patriarch lost interest in Gaza and returned to Jerusalem. Baldwin's attempt to establish himself in the old Philistine lands in the south had failed—but he had shown what he could potentially do.

At this point I must stop to inquire whether the civil war between Baldwin and his mother—the open fight for power—might not have taken place in 1150 rather than 1152. The earlier date has been proposed long ago by Jean Richard.⁷⁶ Any suggestion of so distinguished an expert cannot be lightly discarded. Indeed, as we have seen, the stage was set, the rift was deep enough, and Richard can base his theory on William of Tyre, who tells of the rebuilding of Gaza in the chapter immediately preceeding the two in which he reports the civil war. The war itself, however, was triggered by Baldwin's demand to be crowned at Easter, which in 1150 was on 16 April, and on this day the King was most likely still at Gaza. Moreover, immediately after the Easter events and before the fighting broke out, the kingdom was formally divided, and Baldwin received Acre and Tyre. In this case the Queen Mother would have been unable to dispose of royal lands near Acre, as she did in *RRH*, No. 262, unless we place *RRH*, No. 262, before Easter 1150. We know that in the summer of 1150 the King again went north to deal with Syrian affairs. Because of all this, it seems apparent that there would not have been enough time for the civil war to have occurred in the year 1150; besides, I am convinced that the King was still at Gaza on Easter Day 1150.

The strongest indication that by the summer of 1150 the kingdom had not yet been formally divided comes from the two charters *RRH*, Nos. 259 and 258, issued by Melisende and Baldwin, respectively. They both deal with

⁷⁶ Richard, *Le royaume latin*, 65.

a transaction in the plain of Bethlehem, namely, in that area which, when the kingdom was finally divided, was assigned to Melisende. As in *RRH*, No. 262, the destinee, given the political instability prevailing in the kingdom and in view of the fact that there were now two competing scriptoria issuing charters, wanted to make sure that the transaction was approved by both rulers, but in this case the method employed was different. Had the kingdom already been formally partitioned the approval of the King would not have been needed. Both charters were issued for the Lepers of St. Lazarus outside the walls of Jerusalem. *RRH*, No. 259, is clearly a charter of Guido, emanating from the Queen Mother's scriptorium. Textually it is closely related to *RRH*, No. 256, of 1149, Guido's first charter, which I have already discussed. In her charter Melisende approved the sale to the Lepers of four plots of vineyards in the plain of Bethlehem, made by a Syrian called Mozageth for the price of 1,100 bezants and a horse. The Queen Mother still recognized Baldwin's kingship in the dateline, but his consent is no longer mentioned. This must be considered a deliberate insult, for she replaced the King's consent by *laudamento baronum meorum*. Baldwin's charter *RRH*, No. 258, issued from Acre on 22 June 1150, concerns the same transaction. In this document he confirmed to the Lepers thirteen *carrucae* of vineyards they had bought in the plain of Bethlehem from the Syrian *rais* (i.e., village chief) Melenganos for the price of 1,050 bezants and a horse. Both charters have come down to us in the thirteenth-century chartulary of the Convent of the Lepers of St. Lazarus. This source is notoriously unreliable in its transcriptions and the texts have suffered additionally at the hands of their editor, Comte de Marsy. But even Marsy could not help noting that *RRH*, Nos. 259 and 258, dealt with the same sale.⁷⁷ It is true that the Syrian seller is called Mozageth by Melisende and Melenganus by Baldwin; that Melisende states that the price was 1,100 bezants and a horse while Baldwin fixes it at 1,050 bezants and a horse. Furthermore, Melisende speaks of four pieces of vineyards, while Baldwin specifies thirteen *carrucae*. But the two figures might very well indicate the same thing. The *carruca* was a fiscal unit of approximately thirty-five hectares, thus thirteen *carrucae* were lands of thirteen times thirty-five hectares, but did not necessarily form a single plot. On the contrary, usually a given number of *carrucae* consisted of various plots which together made up the total amount of *carrucae* recorded in the royal *Secrète* as the basis for assessments. In both cases, then, we have a sale of vineyards by a Syrian at almost the same price—and *MC* may easily have been misread by a copyist as *ML*, or vice versa. The fact that in each case a horse was included in the transaction makes it more than likely that both charters refer to the same sale, as does the reference to the vineyards, which in both cases are located in the plain of Bethlehem. That the same price was paid in both cases for vineyards in the same location confirms my assumption that the four plots are to be identified with the thirteen *carrucae*. The implications are clear enough:

⁷⁷ Comte de Marsy, "Fragment d'un cartulaire de l'Ordre de Saint-Lazare, en Terre Sainte," *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, 2^b (1884), 128 note 19.

the Lepers had their acquisition confirmed first in one scriptorium and then in the other.

One can also determine which of the two charters is the earlier. Although Baldwin's charter was issued not by the Queen Mother's but by his own scriptorium, it reveals a notable resemblance in text and formulary to that of Melisende, which was certainly a product of Guido. The only explanation is that the royal chaplain Daniel, who drew up Baldwin's charter, had before his eyes that of Melisende and used it as model. The opposite explanation is not possible since Melisende's document is, in turn, closely related to an earlier charter of hers (*RRH*, No. 256). Melisende is not mentioned in Baldwin's charter nor is her charter *RRH*, No. 259, which he was regranting. The rift by now must have been very deep indeed. Evidently, it was impossible in this case to follow the same procedure that had been employed in *RRH*, No. 262, of the same year. That document (*supra*, p. 140) had been issued by Melisende in full knowledge that it would be submitted to the approval of Baldwin. But then, in *RRH*, No. 262, Melisende had meddled in the northern part of the royal domain which I believe was already under Baldwin's control. In the present case she did not intend to have the King reconfirm a charter concerning a destinee just outside of Jerusalem and a property in the plain of Bethlehem which she considered to be in her own zone of influence. The destinee had, therefore, to approach Baldwin for a separate charter, which he would readily grant—at the moment it would cost him nothing, since he had no control of the plain of Bethlehem anyway and furthermore it would furnish him with the opportunity of pretending that he did have royal rights there, which, in theory, was still true. That he did not mention his mother at all and even in the dateline named only the Patriarch's year of office shows that, as far as he was concerned, the *Samtherrschaft* was finished. On parchment he considered himself the sole ruler, while Melisende paid at least lip service to him in the dateline of her charter. In doing this Baldwin assumed for himself a position he did not have, for, as we shall presently see, his situation in July 1150 was desperate.

Baldwin's charter was written by a certain Daniel, who styled himself *clericus regis, frater Salientis in bonum Hugonis*. We know this brother better than the clerk himself; he was a bourgeois of the King of some importance. But to state this relationship in the royal charter proves that Daniel, like Guido, had not received his training in the royal chancery. The expression is most peculiar and so is his announcement of the witnesses: *Huius igitur vinee perpetuo a pauperibus illis predictis possidende gratia testes sunt*. It makes grammatical sense only if *gratia* is taken as a postposition meaning "because of." But even the construction of the sentence is shockingly incorrect: *Huius igitur vinee . . . testes sunt*, instead of *Huius igitur rei (donationis, concessionis, confirmationis) testes sunt*. Daniel would have found it very hard to explain his version to a senior clerk in a chancery. He certainly came from the royal chapel but had not previously been associated with the royal chancery. It is obvious that with the collapse of the chancery and the setting up of the Queen Mother's

own scriptorium, to which Baldwin had no access, the King had been forced to open a scriptorium of his own.

It was not only the chancery that had collapsed. Melisende had in general begun to create government offices of her own as distinct from those of the Crown. In her charter for the Lepers a chamberlain Nicolaus appears for the first time and then reappears in *RRH*, Nos. 269 and 278, of 1151–52; he must have been her personal chamberlain, since he is not qualified as *regis* or *regius camerarius* but styles himself simply *camerarius*. When in 1152 Melisende was forced to retreat into the citadel of Jerusalem to defend herself against her son she did so, in the words of William of Tyre, *cum familiaribus suis et fidelibus*. Taken together with her creation of a separate scriptorium the evidence can be interpreted in only one way: the Queen Mother had set up her own household, separate from the official royal household. Thus she prepared herself for the oncoming showdown by creating an administrative machinery which was inaccessible to the King and, in the case of a major conflict, would enable her to continue to exercise the functions of a ruler. She went even further. She now created for herself a party of adherents among the barons. Her charter to the Lepers of 1150 is made *laudamento baronum meorum*. So she now considered herself to have her own barons, who owed allegiance only to her and not to the kingdom in general, let alone to the King. Doubtless she had always had a party of supporters among the barons or else she would have been overthrown long before. It had consisted of true and loyal followers as well as of men who would always be on the side of the stronger forces. But now she came out in the open. Apparently, this vassalry of the Queen Mother was a very new thing at the time *RRH*, No. 259, was issued, in the summer of 1150. In the earlier *RRH*, No. 262, of the same year, the Queen Mother had only cautiously hinted at the existence of such a party of barons which was now ready to come out into the open at any moment (see *supra*, p. 141). Indeed, only a short time later, the moment arrived for her to issue *RRH*, No. 259, *laudamento baronum meorum*.

If now there were barons who owed allegiance only to the Queen Mother, the implication is that much more had happened than just the creation of a separate scriptorium and a separate household. Both these measures might still be regarded as constitutional, if only in a formal way, if one were prepared to stretch one's conscience and imagination. But the establishment of a vassalry of her own was really a *casus belli*. No one could overlook this, no one could ignore the fact that now the kingdom had been completely disunited and broken up into two distinct entities. It was not, of course, a state of affairs which could be tolerated for any length of time if the best interests of the kingdom were to be considered. It seriously impaired, in fact it destroyed, the military establishment on which the very existence of the kingdom was based. Melisende can have entertained no illusions as to the seriousness of her step. She must have been prepared for a showdown. To mention Baldwin in the dateline of *RRH*, No. 259, was merely to pay lip service to a past rapidly receding; indeed, it is the last mention of Baldwin in her charters until a

truce was reached in the fight. We can be reasonably sure that Melisende herself cannot have entertained any unrealistic expectations that this situation could be maintained for very long. The barons in the long run would not find it advantageous, and the moment a major military attack threatened the kingdom this system must come to an end and unity be restored, or the kingdom would collapse. In taking so drastic a step the Queen Mother must have labored under the impression that Baldwin III's progress had reached the point where it was very detrimental, if not fatal, to her power and that any further advance of his must be halted at all cost. If she was to prevail, she must break down his position at once. And she had indeed serious reasons for trying to stop him from his next enterprise.

While the King was still rebuilding Gaza, disaster again befell the north, with the capture of Count Joscelin II of Edessa. News of it reached Aleppo on 5 May 1150.⁷⁸ This was presumably what brought King Baldwin III back to Jerusalem although the work at Gaza was not yet completed. He realized that once again he had to go to Syria. But he now found that political conditions had already deteriorated to a point where the cohesion of the state was threatened. It has been duly recorded by William of Tyre⁷⁹—but it has escaped, at least in its full impact, most historians—that when Baldwin III marched to Antioch in the summer of 1150 he encountered serious difficulties: *Assumptis sibi Henfredo constabulario* (an anachronism, because Humphrey was not made constable until 1152) *et Guidone Berythensi, nam de iis, qui in portione dominae reginae erant, licet singillatim evocasset, neminem habere potuit, ad partes pervenit Tripolitanas, ubi et comitem cum suis militibus assumens Antiochiam celer pervenit*. In other words, Baldwin III, on learning of the capture of Joscelin II of Edessa (5 May 1150), summoned his army, but those who sided with Queen Melisende did not show up. The King then resorted to an unusual measure. Instead of issuing a general summons, proclaimed by heralds, he summoned the reluctant lords individually, by written mandate, as the French translator tells us.⁸⁰ They refused to comply with it, and this is why the King was still at Acre on 22 June 1150, where he issued *RRH*, No. 258, when he should already have been in Antioch. This dramatic event clearly shows that my interpretation of the consent of “my barons” in Melisende’s *RRH*, No. 259, as meaning the creation of her own vassalry is not idle speculation. It was a grim reality. In terms of feudal law the barons who refused to serve were committing felony of the worst kind—they were

⁷⁸ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Histoire de Damas*, trans. Le Tourneau, 314.

⁷⁹ WT, XVII.15. Among modern historians only Röhrich, *Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem*, 265 note 7, and Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades*, II, 317, mention this extraordinary event. Röhrich completely misses the point by implying that the story could not be true because the civil war took place in 1152, not in 1150. Evidently Röhrich thought that William of Tyre had here erroneously attributed to the year 1150 a refusal that took place in 1152, or that such refusals of a summons could happen only in times of open civil war. Grousset also partly misses the significance of this event, for he says that it was the vassals of the Queen Mother’s personal fiefs who refused Baldwin’s summons. Thus, while admitting that this amounted to open treason, he does not realize that it is evidence of *ade facto* partition of the kingdom, since the Queen Mother had no personal fiefs but a part of the kingdom which she controlled. It was, therefore, not her personal vassals who refused to serve, but vassals of the Crown.

⁸⁰ *L’Estoire de Eracles* (*supra*, note 30), 783.

neglecting the principal requirement of their military obligation to the King. Without doubt a legal argument was also needed for ignoring the summons. William of Tyre hints at it when he says that the King could not enlist service from those who were *in portione reginae*, i.e., in that part of the kingdom which was under the control of the Queen Mother. Apparently the defiant barons now misconstrued Baldwin II's will as having intended a partition of the kingdom. This was an argument of a sort, but, in view of the two decades which had elapsed, not a very valid one. They cannot simply have argued that they did not owe service at all. Whenever anyone refused service he always took care to explain why he did not owe the service at all, or at least why he did not owe it in the particular case in question. In any event Melisende's party must have contended that they owed service only under summons of the Queen Mother, not under those of the King. This in turn must mean that the Queen Mother had not summoned them and was not willing to do so. She did not approve of Baldwin going north again, where he would inevitably act as regent of Antioch for a second time and also administer the county of Edessa and again acquire the reputation of a political leader. She tried to prevent his going to Syria by cutting him off from the vassals he would need. But if she had hoped that she could thus wreck his position she was wrong. Baldwin went anyway, with whatever troops he could muster, and picked up the army of Tripolis on the way. Humphrey of Toron and Guy of Bairut went with him, says William of Tyre. Toron owed fifteen knights, Bairut twenty-one. If he was in control of Acre and Tyre, as I believe he was, his forces would have been further increased by eighty and twenty-eight knights respectively, assuming the figures in Ibelin's list (see *supra*, p. 118) to be correct. He would also have whatever Simon of Tiberias could muster from Galilee, if Simon was in control there. Yet, undoubtedly the King would have only a fraction of what he had expected when he issued the general summons and, given the situation in the kingdom, he could take along with him to the north only a small force, leaving the larger part behind to ensure that his holdings would not in his absence be occupied by the Queen Mother and her vassals. But go he must, and for the present he had no time to deal with his mother. Had he refrained from taking upon himself the responsibilities of Antioch and Edessa, he would have forsaken an almost venerable tradition established by his predecessors. Since the time of Baldwin I, the Latin kings of Jerusalem had gained political strength from the fact that they mediated the quarrels of the north and made every effort to protect the northern principalities. In public opinion, therefore, Baldwin III's role as king would have been destroyed if he had not rallied to the cause of Antioch and Edessa. This most likely was Melisende's intent, when she prevented her followers from obeying his summons. By persevering in his plan in spite of all opposition, Baldwin revealed a strength and firmness which explain why Melisende's followers were quick to leave her when her fortunes began to turn.

The King must suddenly have realized that he had lost the greater part of the vassals even for warfare. This impression is confirmed by the pathetic

state of his entourage when he issued his charter for the Lepers on 22 June 1150 (*RRH*, No. 258). First, he was attended by members of the royal chapel, his chaplain Adam, his almoner William, and his clerk Daniel. Then, we find as witness the archbishop-elect Ralph of Tyre, who now was on the King's side. He is the former chancellor who had been removed from the chancery by the Queen Mother, according to my interpretation (see *supra*, p. 133). If in 1150 he was attending on the King not as chancellor but as archbishop-elect, it follows that his downfall cannot have been brought about by the King. As the kingdom was disintegrating—with Melisende setting up her own scriptorium, her own household, and her own vassalry—Ralph went over to the King's court (if court it can be called) because there was no place for him on the Queen Mother's side. He may have had his doubts about the King's chances, for certainly he did not support the King to the extent of helping him in the matter of charters. Surely Daniel's poorly written charter could have provoked but pity for the royal clerk on the part of the former chancellor. He did not take an active part in the King's correspondence, not wishing unduly to annoy the opposing side, but, since in his struggle over Tyre he could no longer hope for the support of Melisende and her party, he had to go to the King if he wished to survive. Precisely because he did attend on the King, none of the higher clergy was present—neither patriarch, archbishop, bishop, nor abbot. They would not have anything to do with Ralph. The argument can be reversed. Because the higher clergy was firmly on Melisende's side, the King could have Ralph witness his diploma. Had he been able, as was customary, to enlist the attendance of other members of the higher clergy, he might gladly have omitted Ralph from his list of witnesses; but, as it was, Ralph must have been the only high ranking ecclesiastic he was able to muster in his support. Next, a Templar knight named Hugh of Bethsan is mentioned in the list. La Monte⁸¹ has made several speculations about him, none of which is really convincing. He has tried to tie him in some way to the family of the lords of Bethsan, but his case is by no means proven since the Hugh of Bethsan who appears shortly before and after this charter was not a Templar. This other Hugh was certainly a member of the family of Bethsan, and it must be assumed, therefore, that the Templar knight was a different person. Only by making, on insufficient grounds, two different and succeeding persons of the secular Hugh was La Monte able to identify his elder Hugh with the Templar knight, maintaining that the elder Hugh had joined the Order. While this possibility cannot be altogether dismissed, it is not very probable. The truth is that one cannot say anything definite about this man except that he was certainly not a prominent member of the Order, for he is never mentioned again as a Templar. Next to him in the list of witnesses comes Simon of Tiberias. I have already had occasion to mention that, in all likelihood, the principality of Galilee was disputed at the time and that Simon was the candidate of the King up to the end of the latter's fight with his mother; then Baldwin III

⁸¹ J. L. La Monte and N. Downs, "The Lords of Bethsan in the Kingdoms of Jerusalem and Cyprus," *Mediaevalia et Humanistica*, 6 (1950), 59ff.

began to back the better legal claim of William III of Buris. But it is not at all surprising that in 1150 we should find Simon throwing in his lot with the King's. Thus, although a baron of the first magnitude was attending on the King, we must admit that this Prince of Galilee had no other choice, because, like Ralph of Tyre, he had nothing to hope from the Queen Mother. Next follows the Viscount Clarembald of Acre. It is not at all strange that he should appear in a charter issued from Acre. He had been appointed, it seems, in 1149 or shortly before. At least, Melisende mentions him in her charter *RRH*, No. 256, of 1149, as having transacted a property sale in Acre, although he himself does not witness it. As his two predecessors, one of whom is his father Robert, are mentioned in that same charter, Clarembald's appointment cannot have been made very long before. What caused Clarembald to side with the King is not known, but that he did cannot be doubted, for he reappears in Baldwin's next charters, *RRH*, Nos. 291 and 281, of 1152 and 1153, and several times thereafter until 1169 (*RRH*, No. 465), whereas he is conspicuously absent from the witness lists of Melisende's charters. Perhaps he took the King's side because, when Baldwin III still had little or no power in Acre, the office of viscount had been taken from Clarembald's family and given to a certain Gerald of Valence (*RRH*, Nos. 245 and 246), who may have been a protégé of Melisende and could not continue in office when Baldwin's position in Acre grew stronger. Clarembald's siding with the King meant that the King was now in firm control of Acre, for the Viscount was the representative of royal power in the city. Next in Baldwin's witness list of 1150, we find one William of Barra who was first attested as a vassal of King Fulk in 1142 (*RRH*, No. 210). His next appearance is in this charter of 1150, and after that he is found in the King's entourage four times, in 1155 and 1156 (*RRH*, Nos. 299, 307, 309, and 321). In *RRH*, No. 299, he is qualified as *homo regis*, a royal vassal, not a baron. The appearance of Hugh of Aulans is politically irrelevant since he is expressly said to represent the destinee.

To sum up: Baldwin's charter for the Lepers of St. Lazarus of 22 June 1150 shows the King in control of Acre, but otherwise deserted. His entourage consists of his chapel, a dispossessed archbishop and fired chancellor, an unknown and certainly unimportant Templar knight, a prince of Galilee who was fighting for his principality, and an obscure vassal. The support of the Prince of Galilee would have been important had he been able to back it up with full power; but, as it was, the Prince must have been relying on the King as heavily as the King relied on him. The only man who undoubtedly carried not only full authority but also considerable political weight is the Viscount of Acre. The high clergy and the barons of the first and second magnitude are absent from the King's court. They either had abandoned his cause or had held aloof. We must concede that some of the nobility were perhaps still at Gaza, but the fact remains that the King, who was on the point of embarking on a major military expedition to Syria and should have been attended by a fair number of barons, stood more or less alone, surrounded by the dispossessed, the upstarts, the unimportant, and the faithful but powerless servants of his chapel.

It is true also that some of his partisans were not present, since no mention is made of Humphrey of Toron and Guy of Bairut, both of whom accompanied him to Antioch. However, we have seen that even Humphrey, who remained loyal throughout, had some doubts and seriously considered trading his comfortable lordship in the mountains around Tyre for a very insecure position east of the Orontes.

Let us compare the King's position with that of the Queen Mother. We must turn to her charters' lists of witnesses if we wish to find who belonged to her party, and to do this we must go back to the time when she began to issue charters from her own scriptorium and in her own name. From this time on we may expect to find mention of only her loyal partisans, whereas, previously, witnesses could not be attributed with any degree of certainty to either one side or the other. My purpose is to try to discover in these charters the emergence of a definite retinue of people attending on the Queen Mother. And, indeed, this can be done, even though the charter material that has come down to us is very scanty, for surely both the King and the Queen Mother issued far more charters than we now possess. Lists of witnesses are found in her charters *RRH*, Nos. 262, 259, 268, 269, and 278, extending from 1150 to 1152. It is an impressive array. Of the high ecclesiastics, we find Archbishop Baldwin of Caesarea, Archbishop Robert of Nazareth, and (twice) Abbot Geoffrey of the Temple of the Lord whose abbey had grown very rich through the favor of Melisende and her political followers, as is amply attested by *RRH*, No. 422 a. We may list here also Andreas of Montebarro, the seneschal of the Knights Templars and second highest dignitary of the Order, who rose to be Master between 1152 and 1155 and who appears twice, providing quite a contrast to the unknown Templar Hugh of Bethsan, who witnessed for Baldwin. Of laymen we have (twice) the Queen's son Amaury, who rose to the county of Jaffa during these years; (twice) Philip of Nablus, later lord of Transjordan and Master of the Knights Templars; and Rohard the Elder of Jerusalem, who is attested since 1120 (*RRH*, No. 91), was viscount of Jerusalem from 1135 to 1147 (*RRH*, Nos. 160 and 245), and was now qualified by Melisende as *dominus*, that is, baron. This Rohard appears four times as witness to Melisende's charters of these crucial years and is listed by William of Tyre,⁸² together with her son Amaury and Philip of Nablus, as still adhering to her cause in 1152, when others were already leaving her sinking ship. His successor as viscount of Jerusalem, a certain Bencellinus, appears three times but was viscount in 1150 only (*RRH*, No. 259), being replaced in this office in 1151 (*RRH*, No. 269) by Ralph Strabo, who appears twice. Likewise a person of great standing and large holdings was Viscount Ulric of Nablus, who appears twice in these five charters together with his son Baldwin, who became viscount of Nablus in 1163 and certainly held this office in 1166.⁸³ Ulric not only held his family properties in and around Nablus but had also

⁸² WT, XVII.14.

⁸³ On Ulric and his two successors in the viscounty, see J. L. La Monte, "The Viscounts of Naplouse in the Twelfth Century," *Syria*, 19 (1938), 272-76.

large possessions in Transjordan. *RRH*, No. 562, proves that it had been Melisende who had enriched the family in Transjordan. Between Ulric and his son Baldwin we find Baldwin the Buffalo (*Baldwinus Bubalus*), who held the office of viscount of Nablus in 1159/60; he, too, appears once in Melisende's charters of the years of conflict. Her chamberlain Nicolaus is mentioned three times, Walter Mauduit, a nobleman of some standing in the lordship of Caesarea, makes his appearance twice and so does John of Valenciennes, obviously a newcomer, as his name betrays, who was one of the lesser vassals of the Queen and might be inferred to be at least a knight from his position in these and later lists of witnesses, except that he is expressly qualified as *burgensis* of Jerusalem in *RRH*, No. 433, of 1167.⁸⁴ Apparently John was a drifting soldier who served successively Queen Melisende, King Baldwin III, and King Amaury I. Peter of Perigord, Tosetus, and Herbert (Albert) the Lombard, all of whom are mentioned twice as witnesses in the five charters under consideration, are known to have been influential *bourgeois* of Jerusalem. These people whose names occur more than once in the five lists of witnesses may be considered the hard core of Melisende's followers. And, indeed, some of them were still attending on her after her removal from power, when she issued her charters *RRH*, Nos. 313, 338, and 359, between 1155 and 1159–60. In these we find Abbot Geoffrey of the Temple of the Lord; Philip of Nablus, Rohard the Elder (now called Rohard of Nablus), and Baldwin the Buffalo, viscount of Nablus (each twice); and John of Valenciennes along with John Vaccarius, a knight from a well-known Jerusalem family who also had appeared once before attending on Melisende during the conflict.

Thus Melisende certainly had a group of trustworthy followers, some of whom remained loyal when she retired to Nablus after the struggle was over. To these we may add those witnesses who appeared only once in the five charters, and who neither are high ecclesiastics nor reappear in the documents issued after the Queen Mother's retirement. Among them are some clerics, foremost of whom is Ernesius, the chancellor of the Jerusalem patriarchate. The Patriarch Fulcher himself is never mentioned—perhaps he did not want to take sides officially, although from his behavior in 1152 it is clear that he supported the Queen Mother. His chancellor (who rose to be archbishop of Caesarea in 1158) would not have dared to attend on the Queen against the express desire of the lord Patriarch. Apart from him we find a canon of Bethlehem and a canon of the abbey of the Temple of the Lord, both signing with their bishop and abbot. Then there are some completely unknown people: the scribe John, Fulk of Gerin, Herbert Strabo, Herbert de Rethel, Semoreth the tailor (*li palmentirs*), Petros (a Greek), Guido Gallicus, Gilbert de Lisuncurt, Ralph the nephew of Rohard the Elder, Fulk, Salem (a Syrian Christian),

⁸⁴ We must, however, observe that among the *burgenses* listed in *RRH*, No. 433, there is also Luvellus *miles de Serre*. A knight living in the city and holding a *tenure en bourgeoisie* might thus actually become a member of the bourgeoisie. We would be well advised not to consider the social strata as strictly closed classes into which one was born. Around the middle of the twelfth century this was true only of the high landed aristocracy. Others could still move up or down the social ladder, although this became more and more infrequent.

Ermenaudus and his brother Elias, Odo de Turcame, and Ralph the Falconer (*li Fauchenirs*). Probably most of these were citizens of Jerusalem because, with the exception of *RRH*, No. 262, for the Knights of St. John, all of Melisende's charters issued between 1150 and 1152 are either for the Holy Sepulchre or for the Lepers of St. Lazarus outside Jerusalem. It would have been only natural to call on the *bourgeois* of Jerusalem as witnesses. Yet, these persons must have been partisans of the Queen Mother, or else they would not have been called upon to serve as witnesses. Others among the witnesses are better known. Babinus was the eponymous hero of a well-known noble family in Jerusalem and Cyprus; the following generation of this family owed knights' service from holdings in Jerusalem and Nablus. Further, there were members of the Jerusalem patriariate, like Bricius, Rainald Sechir, Robert de Franlos, Umbertus de Bar, Simon Rufus. Before and after the conflict these *burgenses*, like Peter of Perigord, Tosetus and Albertus Lombardus, are known to have been influential in the capital. Likewise, Rorches of Nazareth must have been a citizen of Jerusalem, for he is a witness later on, in 1167 (*RRH*, No. 435), in the settlement of a dispute between the Holy Sepulchre and the abbey of St. Maria Latina in Jerusalem.

The list is impressive; yet, the absence of several barons of eminent distinction must be noted. No prince of Galilee or lord of Tiberias appears in Melisende's charters of these critical years, and this confirms me in my opinion that Galilee had passed from Melisende's control to that of the King after the death of Elinard of Tiberias (who died after 1148). Also, the great barons of Sidon, Caesarea, and Transjordan are absent. They carried enormous weight but appear neither on Baldwin's nor on Melisende's side. Apparently they were waiting to see how the conflict would develop. As soon as it was over they emerge again, in the retinue of the King: Gerard of Sidon and Maurice of Transjordan at the siege of Ascalon in 1153,⁸⁵ Hugh of Caesarea in *RRH*, No. 293, of 1154.

Three more names occur in *RRH*, No. 262, of 1150. We have already dealt with the surprising appearance in this charter (*supra*, p. 138) of Humphrey of Toron. Besides him we find as witnesses also Barisan and his son Hugh. This Barisan was none other than Barisan le Vieux, head of the Ibelin family. Sometime after 1148 Renier of Ramla-Mirabel died without offspring.⁸⁶ This meant that Barisan le Vieux, husband of Renier's sister Helvis, who was already lord of Ibelin, became lord also of the two important lordships Ramla and Mirabel. By his wife he was related to Philip of Nablus, and his own daughter Ermengarde had been the wife of the late Prince Elinard of Galilee. This meant, of course, that the Ibelins were partisans of Queen Melisende, and very important partisans, too, after they had added Ramla and Mirabel to their holdings and thus controlled the access to Jerusalem from the coast. Because of their family ties and the geographical location of their fiefs, they could count on exerting much greater influence on Melisende than on Baldwin.

⁸⁵ WT, XVII.21.

⁸⁶ Rüdt de Collenberg, "Les premiers Ibelins," 457, enters in his genealogical table a son of Renier named Baldwin, but for him I cannot find any evidence.

Barisan le Vieux must, indeed, have been one of the most powerful supporters of the Queen Mother.

With the death of Elinard of Galilee, the predominant position of Philip of Nablus and Barisan le Vieux, as well as that of the Queen Mother, was seriously upset or at least endangered, should the King succeed in establishing his candidate Simon in the principality of Galilee. In any event, the death of Elinard must have tied the Ibelins all the more closely to the Queen Mother. We do not know precisely at what time Baldwin III and Simon of Tiberias entered the latter's claim for Galilee. This claim is known from *RRH*, No. 258, of June 1150. In the same year Barisan le Vieux is mentioned for the last time in Melisende's *RRH*, No. 262, of early 1150, and must have died soon afterward. At this point something very surprising happened: the constable Manasses of Hierges, a relative and a trusted follower of the Queen Mother, married Barisan's widow Helvis. This marriage must have been concluded before Manasses was exiled from the kingdom in 1152, never to return. From this marriage two daughters were born. While the younger daughter may have been born after the constable was exiled (though she would have been conceived before this event, which took place in the spring of 1152), the elder must surely have been born while the constable was still in power—unless they were twins. This means that the older daughter could not have been conceived later than the spring of 1151—and even that would have put the couple on a tight schedule. It is more likely that the wedding took place sometime in 1150. By virtue of this marriage Manasses was now lord of Ramla and Mirabel. That Manasses actually came into the possession of Ramla and Mirabel is proved by the fact that Baldwin III in 1152, before exiling the constable, besieged him *in castello quodam eius, cui nomen Mirabel*.⁸⁷ The match was satisfactory to the Queen Mother because it immediately replaced the loyalty of Barisan le Vieux with that of the trusted Manasses. It was a splendid coup for Manasses, who suddenly entered the tightly closed ranks of the high, landed aristocracy. Having come to the Holy Land in 1140, he had not been a member of this august circle. The basis of his power was his crown office and the Queen's favor. When eventually, after ten years, the opportunity arose for him to join the ranks of the *barons de la terre*, he took it, of course. The marriage, however, was a threat to the rise of the house of Ibelin. Barisan le Vieux had three sons, Hugh, Baldwin, and Balian. They now inherited the small lordship of Ibelin, which was not much for three brothers, but were cheated out of their expectancy of Ramla and Mirabel, the acquisition of which had been the first big step up for this illustrious family. They would lose Ramla and Mirabel forever should male issue result from the marriage of Helvis and Manasses.

The prospect of this marriage cannot have been a pleasing one to Hugh of Ibelin, now the head of the Ibelin family. In early 1150 Hugh still attested *RRH*, No. 262, of Melisende, together with his father, but at this time, of course, the marriage could not be foreseen. Hugh does not appear on Me-

⁸⁷ WT, XVII.14.

lisende's charters again, but when Baldwin III issued his next charter, *RRH*, No. 291, of 1152, Hugh is found attending on him and later on he remains at the King's court. The marriage between Helvis and Manasses, while strengthening the Queen Mother's control over a vital part of her zone of influence, thus preventing a possible repetition of the dispute over Galilee, must have cost her the support of the Ibelin family, whose star was rapidly rising. In 1164 Hugh of Ibelin was in a position to marry Agnes, the repudiated wife of King Amaury I, daughter of Count Joscelin II of Edessa, and he held Ibelin and Ramla (after Manasses' exile) and whatever dowry Agnes possessed. Hugh was succeeded as head of the family by his brother Baldwin, lord of Mirabel (again after Manasses' fall), who acquired by marriage the castle of Bethsan. Balian, the youngest son of Barisan le Vieux, made a most brilliant match by marrying in 1176 the Byzantine princess Maria Comnena, widow of King Amaury I, who brought him her dowry, the lordship of Nablus. It is quite clear that a family with such aspirations and such determination to arrive at the top, a family which had so completely grasped the concept that to belong among the magnates one had to be among the *potentes parentela et turribus fortes*, was not willing to be brushed aside by the constable Manasses in its claim to Ramla and Mirabel. It is equally clear that Hugh of Ibelin cannot have been exactly a *quantité négligeable* at the time his mother remarried. It is quite likely that in allowing this marriage to take place Melisende committed a fatal mistake. When eventually a baronial opposition began to form against Melisende, as William of Tyre says it did, before matters came to a head in 1152, the Ibelins cannot have failed to have been part of it, especially in view of the fact that William attributes the formation of the opposition to the barons' dissatisfaction with the constable Manasses, who now apparently was felt to have concentrated too much power in his hands.⁸⁸ No one had more reason to be dissatisfied with the régime of Manasses than the Ibelins. This view is a reversal of the traditional opinion, for in all histories of the crusades one reads that the influence of Manasses derived from his marriage to Helvis, by which he won the support of the Ibelin clan. Historians did not realize that this marriage, while enlarging the basis from which Manasses conducted his policies, posed, on the other hand, a considerable threat to the ascendancy of the house of Ibelin and cannot, therefore, have been taken very well by them. Probably the reason for this is that historians did not look carefully enough into chronological problems, for, had they done so, they would have realized that this marriage can have lasted, at most, no longer than two years and in fact had taken place during the very last period of Manasses' long constablership (1143-52).

This prompts me to revert once more to the question of the precise date of *RRH*, No. 262, of 1150, Melisende's charter which shows Humphrey of Toron still somewhat undecided between her and the King (see *supra*, p. 138), and Barisan le Vieux still alive. The earlier in the year it can be dated, the more time is allowed for the death of Barisan and the remarriage of Helvis to take

⁸⁸ WT, XVII.13.

place. It inevitably follows that we must place it earlier than *RRH*, No. 258, of 22 June 1150, Baldwin's last charter before he marched north with Humphrey. In all likelihood it must also be placed earlier than *RRH*, No. 259, Queen Melisende's charter for the Lepers of St. Lazarus concerning the same matter as *RRH*, No. 258, for it must be assumed that immediately after having received *RRH*, No. 259, the Lepers applied for King Baldwin III's confirmation.

I have now reviewed Queen Melisende's party. This review not only revealed what was her base of power in the kingdom (and how it was beginning to crumble), but also showed that the Queen Mother was in a position to do much toward obstructing her son's going north to Syria, since a large part of the feudal army was usually recruited from that part of the kingdom now under her exclusive control. That Melisende must have had a great interest in preventing Baldwin from going to Syria to protect Edessa and Antioch, and that nonetheless he went, has already been mentioned (*supra*, p. 149).

It must have been sometime in the summer of 1150 that Baldwin III marched to Syria after hearing of the capture of Count Joscelin II of Edessa (5 May 1150). The situation there grew worse when Sultan Ma'sūd of Iconium invaded the county of Edessa that same summer, news of which was received in Damascus on 28 July 1150.⁸⁹ In Antioch Baldwin had to carry out difficult negotiations with the Syrian nobles and the representatives of the Byzantine Emperor Manuel Comnenus. Manuel saw in the predicament of the county of Edessa an interesting possibility of reestablishing Byzantine authority in northern Syria. He offered to buy from the Countess the remaining Christian fortresses between the Orontes and the Euphrates. These definitely international dealings must have brought Baldwin into great prominence. He was establishing his leadership especially by managing to convert to his own views some of Antioch's nobles, who had felt that such desperate measures as selling out the fortresses to the Byzantines were not yet called for. But Baldwin, who was again in charge of the administration of Antioch and Edessa, knew that he would be unable to remain in the north very long and apparently did not believe that the fortresses east of the Orontes would remain in Christian hands much longer—William of Tyre expressly links Baldwin's dealings with the Byzantines with his refusal to take the blame for the total fall of Edessa. His mother would have held him principally to blame had the Muslims captured the remaining six fortresses, even though she had done all she could to let this happen by refusing to summon her own vassals to follow the King. Certainly Baldwin's own strength was not sufficient to hold the area between the Orontes and the Euphrates. By selling it to the Byzantines a splendid bargain could be struck, since the price offered by Manuel was very high, and if the fortresses then were captured, as indeed they all were within a year,⁹⁰ the blame would fall on Manuel rather than on

⁸⁹ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Histoire de Damas*, trans. Le Tourneau, 315. For the story of Baldwin's northern campaign, see WT, XVII.15–17.

⁹⁰ See C. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche* (Paris, 1940), 388f.

Baldwin. Here for the first time the political foresight and the diplomatic skill of Baldwin III emerged fully. After having talked the nobles into accepting the offer made by the Byzantine Emperor, the King and the Count of Tripoli immediately went to the fortress of Turbessel to install the Greeks there and to lead the Latins to safety. It was a sad exodus and the Christians were much harassed by Nūr ad-Dīn until they reached 'Ainṭāb. Here Humphrey of Toron and Robert of Sourdeval, a nobleman from Antioch, proposed that the fortress of 'Ainṭāb be given to one or the other of them, each feeling strong enough to hold it against the Turks. Baldwin III, however, thought otherwise and would not violate the treaty with the Byzantines, 'Ainṭāb being also one of the fortresses he had sold to Manuel Comnenus. Quite evidently he was able to impose his will, for the Greeks were installed in 'Ainṭāb and the march continued, with the King leading the vanguard and Humphrey of Toron and the Count of Tripoli protecting the rear. The people suffered not only from the dust and thirst but (fortunately for the historian) also from the heat of August (*calor quoque qualem solet Augustus ministrare*), so that a date for this march can be established—August 1150. After the King had successfully led the people back to Christian territory he returned to Antioch.

The next important question now is whether the King returned to the south in 1150 or 1151. William of Tyre stresses repeatedly that the King felt he could not remain in Antioch very long,⁹¹ yet, in reading William's account, one gets the impression that remain he did. On the basis of William's chronicle one would assume that, after returning from Turbessel to Antioch, the King endeavored to find a suitable husband for Princess Constance of Antioch, who refused every candidate he proposed. Always according to William, he then summoned a meeting of the Haute Cour to be attended by the nobility of Jerusalem and Antioch and to be held at Tripoli, where it was also attended by the local nobility. Not only did all the barons of Jerusalem come, but also Baldwin's mother Melisende. The assembly first dealt with public matters, then the question of the marriage of Princess Constance, also present, was discussed. Nothing was accomplished and the assembly broke up. Queen Melisende returned to Jerusalem with her sister Hodierna, countess of Tripoli, who had been quarreling with her husband. The Count of Tripoli, having escorted Princess Constance part of the way toward Antioch, returned to Tripoli, only to be murdered by an assassin as he entered his city. The King of Jerusalem, instead of looking after his interests in his own kingdom, was playing dice in Tripoli when the news of the Count's murder arrived, causing an enormous uproar. He then recalled his mother and the Countess of Tripoli and had the nobles of Tripoli swear allegiance to the Countess and her children; after that he returned with his mother to the Kingdom of Jerusalem.⁹²

This story, as told by William, places the assembly at Tripoli at the latest in early 1151, and this is incompatible with the actual events for two reasons. The first is that one cannot see how or why Melisende's vassals should have

⁹¹ WT, XVII.16,18.

⁹² WT, XVII.18,19.

obeyed the King's summons to the Haute Cour in Tripoli when in 1150 they had rejected his summons to go to the aid of Antioch and Edessa. Why should Melisende, who had prevented their going in 1150, have let them go in 1151, and even have gone herself, whereas, by not permitting them to attend, she could have precluded the meeting altogether? The second reason, which more fundamentally disrupts William's sequence of events, is that Count Raymond II of Tripoli, who was certainly murdered shortly after the Tripoli assembly, was still alive in 1151 and in early 1152. In 1151 he confirmed a property transaction with the Knights of St. John in his county (*RRH*, No. 270). Even more interesting is a charter recently published by Jonathan Riley-Smith.⁹³ It is a confirmation made in June 1157 of an agreement between the Master of the Templars and the Bishop of Tortosa in which the Knights were given a tract of land in the city of Tortosa in order to build there a new castle, *quod civitas Tortosa a Turcis capta et combusta miserabiliter remansit deserta et destructa*. This agreement was witnessed by Raymond count of Tripoli, son of Count Pons, which leaves no doubt that this witness was Raymond II of Tripoli, later murdered by an Assassin. The agreement, therefore, was drawn up before the Count's murder and after Tortosa had been first destroyed by the Muslims and subsequently recovered by the Franks. News of the capture of Tortosa by Nūr ad-Dīn was received in Damascus in April 1152.⁹⁴ We learn that Nūr ad-Dīn placed a garrison there, but this is all we are told. The Christian chronicler does not even tell us that Tortosa was ever captured, while the Muslim sources mention only that it was captured but fail to say when it was regained by the Franks. Riley-Smith dated the agreement "from the months between February—because Nūr ad-Dīn's occupation of the town could hardly have taken place earlier—and the end of the year." Here Riley-Smith allows a considerable amount of time, about two months, for the news of the capture of Tortosa to travel to Damascus. This is very unlikely. Good news travelled fast, and if it reached Damascus in April we should place the capture of the city in the same month. We should allow also for only a short time for the Muslims to have held the town. In reading the sources one is struck by the generally short duration of military campaigns. Neither side was able to keep its army in the field for a long time. If it was a campaign not entailing a prolonged siege of a major town, it would usually last only a few weeks. Since Tortosa had been destroyed, it may be assumed that the garrison placed there by Nūr ad-Dīn was not really meant to stay, and that destruction had been the main purpose of the campaign. Surely the capture of a town like Tortosa was a highly dramatic event, which would not have left the government of Jerusalem impassively looking on, but would have brought the King up to Syria again, had he been in his kingdom. This, then, would have induced the Muslim garrison to abandon the place, as surely they must later have done. We may assume that this agreement between Bishop and Templars was

⁹³ J. Riley-Smith, "The Templars and the Castle of Tortosa in Syria: An Unknown Document Concerning the Acquisition of the Fortress," *English Historical Review*, 84 (1969), 278–88.

⁹⁴ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Histoire de Damas*, trans. Le Tourneau, 327.

drawn up some time in April or May of 1152, after the Muslim garrison had left, for the town had first to be inspected before these arrangements were made. This means that Count Raymond II of Tripoli was still alive in April or May 1152 and that the meeting of the Haute Cour at Tripoli, convened by Baldwin, cannot have taken place before 1152, since Raymond II was murdered immediately after the meeting. To be more precise, the assembly did not meet until after this agreement of April or May 1152 had been concluded. Now surely Baldwin III had not remained in Syria from the summer of 1150 to the early summer of 1152 without returning to Jerusalem, for it was during that period that the civil war had broken out there, and Baldwin campaigned actively within his own kingdom. My conclusion is that he must have been in the north at least twice during those years; once in the summer of 1150 to come to the aid of Antioch and Edessa, and again in the summer of 1152 to hold his assembly at Tripoli.

Not much is known about the events of 1151. On 20 June 1151 we find Baldwin III campaigning in the Ḥaurān against Nūr ad-Dīn and returning between 28 June and 7 July. In July 1151 an Egyptian fleet of seventy vessels attacked the regions around Jaffa, Acre, Sidon, Bairut, and Tripoli, and it is hardly imaginable that the King should not have been busy fighting them off. Could the civil war in Jerusalem possibly have taken place in this year? There would have been enough time for it between Easter and the campaign in the Ḥaurān in June. But the assumption is unlikely. Michel le Grand in his *Syriac Chronicle* told a story on the civil war, but just at the very point where he begins there is a lacuna of ten leaves in the manuscript.⁹⁵ He places it in the year 1464 of the Seleucids (which should be corrected to 1463) and goes on to say that this corresponded to A.D. 1134 and A.H. 531, all of which is very wrong, because 1463 of the era of the Seleucids does not correspond to 1134 but to 1153 (which is indeed 622 plus 531, disregarding the lunar calendar); neither is it A.H. 531 but, rather, A.H. 548. Nor is the equation A.D. 1134 = A.H. 531 correct, for A.D. 1134 would be A.H. 528, while A.H. 531 would be A.D. 1137. In short, all this is a great chronological jumble. Fortunately, however, the faithful excerptor of Michel le Grand, Bar Hebraeus, corrected the mistake in the thirteenth century. Like Michel he places the quarrel between Baldwin and his mother in the year of the Greeks 1464, but he equates this with the year 547 of the Arabs, which ran from 8 April 1152 to 28 March 1153.⁹⁶ Nothing new is to be gained for the story of the civil war except that the short excerpts confirm William of Tyre's account of the last stages of the conflict. The same holds true of another source which briefly mentions the civil war in Jerusalem. This is the continuation of the chronicle of Sigebert of Gembloux, written by a Premonstratensian monk of the diocese of Laon or Reims. The author was roughly contemporary with the events he narrates, for he did not carry his

⁹⁵ *Chronique de Michel le Syrien patriarche jacobite d'Antioche (1166-1199)*, ed. J.-B. Chabot, III (Paris, 1905), 309.

⁹⁶ *The Chronography of Gregory Abū'l Faraj commonly known as Bar Hebraeus*, ed. and trans. from the Syriac by E. A. Wallis Budge, I (London, 1932), 279.

additions to Sigebert beyond the year 1155. A fierce enemy of Melisende, he accused her of having poisoned Alphonse-Jordan of St. Gilles, who had come to the East and presented a threat to the rule of Raymond II of Tripoli, the husband of Queen Melisende's sister. The continuator also accused Melisende of having had dealings with the Saracens and gives this as the reason for Baldwin III's revolt against her rule.⁹⁷ Be this as it may, the continuator tells essentially the same story of the last stages as do William of Tyre and Bar Hebraeus, and definitely dates the events in the year 1152. I would, therefore, be very reluctant to place the civil war as early as 1151, especially since I interpret the Tripoli assembly, which cannot have been held before 1152, as a great demonstration on the part of Baldwin III of his victory.

The Queen Mother in 1151 issued two charters, *RRH*, Nos. 268 and 269, for the Holy Sepulchre and the Lepers of St. Lazarus, respectively. Relations with Baldwin had apparently deteriorated grievously, for hardly any mention of him is made in either of these charters. Only in *RRH*, No. 268, is it mentioned in passing that the sons of Melisende saw and approved the grant. It is only Baldwin's later confirmation of the same act (*RRH*, No. 306) which reveals that his participation was, legally speaking, exactly as weighty as that of his mother. This was certainly not made clear in *RRH*, No. 268, especially since the Queen Mother was now active only within her zone of influence. In *RRH*, No. 268, she confirmed an exchange that had been made between John Patricius and the Holy Sepulchre. John had given his two villages Megina and Mezera, in the vicinity of Jerusalem, and had received from the canons two other villages, Caphermelich and Anquina, the second of which was in the vicinity of Jerusalem and the first in the territory of Nablus. This exchange had originally been made in the days of King Fulk. But while King Fulk was still alive John had apparently changed his mind and, according to the canons of the Holy Sepulchre, had been raising difficulties. Consequently, the transaction had never been fully completed. The Queen Mother now declared that she was upholding the exchange, having been present when it was originally made and having now again examined the matter. This was obviously an attempt to ingratiate herself with the Church. That Baldwin III had also been present (*RRH*, No. 306) she ignored completely. In her next charter of the same year (*RRH*, No. 269) Melisende wooed the population of Jerusalem, and since she did so again the following year her attitude—given the scantiness of our evidence—may almost be considered a deliberate policy. In 1151, in order to increase the usefulness of the Gate of David, the capital's main entrance, she ordered the confiscation and destruction of a mill belonging to the Lepers of St. Lazarus. In compensation for their loss she gave them a vineyard of five *carrucae* in the plain of Bethlehem, where the convent seems to have been concentrating its wine production. Melisende appears here in complete control of the city, and busy improving it. She is attended, among others, by her chamberlain Nicolaus and by Ralph Strabo and Bencellinus, the current and the former viscounts of Jerusalem. In the previous charter she

⁹⁷ *Sigeberti continuatio Praemonstratensis*, MGH, SS, 6 (Hannover, 1844), 454f.

had been attended by an impressive retinue of high ecclesiastics and nobles from her camp and five leading citizens of Jerusalem.

Yet her position was not really sound. The King had first tried to meddle in her zone of influence by rebuilding Gaza, and she had been able to block this only by contriving to have the castle turned over to the Templars. By 1150 Galilee had slipped from her control and at the same time the King had entrenched himself in Acre, where Melisende earlier had endeavored to extend her power. With the south and the center of the kingdom under the Queen Mother's control, the King had taken the only possible course of action open to him and had built a zone of influence of his own in the north. The Queen Mother had to make sure that he would stay there and not try again to become active in the south. This was all the more important for her after she had lost the support of the Ibelins in the south. To secure her position there, apparently, she created her younger son Amaury count of Jaffa in 1151. In *RRH*, Nos. 262 and 259, of 1150, Amaury had no title and was only called *filius regine* (not *frater regis*, thus being clearly placed with Melisende's party), whereas he appears as *Amalricus comes Ioppe* in *RRH*, No. 268, of 1151, and again as *Ioppensium comes* in *RRH*, No. 278, of 1152.⁹⁸ This appointment meant that Melisende now had firm control of the plain of Saron in the southwest. We can be sure that Baldwin III had no part in this nomination, given the loyalty which Amaury showed toward his mother to the bitter end of her struggle with the King. One of the reasons for remaining loyal to her when her cause was almost lost could have been that Baldwin might revoke this appointment, as indeed I believe he did. To create Amaury count of Jaffa was an effective move, which Baldwin cannot have liked. Added to the increasing power of the constable Manasses (revealed by the place he has in the lists of witnesses⁹⁹), it threatened the position for which the King had fought so hard during the past years. It must especially have thwarted his hopes of ever expanding south again, for, should one of the royal family now become active in the south, it would be the Count of Jaffa, not Baldwin. Besides, a cursory glance at the map will reveal that Melisende, in spite of having been forced in recent years to contract the areas under her control, had succeeded in building up around the capital a solid power block consisting of the royal domain in Samaria and Judaea down to Hebron, the lordship of Nablus, those of Ramla and Mirabel between Jerusalem and the coast, and the county of Jaffa on the coast itself. From the center of the kingdom she now firmly

⁹⁸ Using strictly the evidence provided by William of Tyre, L. de Mas Latrie, "Les comtes de Jaffa et d'Ascalon du XII^e au XIX^e siècle," *Revue des questions historiques*, 26 (1879), 188, also arrived at the conclusion that Amaury was raised to the county of Jaffa at the age of 15, in 1151.

⁹⁹ Manasses is the first to sign *RRH*, No. 240, but then no barons of the first magnitude were present, only crown functionaries, among whom he was the most important, a viscount, and petty nobility. In *RRH*, No. 245, of 1147, he is indeed listed before such great magnates as Humphrey of Toron, Gerald of Sidon, Walter of Caesarea, and even Philip of Nablus, but after Elinard of Galilee and Guy of Bairut. In *RRH*, No. 262, of early 1150, he signs after Barisan le Vieux and his son Hugh; in *RRH*, No. 259, of the summer of 1150, he is listed after the Queen Mother's son Amaury, Rohard the Elder, the Viscount Bencellinus of Jerusalem, and Philip of Nablus. But in *RRH*, No. 268, of 1151, because of his marriage to Helvis of Ibelin, he has climbed to the top and signs, among the laymen, immediately after Amaury and before Philip of Nablus and Rohard the Elder.

controlled its entire width, thus cutting off Baldwin in the north from his (presumably) new allies, the Ibelins in the southwest. The appointment of her younger son in Jaffa provided the finishing touch to a policy by which she had successively brought the region between Jerusalem and the coast under her sway, for, with Manasses in Ramla and Mirabel, she was more secure than she had been with Barisan le Vieux because Manasses was her kinsman and had also for a long time been dependent upon her patronage. And surely she could rely on her younger son in Jaffa. She may have felt that this solid block of lordships was impregnable for her enemies and would outweigh any ill effects deriving from the loss of the Ibelins' support.

King Baldwin III cannot have been unaware of what was happening. Relations between his mother and himself, never good, had been steadily deteriorating since 1149. He had made some headway against his mother, had suffered some setbacks, but on the whole the balance had been slightly in his favor until Melisende managed to entrench herself so firmly in her part of the kingdom to the point that she apparently no longer recognized the King at all. In order to stay in power she had years before embarked on a policy of gradually splitting the kingdom without formally dividing it. In, or before, 1149 she had removed an able chancellor and opened her own scriptorium. She had created her own household. In 1150 she had created her own vassalry and prevented it from following the royal summons to war. What she did now, however, transgressed all limits: she created a baron of the first magnitude, a count of Jaffa, without consulting the King. Such an act could not be tolerated by Baldwin unless he was prepared practically to abdicate. No matter how one looks at it, Baldwin had not a single reason to make his brother count of Jaffa. So far, Amaury, had only been used against Baldwin in the game of power politics in which his mother was engaged; she had assigned him a part in the joint rule without being empowered to do so under her father's will. This had decidedly diminished Baldwin's part in the joint rule while not endangering Melisende, who could count on her younger son's loyalty. For Baldwin, his brother had up to this time been only a competitor whom he could have no interest in elevating, especially to the county of Jaffa. If Melisende went so far, there was no way of telling how much further she might go. The King must certainly have realized that his mother might now at any moment raise the Count of Jaffa to the position of a counter-king. It would have been a daring move but not one that should be put past her. It would have antagonized only those barons who were already against her, whereas it would doubtless have won the approval of those who had gone so far in opposing Baldwin III as to refuse, in 1150, to render him the military service they owed him. The setting up of a counter-king who owed everything to her would have been a firm step toward the overthrow of Baldwin and the restoration of the kingdom's unity under Melisende's rule, with a boy of fifteen on the throne who, at least for a couple of years, might be expected to obey her command. Had such a scheme been successful, it would have provided a much better solution for Melisende than the *de facto* partitioning of the kingdom, to which she was

reduced in order to save part of her power. It would have been much better, too, than any formal partitioning, which had not as yet been undertaken but to which her policy of gradually splitting the kingdom was sooner or later bound to lead. The barons would not agree to a formal partition for very long, since it would jeopardize the safety of the kingdom and the interests of their class. Once the kingdom was formally divided the end of Melisende would be in sight because, if unity was to be restored to the kingdom, it would not be under her rule but under that of Baldwin who had proved himself an able military leader and, moreover, a clever diplomat and a sound administrator during his various expeditions to the north. In spite of all the praise William of Tyre heaps on Melisende's abilities, Baldwin was decidedly better suited to rule now that he was grown up. At this point I should state most emphatically that I do not imply that Melisende was actually planning to set up Amaury as counter-king. I am merely assessing the potentials of the situation. What she planned is not important. It is what Baldwin III must have envisaged as the worst possible turn of events that counts. The King must have realized that if the kingdom and its unity were to be preserved he must act, not only to affirm his power once and for all but also to prevent the consolidation of the power block established by Melisende in 1150/51 by means of the marriage of the constable Manasses and the creation of the count of Jaffa.

In the spring of 1152 Baldwin began to move.¹⁰⁰ His aim was to be solemnly crowned on Easter Day in Jerusalem. The Patriarch, who alone could perform such a ceremony, immediately realized the significance of this event, for Baldwin demanded to be crowned without his mother being present. This was the whole point. He had first been crowned in 1143, together with her; now he wished to have a confirmatory coronation without her. This, for mediaeval minds, would automatically signify that he was now the sole ruler and that his mother's rule had come to an end; if her rule were meant to continue, it would be only proper that she, too, be accorded the honor of a confirmatory coronation. The ceremony would receive the widest publicity possible since on Easter Day the Holy Sepulchre would be packed to capacity. Baldwin's plan was clever. The King's presence at the Holy Sepulchre on Easter Day being customary,¹⁰¹ Melisende could not very well prevent him from going there. His absence would have caused great disturbance among the population. Moreover, it was also customary that a feast-day coronation should be held on Easter Day.¹⁰² The final word was with the Patriarch, for surely Melisende was also expected to be in the church on Easter Day. Baldwin was in fact demanding that the Patriarch, who was the only legitimate authority for performing the coronation ceremony, should crown him but refuse to crown his mother. For Baldwin this would have the additional advantage of making the responsibility for the decision, the recognition of the legality of his claim to sole rulership, and finally the removal of Melisende from rulership appear to rest on the

¹⁰⁰ For the following, see WT, XVII.13,14.

¹⁰¹ Mayer, "Das Pontifikale von Tyrus" (*supra*, note 5), 170, 230 ff.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 170.

Church. Actually, the Church sided with Melisende, but Baldwin tried to maneuver the Patriarch into an awkward position, in which he would appear to have changed sides. Although refusal to perform the ceremony was within a patriarch's power, it was not completely at his discretion. He could not refuse without sufficient grounds. Furthermore, it was difficult to refuse Baldwin's principal request, namely, that he be crowned on Easter Day, because custom dictated a festival coronation on this day and the Patriarch would have overstepped the bounds of civility and violated the obligations of his office had he refused outright to crown Baldwin. The Patriarch took the only way out of the dilemma by earnestly entreating Baldwin to let his mother share in the glory of the ceremony. But, while such an event would have been something not seen in Jerusalem for several years, it would also have wrecked Baldwin's plan; indeed, it would have counteracted it. A joint coronation of mother and son would have made it appear that the break between them had been patched up—and that was the last thing Baldwin wanted. Also, the ceremony would then have acquired the character of a festival coronation of no particular significance. The compromise suggested by the Patriarch was in fact no compromise at all. Baldwin may have foreseen this development, which, after all, was the only course of action open to the Patriarch and, in addition, served the Church's interests. He decided, therefore, to resort to deception. He offered an alternative compromise to the prelate. Since the latter was evidently unwilling to crown him alone, Baldwin proposed that neither he nor his mother should be crowned. He said that he would defer his coronation on Easter Day, *ne matrem haberet consortem*. This expression meant more than simply that he did not want his mother to be included in the coronation: it meant that he did not want it to appear to the people that she was still *consors regni*, sharer in his rule. This proposal the Patriarch was able to accept. It was at this point that Baldwin outwitted him. Neither he nor his mother was crowned on Easter Day, but on the following day Baldwin III unexpectedly appeared in public wearing a crown, without his mother having been either invited to appear or informed of his intentions. While the simple act of wearing a crown was not as impressive an event as the coronation of Baldwin alone in the church of the Holy Sepulchre would have been, it was striking enough. It clearly conveyed the idea that Baldwin was now asserting that he was the sole ruler in all the kingdom; what is more, he staged his performance in the very center of Melisende's zone of influence. Since he had declined to be crowned together with his mother, declaring that he would rather not be crowned at all, there is every reason to suppose that the King had induced the Patriarch to promise that he would, likewise, not perform the coronation of his mother alone. Having first argued that Baldwin could not be crowned alone, the Patriarch would certainly have been forced to give the King this assurance. When Easter Day had passed without either of the two having been crowned, Baldwin staged his demonstration. This is again evidence of his abilities as a politician.

The event was dramatic enough to warrant debate by the Haute Cour. Both the King and the Queen Mother were present, and Baldwin demanded that his mother divide the kingdom with him officially and solemnly and assign to him part of his grandfather's heritage (*avitae hereditatis portio*). The Haute Cour debated at length on the request, which was finally approved. The law was undeniably on Baldwin's side. His grandfather had established joint rule in 1131, but it was easily proved by the events of recent years that the joint rule could no longer work. It had been the Queen Mother and her vassals who, by refusing to obey the summons of 1150, had clearly demonstrated that in their opinion the kingdom was actually divided into two distinct parts, under two separate rulers. They could not very well refuse now to ratify by their assent what they had been practicing for two years. The King's partisans, although aware that they were violating the will of Baldwin II, did, of course, support the King's request, which would only legalize existing conditions and might put an end to Melisende's power. The Queen Mother surrendered to the inevitable. Had she been wise, she would have taken this opportunity to withdraw honorably and with dignity. But, as in the past, her thirst for power was greater than her wisdom. She agreed to the partition, but, in doing so, used a most curious argument which reveals what position she was taking and can only have been intended to serve as the basis for regaining sovereignty. Her argument is found only in the thirteenth-century French translator of William of Tyre:¹⁰³ *Tant parlèrent li baron à la reine qu'ele dist qu'ele voudroit bien que li roiaumes fust partiz, et que li rois en preist l'une moitié, ele en eust l'autre, porce que tout estoit de son héritage*. From the legal point of view this was an enormity, totally incompatible with the will of Baldwin II. What Melisende said was that she was willing to surrender one half of the kingdom and retain the other half—although all of it belonged to her by hereditary right. This proposition not only left the door open for a recovery of power but at the same time defended her past behavior. If the whole kingdom was hers by hereditary right, then she had been justified in everything she had done, like creating a count of Jaffa, setting up her own scriptorium, and preventing her partisans from obeying the King's summons. On the basis of her argument Baldwin III appeared as the troublemaker. It was not she who had withheld from him what was rightfully his, but he who had taken from her things to which he had no claim. William says that Baldwin was given a choice in the partition and took Acre and Tyre, leaving to his mother Jerusalem and Nablus (and, of course, Jaffa). Actually, this was not a choice. No other division would have been possible in view of the loyalties created in the two parts of the kingdom during the past years. The formal division only legalized a situation that had existed for some time.

I now propose to show that this state of affairs lasted only an extremely short time. Melisende's vassals must surely have realized that the Queen Mother was doomed. In my opinion Melisende's charter *RRH*, No. 278, must be placed within this short period, in the month of April 1152, during which

¹⁰³ *L'Estoire de Eracles*, 781.

the kingdom was formally divided. This charter is dated 1152 and is thus later than her charters *RRH*, Nos. 268 and 269, of 1151. While in these charters of 1151 relations with her son had been seemingly irreconcilable and he had not been mentioned either in a consent or in the dateline and, therefore, was no longer recognized by her as king, now we find a change. Again, there was no formal recognition in the dateline—the only official place for recognizing the rule of a king. But, if the charter was indeed issued during the short duration of the partition, there would not have had to be a recognition in the dateline, because the charter was obviously issued in Jerusalem where the Queen would then have been ruling in her own right. But the consent of King Baldwin and Count Amaury of Jaffa (*assensu . . . regis scilicet Balduini et Amalrici Ioppensium comitis*) was again included. This seems to indicate that the breach had been mended, and that friendly relations within the family had been restored, at least outwardly. The Queen Mother did not go quite so far as to speak of her “beloved” son Baldwin, as she did in her late charters, but at least she mentioned him and did not behave as if he altogether did not exist, as she had done in *RRH*, Nos. 268 and 269. She would not have adopted this new attitude before the events of Easter 1152. On the other hand, the charter cannot have been issued after her removal from power, for then she retained only Nablus, while the charter I am now discussing is definitely concerned with Jerusalem. The Queen Mother waived a suit she had brought against the church of the Holy Sepulchre over some Syro-Christian inhabitants of the village of Bait Surik near Jerusalem. The Holy Sepulchre was now to own these people in peace as it was known to have held them since the days of Godfrey of Bouillon. To them Melisende added certain Syro-Christians of the village of Calandria, also near Jerusalem, as well as certain Syrians in ar-Ram, again in the district of Jerusalem. Once restricted to Nablus, she would have been in no position to make such a grant, which would then have fallen within the competence of the King. Thus, the only possible conclusion is that the charter must be dated to April 1152, the only period when the kingdom was formally divided. It is interesting to note that once more the Queen Mother tried to buy the support of the population of Jerusalem. The place she gave to the prominent citizens of Jerusalem in her charters was far from insignificant; apparently she tried to win their support as well as that of the Church and the nobility. Previously, she had improved the Gate of David; now she was building a new street in the capital. In the case of the villagers of Calandria, there was actually an exchange in which she received from the canons of the Holy Sepulchre a shop that had once belonged to William the Bastard, and, in addition, the share which the canons had held in two money-changer tables. All this she received *ad perficiendam ruam novam in Iherusalem*. In providing the new street she was acting in her capacity as highest city official. This again is evidence that the charter could not have been issued after her withdrawal to Nablus.

Once King Baldwin had forced his mother to agree, against her will, to the formal partition of what she considered to be her own heritage, he moved swiftly. His advantage lay in the fact that he had enforced his will upon his

mother in open assembly, within her own capital. This betrayed a serious, though possibly only momentary, weakness in her position, which Baldwin was quick to exploit. First, he appointed his own constable, his choice being Humphrey of Toron, a wise choice indeed. He could do this because now he did not have to obtain his mother's consent to such appointments. Then, he argued that the way the division had been made would deprive him of the financial resources needed for the kingdom. Admittedly, the Queen Mother had retained the vast royal domain in Judaea and Samaria, but the King had received the two port cities of Acre and Tyre where enormous amounts of money were collected in duties and market fees. Quite likely he had more money than Melisende, but he argued that, now that he was King (with its concomitant military responsibilities), one half of the kingdom would not be enough for him.¹⁰⁴ Melisende realized immediately that the King intended to deprive her of the rest of her possessions also. She left Nablus, which was not fortified,¹⁰⁵ to some of her followers and retired to the city of Jerusalem. In the meantime the King collected as large a force as he could and laid siege to the castle of Mirabel where the constable Manasses had gone. He forced Manasses to surrender and leave the kingdom and "all regions this side of the Sea." After that Baldwin occupied Nablus without too much effort, since it had no fortifications, and then moved toward Jerusalem in pursuit of his mother. The Queen Mother was now deserted by those of the barons who held possessions within her part of the country but had been bound to her by nominal loyalty only (*fide media*). These must have been the usual opportunists who invariably go over to the stronger side. The few who now still adhered to her cause served her with strictest loyalty. Among them was Count Amaury of Jaffa, Philip of Nablus, Rohard the Elder, and a few others whose names William of Tyre said were unknown to him. When the Queen Mother learned that the King was advancing against her with an army she retired to the citadel in the Tower of David with her household staff (*de familiaribus*) and her faithful followers, relying for safety upon the strength of the fortress. The Patriarch Fulcher of Jerusalem now openly gave the full support of the Church to the Queen Mother. Accompanied by several of his clergy he went out of the city to meet the King, whom he implored to call a halt to his base project, to keep to the agreement that had been concluded with his mother, and to leave her in peace. It was to no avail. The King had committed himself too far to turn back; besides, why should he listen to the arguments of the Patriarch, whom he well knew only represented the interests of his mother? When the Patriarch realized that his mission would serve no purpose he angrily returned to the city, but not without having first uttered sinister threats in public: *s'en retorna en Jerusalem, mès bien dist au partir devant touz qu'il avoit mauves conseil et trop felon*.¹⁰⁶ This was a last attempt to save

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 781f.

¹⁰⁵ WT, XIV.27; XVII.20. There was, however, a royal castle there (*RRH*, No. 303), but the town proper had no walls or fortifications.

¹⁰⁶ *L'Estoire de Eracles*, 782.

Melisende since it was, of course, generally understood that the Patriarch was thereby implying that the Church would not support a King who was so ill-advised. Baldwin, however, failed to be intimidated and pitched camp before the city. Now even the citizens of Jerusalem began to abandon Melisende, in spite of all she had done to embellish their city. William of Tyre says that, fearing the royal indignation, they opened the city gates to Baldwin; the French translator is even more explicit and says that the people within the city realized that Baldwin was their lord and king, meaning by this that they now broke the oath under which they must have been bound to Melisende, who since the formal division of the kingdom had been the rightful city lord, and switched their loyalty to the King. Baldwin then besieged the Tower of David, erecting siege engines and storming it with *balistae*, bows, and hurling machines, giving no respite to the besieged. The latter put up a valiant defense, repaying their attackers in equal coin. The battle continued for several days because the King neither made much progress nor forsook his objective. The Tower of David was a very strong fortress and doubtlessly well stocked, but it could not resist indefinitely. Realizing that Melisende's position was hopeless, some unidentified persons came forward to negotiate a settlement. The Queen Mother was content to settle for Nablus and its district, and surrendered the capital (*caput regni*) to the King. The possession of the capital, of course, greatly enhanced Baldwin's position. He offered sufficient guaranties, sworn to under oath, that he would not molest his mother in her possession of Nablus during her lifetime, a promise he very nearly kept (see *infra*, p. 179). The arrangement must be understood to have meant that Melisende would receive Nablus not as a part of the kingdom to be ruled by her, but as a sort of dowry to provide for her living. From the subsequent history of the kingdom it can be assumed that, as part of the compact, the Queen Mother had agreed to abstain from politics and to act in Nablus only as any other city lord would. Indeed, it can be proved that the influence she had in other parts of the kingdom was minimal. To accord her Nablus meant to give her a substantial income without giving her a center of military power, for Nablus, as I have already pointed out, was not fortified. It must have been agreed that whatever her actions in the future they would require the consent of the King.

The conflict was over. Melisende had lost, and had finally gone into retirement. Baldwin was now sole ruler, after a struggle that had lasted over eight years. Its final stages had started on Easter Day 1152, which fell on March 30. Less than a month later all had ended—in this light Baldwin's charter *RRH*, No. 291, of 20 April 1152, must be interpreted.¹⁰⁷ It is a charter for the abbey of St. Mary Josaphat outside Jerusalem and contains a general confirmation of the possessions of the abbey such as it had last received in 1130 from Baldwin II (*RRH*, No. 134). This in itself is revealing. The abbey of St. Mary Josaphat was always dear to Melisende; it was to be her burial place and her mother Morphia was already buried there; it was situated in the center of her former

¹⁰⁷ This document has often been dated in 1154, but that it belongs in 1152 was established already by Röhrich in the *Additamentum* to his *RRH*, No. 291.

sphere of power, immediately east of Jerusalem in the Kidron valley. The abbot must have been concerned about the close relations which his abbey had entertained with Queen Melisende and, in order to feel safe, he was now eager to have his abbey's possessions confirmed by the new ruler. This, Baldwin did. He was determined not to be overly severe, being well aware that, like any ruler, he would need the support of the Church, which up to this time had firmly sided with his mother. Thus, he fully confirmed the possessions held by St. Mary Josaphat, this also providing him the opportunity to show that he was now the sole ruler, even in Jerusalem and vicinity. His mother's consent was no longer needed and in fact was not mentioned. The King was now surrounded by an impressive retinue of high ecclesiastics and great barons, among them the new Archbishop Peter of Tyre who had been installed in Tyre after the Pope had removed the intruder Ralph. Peter had been prior of the Holy Sepulchre, that is, head of a house of Austin canons very closely linked with Queen Melisende. That he was now called to witness a charter of the King meant that the Church had decided officially to support King Baldwin. The same applies to Archbishop Baldwin of Caesarea, who had formerly witnessed Melisende's *RRH*, No. 262, of 1150, and to the seneschal of the Knights Templars, Andreas of Montebarro. Among the great barons we find in *RRH*, No. 291, Simon of Tiberias, Philip of Nablus, Hugh of Ibelin, the Viscount Clarembald of Acre, Paganus de Voh, who had been appointed new viscount of Jerusalem, and Baldwin of Lille, a trusted vassal of the King. That even Philip of Nablus, who had accompanied the Queen in her last flight into the citadel of Jerusalem, was now on the King's side is positive evidence that the conflict was over. The dramatic events that had begun with Baldwin's attempt to be crowned on Easter Day, followed by his wearing of the crown in public after Easter; the assembly during which the kingdom had been formally divided; the appointment of Humphrey of Toron to the office of constable; the attack on Mirabel and the exile of the former constable Manasses; the occupation of Nablus, the negotiations with the Patriarch outside Jerusalem; the siege of the Tower of David; and the final negotiations which removed Melisende from power—they had all taken place between 30 March (Easter) and 20 April 1152, when *RRH*, No. 291, was issued from Tyre. Baldwin had moved swiftly, and the very swiftness of his actions cannot have failed to impress people.

He had appointed a new constable and a new viscount for Jerusalem because, like his mother, he realized how vital it was to control the crown offices by means of trusted partisans. He had also reestablished the chancery, for *RRH*, No. 291, was authenticated by chancellor Ralph, former archbishop-elect of Tyre and, before that, royal chancellor, whom Melisende had overthrown and who had now been reinstalled together with his capable notary, whose *dictamen* appears unmistakably in *RRH*, No. 291.

This charter was not the only general confirmation of the possessions of ecclesiastical institutions. The Knights of St. John received a similar general confirmation on 30 July 1154. The case concerning the church of the Holy

Sepulchre was somewhat different in that the King waited until July 1155 before giving this church, which had so consistently supported Melisende, a general confirmation (*RRH*, No. 309). Doubtless the church itself would have wished to receive it sooner. But it had to wait until June 1155 before the King would confirm at least Melisende's *RRH*, Nos. 268 and 278, by his *RRH*, Nos. 306 and 307. Obviously, relations between the King and the Holy Sepulchre were not restored to amicability until some time after the end of the conflict. Once he had resumed good terms with this church, however, Baldwin reiterated the general confirmation in *RRH*, No. 354, of 1160—at the time when Melisende was suffering from her long, final illness.

Shortly before Baldwin's victory, which was complete by 20 April 1152, Nūr ad-Dīn must have taken Tortosa (see *supra*, p. 159f.). This event must have brought Baldwin III to the aid of the Count of Tripoli. So once more he went north. It is with this expedition, which William of Tyre does not mention, that I associate the assembly held by the King at Tripoli, according to William. Let me recall here that the Count of Tripoli was murdered immediately after the assembly but was still alive in April or May 1152. Consequently, I presume that the summons for the assembly was issued after the King had assisted the Count of Tripoli in recapturing Tortosa. This would explain why the assembly was held at Tripoli, for Tortosa was in the county of Tripoli. William's choice of words when he writes about the assembly at Tripoli is hardly accidental. He says that the King called for an assembly of the nobility of both Jerusalem and Antioch to be held at Tripoli (*rex apud Tripolim principibus utriusque tam regni quam principatus curiam indicit generalem*);¹⁰⁸ *indicit* points to a formal summoning. The nobility of Tripoli was already there, of course, and the presence of the Count and Countess of Tripoli is attested. The King also invited (*invitat*) the Patriarch of Antioch and his suffragans, and Princess Constance of Antioch, for, aside from dealing with public matters, Baldwin wished to exercise pressure on Constance to choose a husband, in order that he himself might be relieved of the responsibility for the principality of Antioch. This had been a cause of concern to him already in 1150, when he was in Antioch. The Princess then had refused all candidates he had suggested to her. Queen Melisende "took part" in this assembly (*interfuit*). Apparently she had been neither summoned nor invited; she just came, and William of Tyre expressly mentions strictly private reasons for her journey. She had come, he says,¹⁰⁹ with the purpose of composing a marital crisis which had arisen between the Count of Tripoli and his wife, who was her own sister, and of visiting her niece, the Princess of Antioch (*ut principissam neptem suam videret*). However we look at it, the Queen Mother's presence had a personal character, and although she did participate in the debate on Constance's marriage, she is not reported to have done so when general public matters were discussed. It was only in the settling of family affairs (even though they might be linked with public interest) that she was given a voice. The meeting broke up having failed to

¹⁰⁸ WT, XVII.18.

¹⁰⁹ WT, XVII.19.

induce Constance to choose another husband. Furthermore, the crisis in the Tripoli family had not been resolved and Melisende took her sister with her on her trip home. However, after the murder of the Count of Tripoli the two ladies did not proceed to Jerusalem but were recalled for the funeral and then, naturally, the Countess remained in Tripoli while Baldwin, whose good relations with his mother were now outwardly restored, went home to Jerusalem with her. Nothing had been accomplished in Tripoli, but the importance and significance of the assembly is revealed by its nature, rather than its results. What Baldwin convoked was a *curia generalis*, a meeting of the Haute Cour, the highest body of the vassals of the Latin Kingdom, in which law would be determined and interpreted, verdict given on royal tenants, and debates held on the general policies of the kingdom. To attend the meetings of the Haute Cour was the obligation of the crown vassals, resulting from their right to give counsel to the king. In 1150 a large part of the vassalry had ignored Baldwin's summons to war in Syria. He now showed everyone that he was in complete control of his kingdom by summoning his vassals to a meeting of the Haute Cour even outside his realm and having them obey him. He also made the higher levels of society of Antioch and Tripoli attend it. In so doing he was no doubt following the example of Baldwin I, who had established himself as the arbiter of the whole Latin East at a similar assembly held at Tripoli in 1109. Since precedent was, as it were, sacrosanct for the barons of Jerusalem, the significance of a meeting of the Haute Cour held at Tripoli, with the nobility and clergy of Antioch and Tripoli in attendance, cannot have gone unnoticed in the Latin East. Even though Baldwin III had not achieved his immediate aim of settling the affairs of Syria, as Baldwin I had done at Tripoli, he had held a great court, had received the full obedience of his vassals, and his mother, although she had been present, had been allowed to come only for a private visit to members of her family. No one could now doubt that the King was in complete control of his kingdom.

In the royal domain he now did as he pleased. It was he who forthwith brought to a successful conclusion the enlargement of the domain at Casel Imbert, a project begun in 1146, presumably by his mother (see *supra*, p. 122). On 26 February 1153, while besieging Ascalon, he confirmed the contract concluded by the former Viscount of Acre, Gerald of Valence, with those Latins whom he had settled at Casel Imbert *iussu meo*, i.e., under orders of the King (*RRH*, No. 281). Even at Nablus it was now the King who transacted all affairs which were properly the business of the overlord. It was he, not Melisende, who issued *RRH*, No. 321, of 1156, in which the possessions of the royal hospital at Nablus were confirmed. General confirmations of possessions were royal business and therefore fell within his competence, not that of Melisende, who held Nablus only as her dowry. Nothing could illustrate more clearly that she held it from the Crown, that is, from her son, and not in her own right as ruler or sharer in joint kingship.

What place was Baldwin willing to allow his mother now that he had won? After all that had happened they must have hated each other intensely. Yet

both sides made it a point to pretend that relations were not at all strained and were actually as they should be in a happy family. Evidently, it had been agreed that whatever Melisende did from now on would be done with the consent of Baldwin III. This consent is included in all her charters after 1152, of which we have four (*RRH*, Nos. 313, 338, 339a [only an abstract], and 359). She did not include simply his consent, but the consent of her beloved son (*dilectus filius*) King Baldwin. He, on his part, was willing to accord to his mother all honors due to her exalted station in life and grant her the possibility of advising him. Practically speaking, this amounted to little, but it spared her public humiliation. Baldwin was capable of restraint and had no interest in insulting his mother once he had driven her from power, an attitude that might only have induced her to attempt to reestablish her sovereign power. He allowed her consent to reappear in his charters in 1154 (*RRH*, No. 293), and there in general it was added until 1157 (*RRH*, No. 325). His charters were issued *consilio et consensu* (*RRH*, No. 293), *assensu* (*RRH*, No. 306), *assensu et concessione* (*RRH*, No. 307), *consilio et concessione* (*RRH*, Nos. 321 and 322), *assensu* (*RRH*, No. 325), and *precibus matris* (*RRH*, No. 336). These formulas seem to indicate that he permitted Melisende to give her advice on certain political matters. In most cases this would have been a matter of courtesy only; in some others he may have allowed her something more substantial. The cases of *RRH*, Nos. 306, 307, 321, and 336, are explained by the fact that the King was either confirming Melisende's earlier charters or dealing with property in Nablus. The inclusion of her consent, her advice, even her concession, meant that the King was keeping his promise never to disturb the Queen Mother in her Nablus possessions and that, in confirming her earlier charters, he was implying that she had done nothing wrong in having issued them under her name only. In point of fact, she had then infringed on Baldwin's royal rights; but nothing could be gained by emphasizing it now. Occasionally, however, the King seemed to allow her a genuine right to counsel. In 1155 or 1156 he confirmed an important sale to the Holy Sepulchre of properties which Hugh of Ibelin held in fief from the King's brother Amaury (*RRH*, No. 299). In this charter no mention was made of Melisende's consent, but she was allowed to confirm the sale by a charter of her own (*RRH*, No. 313). So was Count Amaury of Ascalon in *RRH*, No. 300, though in his case he was directly involved, the lands that were sold being held in fief from him. Melisende, on the other hand, was not involved because the land, being apparently part of the lordship of Mirabel, was neither held from her at this time nor did it lie within her part of the royal domain at Nablus. As far as we can identify the properties involved, they were very close to Jerusalem and thus outside Melisende's dowry. Why she issued a charter confirming their sale is not entirely clear, but the fact that she did indicates some degree of influence. She had also been allowed to retain some private property around Jerusalem, for in *RRH*, No. 338, of 1159, she disposed of a *gastina* in the vicinity of the capital in favor of the Lepers of St. Lazarus. Her other two charters, *RRH*, No. 339a, and *RRH*, No. 359, concern

property in and around Nablus.¹¹⁰ It is only in the years 1156 and 1157 that she achieved once more some degree of political influence—not very much, it is true, but some. I am unable to explain this and must limit myself to recording the fact. When on 2 November 1156 Baldwin III negotiated an important treaty with Pisa, restoring the peace and harmony with that city which had been disturbed, creating a Pisan establishment in Tyre, and getting the Pisans to agree that they would not sell arms or iron, wood, and pitch (i.e., shipbuilding material) to Egypt, he did so *consilio et concessione Milisendis regine* (*RRH*, No. 322). In the following year Melisende and her younger son Amaury were permitted to add their consent to Baldwin's confirmation (*RRH*, No. 325) of a grant of lands and castles which the constable Humphrey of Toron had made to the Knights of St. John. The consent of the Queen Mother and of the Count of Jaffa-Ascalon had certainly a public, not a private character. The grant comprised both patrimonial and feudal lands of the constable. The latter were held from the lord of Bairut and, like the patrimonial lands, were situated in the north of the kingdom, where neither Queen Melisende nor Count Amaury of Jaffa-Ascalon had, at the time, any interests or rights stemming from family properties. Their intervention, therefore, can be explained only by the assumption that in this instance they exercised some kind of public function, the exact nature of which I cannot, unfortunately, determine; nor can I discover the reason for it. In the same year—1157—the Queen Mother insisted that a Muslim stronghold on the eastern bank of the Jordan should be attacked. Her part in this matter is not quite clear. William of Tyre says that the fortress was captured *studio et industria dominae Milisendis reginae*, but leaves no doubt that the actual operations were carried out by Baldwin of Lille, the King's regent, since the King himself was busy in Syria. In this same year the Queen Mother, together with some other ladies of the royal family, unquestionably took a hand in the election and promotion of Amaury of Nesle, prior of the church of the Holy Sepulchre, to the office of patriarch of Jerusalem.¹¹¹ It is not surprising to find that Bishop Ralph of Bethlehem, whom Melisende had first compelled to become bishop of Tyre and then abandoned and even removed from the royal chancery, opposed this election and appealed to Rome, nor that the Patriarch Amaury witnessed Melisende's charter *RRH*, No. 359, of 1159 or 1160.

On the whole, it may be said that, after 1152, Baldwin III allowed his mother just enough influence to prevent her feeling totally excluded, without, however, allowing her actually to share in his rule. From William of Tyre's chronicle it is clear that the royal constable Humphrey of Toron, for instance, exercised a far greater influence on politics than did Melisende herself. The latest of Baldwin's charters in which her consent was included was *RRH*, No. 325,

¹¹⁰ I believe that *RRH*, No. 359, belongs to 1159 rather than 1160, although it is dated *a. inc. 1160, indictione VIII*, which is correct. But Baldwin's *RRH*, No. 336 of 1159, which is also correctly dated, expressly mentions the privilege *RRH*, No. 359, and must, therefore, have been issued after it. This leaves two alternatives: either *RRH*, No. 359, must be placed in 1159 or *RRH*, No. 336, in 1160. I chose the first solution because I believe that in 1160 Melisende had already contracted her final and incurable illness, which caused her death in September 1161, and was no longer in a position to issue charters.

¹¹¹ *WT*, XVIII.19, 20.

of 1157, but *RRH*, No. 336, confirming one of her charters, was issued *precibus matris*. Thereafter she disappears from the royal charters. She is not mentioned in *RRH*, Nos. 341, 344, 353, 354, 355, and 366, which extend from 28 January 1160 to 31 July 1161, even though *RRH*, No. 353, of 25 July 1160, dealt in part with the confirmation of her own charter *RRH*, No. 278, of 1152. The explanation is probably to be sought in the fact that Melisende, who died on 11 September 1161, had been suffering for quite some time from an incurable disease. She died, William of Tyre reports, *longo macerata languore*.¹¹² It would seem that this illness had already taken hold by the end of January 1160 and that from then on she was in no condition to give her consent. We must not totally discard the other possibility that, when she fell seriously ill and the King was informed by her doctors that her disease was incurable, he felt it no longer necessary to include her consent, for she would have been unable even to voice a complaint. This, perhaps, charges Baldwin with excessive callousness, but we shall see that at the time of Melisende's death not all the accounts originating from the events of 1152 had been fully settled.

It was not only Melisende who was overthrown in 1152, it was also her whole party. The majority of her followers abandoned her when her luck turned, and tried to gain favor with King Baldwin who had emerged as the new strong ruler. Many of them probably succeeded, since the King could not eliminate all of Melisende's former vassals. On some, however, he took his revenge. The most prominent ecclesiastical supporter of Queen Melisende had been the Patriarch Fulcher of Jerusalem. Although he lived until the end of 1157 (and was out of the country only in 1155, on a mission to Rome), after 1152 he did not appear in Baldwin's charters. Archbishop Robert of Nazareth also did not return as a witness, but then his successor Letardus was in office by 1154. Similarly, Bishop Gerald of Bethlehem remained excluded, even though he held office until 1156. On the other hand, Archbishop Baldwin of Caesarea apparently was allowed to return to court immediately, for he appears in *RRH*, No. 291, of 20 April 1152. His successor Ernesius, former chancellor to the Patriarch Fulcher of Jerusalem, who had signed one of Melisende's charters during the conflict, was promoted to the archbishopric in 1158 and admitted to court service in 1160 (*RRH*, No. 354). Before him, in 1155 or 1156, abbot Geoffrey of the Temple of the Lord had made his reappearance (*RRH*, No. 299). Of the laity, Count Amaury of Jaffa was the most prominent partisan of Queen Melisende and one who remained at her side to the very end. In reading William of Tyre's account, one would assume that Amaury suffered no harm. William had told how Amaury was created count of Jaffa in 1151. He further told how Baldwin III distributed or sold the lands around Ascalon after its capture in 1153 to those whose conduct during the siege had been worthy of recognition, and that in this he followed his mother's advice. The greatest prize of all went to Count Amaury, who was given the county of Ascalon in addition to that of Jaffa.¹¹³ It would seem that there was no setback in Amaury's

¹¹² WT, XVIII.27, 32.

¹¹³ WT, XIX.1; XVII.30.

career. He is still called count of Jaffa in Melisende's last charter *RRH*, No. 359, and William of Tyre referred to him as count of Jaffa in 1161, at the time of Baldwin IV's baptism.¹¹⁴ However, after 1153 Amaury in his own charters calls himself always count of Ascalon, never of Jaffa. Again, whenever he is mentioned as count in his brother's charters he is called count of Ascalon only. Yet, the inference that he had been forever deprived of the county of Jaffa would be wrong. It is true that later counts or countesses of the double county would bear the title of both Jaffa and Ascalon, but in Amaury's time this was not the case. Most likely the county came to be regarded as a single fief and to be called the county of Ascalon until people remembered that the county of Jaffa had existed long before the creation of the county of Ascalon. In 1157 Amaury granted rights in the city of Jaffa to Pisa (*RRH*, No. 324), and the Viscount of Jaffa repeatedly witnessed charters issued by Amaury as count of Ascalon. Surely, therefore, he held both Jaffa and Ascalon. Yet, something had happened to him about which William, who was Amaury's court historiographer after the latter had risen to kingship, is silent. William of Tyre says nothing about Amaury participating in the siege of Ascalon.¹¹⁵ He does not specify at just what time after the capture of Ascalon Baldwin gave the city to his brother. If it is true that the King distributed and sold lands in the southwest—of which the assignment of Ascalon to Amaury was part—upon the advice of his mother, it may very well have been at some time after the city was captured, for, as we have seen, Melisende's consent in the charters and her counsel are not found again until 1154 (*RRH*, No. 293). It is precisely in this document of 1154 that Amaury makes his first reappearance after the civil war of 1152 and here he is qualified only as *Amalricus frater regis*. We possess the original document, so there is no question of faulty transmission. It was written by one of the most careful chancery scribes we know, and there is little likelihood of clerical error. We are forced to assume that Amaury, who before 1152 had first been referred to as *filius reginae* and then as count of Jaffa, had lost the county of Jaffa in 1152, and in 1154 had not yet regained it. Nor had he at that time been awarded the county of Ascalon. I believe that it was only after charter *RRH*, No. 293, of 30 July 1154, that Jaffa was returned to Amaury and Ascalon added to it. This is indeed confirmed by the chronicler Ernoul, a well-informed man of the early thirteenth century, who says that Amaury received the counties of both Ascalon and Jaffa after the siege of Ascalon.¹¹⁶ All this shows that, at least for some time, Amaury must have felt his brother's wrath.

A few others also returned to Baldwin's court and were named in his charters. The Knights Templars came back immediately, with their seneschal Andreas of Montebarro (*RRH*, No. 291, of April 1152). Other important citizens of Jerusalem returned in 1155 or 1156 (*RRH*, No. 299): Bricius, Peter of Perigord, and Rainald Sechir. Presumably they were so influential in the city that the

¹¹⁴ WT, XIX.29.

¹¹⁵ Cf. the list of the great personages participating in the siege, WT, XVII.21.

¹¹⁶ *Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier*, ed. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871), 14.

King could not afford to exclude them from court service forever—all three had been members of the *Cour des Bourgeois* of Jerusalem as early as 1149 (*RRH*, No. 255), thus serving under the viscount in the administration of royal justice in the city. Babinus and John of Valenciennes were readmitted in 1155 (*RRH*, No. 307). Rohard the Elder, who had held the position of viscount of Jerusalem from 1135 to 1147 and later had been one of the three who supported Melisende to the last, accompanied the Queen Mother in her retirement. For him there was no longer a place in Baldwin's Jerusalem. A certain Rohard of Nablus turns up as a witness to Melisende's charters *RRH*, Nos. 313 and 359, and it is from William of Tyre that we learn that Rohard the Elder did actually later call himself Rohard of Nablus.¹¹⁷ In 1160 and 1161 Rohard eventually makes his reappearance on the charters of Baldwin III (*RRH*, Nos. 344 and 366). Herbert de Rethel, who had signed Queen Melisende's charter *RRH*, No. 278, of 1152, also returned to the King's service in 1160 (*RRH*, Nos. 352 and 353). It is perhaps not accidental that some partisans of Melisende, such as Ernesius, Archbishop of Caesarea, Rohard the Elder, and Herbert de Rethel were readmitted to the King's presence in 1160, at a time when it was known that the Queen Mother was afflicted by an illness which was expected to lead to her death.

The list of those who remained permanently excluded from Baldwin's charters, i.e., from court service, is much longer. We hear nothing, after 1152, of John the scribe, Fulk de Gerin, the Queen Mother's chamberlain Nicolaus, Herbert Strabo, Ralph Strabo (who had been viscount of Jerusalem in 1151), Semoeth the tailor, Petros, Guido Gallicus, Tosetus (who had been an influential citizen of Jerusalem before 1152), Gilbert de Lisuncurt, Rohard's nephew Ralph, Ermenaudus and his brother Elias, Ralph the Falconer, Odo de Turcame, and Walter Mauduit. Some of them may have died shortly after 1152. This is certainly true of Tosetus—who is last mentioned in Melisende's *RRH*, No. 278, of 1152—for his sons Andrew and Rohard appear in *RRH*, Nos. 301 and 391, of 1155 and 1163. But not all these people can have died; most of them may simply have slipped back into the anonymity whence they had once been called to attend the Queen Mother, an honor which had given them a position of prominence and of course a chance for getting on in the world. Of others who remained excluded from Baldwin's charters we know that they carried on, some in important posts. Among them is Bencellinus, who had been made viscount of Jerusalem by Melisende. He had sat on the *Cour des Bourgeois* as early as 1149 (*RRH*, No. 255) and was still alive in 1154 (*RRH*, No. 295). Peter Salomon, also on the *Cour des Bourgeois* in 1149, was still one of its members in 1155 and 1163 (*RRH*, Nos. 255, 310, and 391). Robert of Franlos was still living in 1153 (*RRH*, No. 284) and was a citizen of some standing in Jerusalem. Umbertus of Bar had been on the *Cour des Bourgeois* in 1149, was still a *burgensis regis* in Jerusalem in 1158, and is last mentioned in 1160 (*RRH*, Nos. 255, 333, and 360). Similarly, Simon Rufus sat on the *Cour des Bourgeois* in 1151 and was still a *burgensis regis* in 1158 (*RRH*, Nos.

¹¹⁷ WT, XIV.18.

273 and 333). Albert (Herbert) the Lombard, who had been an important member of the Jerusalem patriciate, remained such until 1174 (*RRH*, No. 516). The knight John Vaccarius is last mentioned in Melisende's *RRH*, No. 359, of 1159 or 1160; he probably died not long afterward since his son is mentioned in 1167 (*RRH*, No. 433). Viscount Ulric of Nablus, of whom we first heard in 1115, was last mentioned in Queen Melisende's *RRH*, No. 268, issued in 1151; he was certainly dead by 1159. However, neither his immediate successor Baldwin the Buffalo nor his son Baldwin, who succeeded the Buffalo in the viscounty of Nablus, ever reappear in the charters of Baldwin III, although we know that the King had dealings with Baldwin, the son of Ulric. It is only under King Baldwin's successor Amaury that the younger Baldwin was finally readmitted to court. La Monte, who has disentangled the history of the family of the viscounts of Nablus in the twelfth century,¹¹⁸ is of the opinion that the viscounty was restored to the younger Baldwin not during the reign of Baldwin III but only on the accession of Amaury I.

The evidence available points to the following conclusions. Very few of Melisende's partisans were restored immediately to the good graces of Baldwin: Archbishop Baldwin of Caesarea, the seneschal Andreas of Montebarro of the Knights Templars, and Philip of Nablus, of whom I shall speak presently. These were evidently persons whom the King could not spurn if they wished to serve him. Obviously, he could not refuse the Archbishop of Caesarea, third in ecclesiastical rank in the kingdom, at a time when he must have been eager to show that the Church was with him. Nor could he refuse the man second in rank in the Order of the Knights Templars, especially since he accompanied the Master of the Order himself to attend upon the King. As for Philip of Nablus, he was too powerful in Nablus and environs to be punished with the King's contempt. Next to Melisende he was by far the greatest landowner in this region and had powerful relatives in the Ibelin clan—men who, although they had changed sides from the Queen Mother to the King, would hardly have been prepared to tolerate the elimination of Philip. The King needed their support and was in no position to offend them. They now held the lordships of Ibelin, Ramla, and Mirabel, the latter two of which had formed part of the county of Jaffa from the days when the family of Le Puiset had held the county in the twenties and thirties. This meant that the Ibelins were vassals of the King's brother when the county of Jaffa was restored to him, but, as long as the King could command their loyalty, they would also serve as a very effective check on Amaury. A glance at the map suffices to show that, with Ibelin, Ramla, and Mirabel, they virtually encircled the county of Jaffa proper. In the north, too, the King had to reckon with Philip: *RRH*, No. 293, reveals that Philip had important possessions outside of Acre. But most important of all reasons for not dealing sternly with Philip of Nablus was Baldwin III's agreement with his mother, made in 1152 (see *supra*, p. 169). Had he attempted to punish Philip, he would have deprived Melisende of the support of the most powerful lord of the region near her, which indisputably would have been a

¹¹⁸ La Monte, "The Viscounts of Naplouse in the Twelfth Century," 276.

breach of their agreement. Since the King could not strike at Philip, it was in his own interest to readmit him into his service so as not to have him as an enemy. Philip of Nablus and Count Amaury of Ascalon were the only two magnates who, after 1152, could afford to serve both King and Queen Mother, and, indeed, they appear in the charters of both. They could not be touched. Thus, while only very few of Melisende's old partisans were readmitted to court service immediately after the civil war, others, headed by Amaury, returned after 1154, and still more in 1160, when it became clear that the days of Queen Melisende would soon be over. A fair number of the Queen's followers were never recalled to the court of King Baldwin III, though they can be shown to have still been men of no little standing. A considerable group just fade away in 1152. By and large, the King did settle his accounts with Melisende's followers after he had removed her from power. The civil war of 1152 had not only a long prelude but also a comparatively long aftermath.¹¹⁹

It was in 1161 that the King finally settled his last account—that with Philip of Nablus. The Queen Mother died on 11 September 1161. When the King received the news he gave a fine public show of grief and is said to have been inconsolable for several days.¹²⁰ But a month and a half before Melisende's death, at a time when she must already have been completely incapacitated, the King moved into Nablus and acquired Philip's vast holdings there, giving him in exchange the lordships of Transjordan and Hebron (*RRH*, No. 366).¹²¹ In so doing he established himself as the second largest landholder in Nablus and was in a position where he could easily molest the Queen Mother at any time. It was undeniably a violation of the 1152 agreement, but no one cared now, except perhaps Philip. Knowing that his mother was dying the King determined not only to inherit her holdings in and around Nablus but to make the whole region revert to the royal domain. In order to achieve this, he had to remove Philip, whom he compensated royally with Transjordan and Hebron. The gift would, however, have been less generous than it seemed had Philip already had a claim to Transjordan. The *Lignages d'Outremer*¹²² of the fourteenth century made him the nephew of the royal butler Paganus and his successor as lord of Nablus. But documentary evidence is lacking; the story probably developed from the fact that Paganus had a nephew, Maurice, who succeeded him in the lordship of Transjordan. Etienne of Lusignan in the sixteenth century made Philip of Nablus the son-in-law of Maurice of Transjordan,¹²³ which would also have given Philip a claim to Transjordan; for this, no evidence whatsoever exists. In any case, Philip did not seem to like his new

¹¹⁹ In discussing the aftermath of the civil war I have omitted all mention of the witness list in *RRH*, No. 276, for Marseille, dated 23 September 1152. The charter is manifestly a forgery and the list of witnesses must have been copied mostly from a charter of Queen Melisende, not from one of King Baldwin III, who supposedly issued this document. I discuss the problems of this charter in my book, *Marseilles Levantehandel und ein akkonensisches Fälscheratelier des 13. Jahrhunderts*, Bibliothek des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Rom, 38 (Tübingen, 1972), 31 ff.

¹²⁰ *WT*, XVIII.32

¹²¹ For Hebron see *Lignages d'Outremer* (*supra*, note 47), 462.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 452.

¹²³ *Les Familles d'Outre-mer de Du Cange*, ed. E.-G. Rey (Paris, 1869), 403.

position very much, for now his life became very unstable. Before 1168 he had given Transjordan to his daughter and her husband Humphrey III of Toron, the constable's son, and had joined the order of the Knights Templars under his old name of Philip of Nablus (*RRH*, No. 449); by 1169 he was Master of the Knights Templars (*RRH*, No. 466) but resigned from that position before 1171, when he accompanied King Amaury I on his state visit to Constantinople.¹²⁴ This is the last we hear of him. The instability of his life after he relinquished his ancestral lands in Nablus—which he had held since 1138—seems to indicate that he had not yielded his old holdings voluntarily. It was, in my opinion, the final account from the time of the civil war of 1152 that was settled here, and its settlement at last gave the King control of the remnants of Queen Melisende's original possessions.

I have followed the career of Queen Melisende, one of the most energetic among mediaeval queens, in its more significant stages. However, I have investigated here only some parts of her history and this study should by no means be considered an attempt at a biography, which would have to deal also with such questions as her foundation of the convent of Bethany or her patronage of the arts, as evidenced by the very beautiful psalter in the British Museum known under her name. My only purpose here has been to give the story of her struggle for power, to discover its causes, and to recount how eventually she lost it. In so doing I have offered a number of suggestions which—if they can be accepted by specialists—revise several points in the history of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem between 1131 and 1161. These revisions have varying degrees of certainty, owing to the paucity of the available evidence. I explicitly invite the comments of, and debate with, those who may be inclined not to share my opinion. For their benefit I should like to summarize those points on which I beg to differ from the traditional interpretation. I believe that the will of King Baldwin II altered the agreement concerning his succession which he had concluded with Count Fulk of Anjou in 1128 and which was rendered effective by the marriage of Fulk and Melisende in 1129. I also believe that this will was of major importance in determining the claims to power of Fulk, Melisende, and Baldwin III. I suggest that the revolt of Count Hugh of Jaffa cannot have taken place until 1133—more likely after July 1134—rather than in 1132. I further suggest that the revolt of Romanus of Puy was closely linked with that of Count Hugh, that they were in fact one and the same; but that a previous revolt of Romanus may have occurred in Transjordan as early as 1126, if the Paganus of Montroyal who appears in 1126 and 1132 is actually to be identified with the royal butler Paganus. The reason for this revolt of Hugh and Romanus I find in an attempt made by King Fulk to brush aside Melisende at the beginning of his reign and rule alone. While Fulk could rest his claim on the 1128 agreement, the rebellious nobles apparently upheld King Baldwin II's will in favor of the Queen. The revolt determined the fate of Count Hugh; but the leniency of the sentence pronounced on him, the exaggerated wrath of the Queen over the matter, and

¹²⁴ WT, XX.22.

the fact that from that time on Fulk became very deferential—even uxorious—barely conceal that on the main point at issue, namely how royal power should be distributed in the kingdom, Fulk had lost his fight. The real power of Melisende dates from the end of Count Hugh's revolt. This power, as has long been known, she was not willing to relinquish on her husband's death. I have been able to show, from a study of the royal charters, how she increasingly and successfully downgraded the constitutional position of her older son Baldwin by diminishing his participation in the charters from that of joint issuance with her to that of mere consent—after having (probably not quite legally) made her younger son Amaury a sharer in the rule. From 1144 Baldwin tried to resist this situation, without much success at first. His chances lay only in that he could be a military leader. I suggested that during the Second Crusade the decision to attack Damascus, which proved fatal to the enterprise, was not made originally at the Acre war council of June 1148, but had previously been agreed upon in a meeting of King Baldwin III, King Conrad III of Germany, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, and the Knights Templars; and I think that this decision carried sufficient weight to predetermine the vote of the council itself, especially since the King of France was informed beforehand. I presume that Melisende was excluded from this first meeting and had no reason to support the expedition against Damascus (unless she was playing a reckless game), while her son had strong motives to favor it. As Baldwin grew older I believe one can observe an increasing rigidity in his relations with the Queen Mother and from 1149 I see Melisende embarking on a hazardous policy directed at severing the kingdom. This is the year, in my opinion, in which she caused the downfall of the chancellor Ralph and created her own scriptorium to which her son had no access. The following year—during which Baldwin III managed to establish a zone of influence of his own in the north, in Acre and probably also in Galilee, and meddled in his mother's zone of influence at Gaza in the south—saw the further disintegration of the Latin Kingdom, for Queen Melisende appointed other household officials of her own and finally created her own vassalry, whom she successfully induced to refuse to follow the King on a military expedition to Syria in the summer. It was probably in the same year, 1150, certainly not earlier, that her constable Manasses married Helvis, the widow of Barisan le Vieux of Ibelin, and thus acquired the lordships of Ramla and Mirabel. Contrary to the traditional view which would make this marriage strengthen Manasses' position by giving him the support of the powerful Ibelin family, it can be demonstrated with a high degree of probability that this match cost Manasses and the Queen Mother the support of the Ibelins, since the young members of the family found themselves in danger of being cheated of their expectancy of Ramla and Mirabel, should the marriage of Manasses to Helvis produce male offspring. Further, I have suggested that the civil war, to which all these events were inevitably leading, took place in 1152 and was very brief, lasting not longer than from 30 March to 22 April. After that the King settled his accounts with Melisende's partisans: some he admitted back to court service immediately

because he could not refuse them, others after a few years, in the mid-fifties, and some not until 1160, when Melisende had become so ill that her death was imminent; but he excluded the majority, though not the most powerful, throughout his reign. I believe that in dealing with his brother Amaury the King temporarily deprived him of the county of Jaffa to punish him for his support, to the very end, of the Queen Mother, who had raised him to that county and had thereby created a *casus belli*. In my opinion it was at some time in 1154 that the county of Jaffa was restored to Amaury and that the county of Ascalon was added to it—not in 1153 as is commonly believed. Finally, I submit that the extensive exchange of lands between the King and Philip of Nablus in 1161 was the ultimate settling of accounts from the time of the civil war, and that in making this exchange King Baldwin III was violating his agreement with his mother that he would leave her undisturbed in Nablus for the rest of her life. At that time, however, Queen Melisende was very close to answering her final summons.